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The 



Russians 



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Gates of Herat 



BY CHARLES MARVIN 



WITH MAPS AND PORTRAITS 



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1885 



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THE 



RUSSIANS 



GATES OF HERAT 




V3S NVtdSVO 



THE 



RUSSIANS 



AT THE 



GATES OF HERAT 



CHARLES MARVIN 

Author of '•'The Russian Advance Towards India" "Merv, the 
Queen of the World," "Reconnoitering Central Asia," etc. 



WITH MAPS AND PORTRAITS 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1885 

[All Rights Reserved] 



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'[AM, 



1 ESTATE OF 

William c. R*y: 

N^APiilL, 1940 



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PREFACE. 



In my " Russian Advance Towards India," published 
in 1882, I made these remarks : " In my writings on 
Russia I try to be impartial. I know I have a greater 
love for Russia, the country of my youth, and a better 
appreciation of the Russian people, than the so-called 
i Russophile ' traders in politics, who lauded her indis- 
criminately in 1877, from motives of self or party inter- 
est, and abandoned her afterwards to false attacks ; and 
the public know, from my writings, that I am a vigilant 
and anxious observer of the Russian advance towards 
India. I am thus, I suppose, both a Russophile and a 
Russophobe. As for my local opinions, my youth was 
passed in a country which has no political parties cor- 
responding with our Liberal and Conservative factions, 
and does not want them ; while my studies have led 
me to survey politics from the standpoint of one who 
considers himself more in the light of a citizen of the 
English Empire — of that great empire that embraces 
the live empires of England, of Canada, of Australia, 
of South Africa, and of India — than merely a Liberal 
or Conservative Englishman of Lesser England only. 



IV PREFACE. 

Being, in this sense, an Imperialist, and a non-party 
writer, I claim immunity from any charge of unduly 
favoring Liberal or Conservative policy in my remarks 
on the Central Asian Question. At the same time, I 
would have it with equal clearness understood, that the 
opinions expressed are not merely the heedless and 
ephemeral views of an irresponsible writer, but the deep 
conviction of one who is conscious that they may some 
day be called up against him, in other spheres than that 
of Journalism and Literature." 

These remarks cover all that I need say by way of a 
preface to the present volume, except that the entire 
work having been written and got out in eight days, I 
may ask indulgence for any errors that may have es- 
caped my eye in the volume. 

CHARLES MARVIN. 



Grosvenor House, 

Plumstead Common, Kent, 
March 23d, 1885. 



CONTE NTS 



CHAPTER I. 

HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 

The landing of the Russians at Krasnovodsk— Early Turcoman 
campaigns— Alikhanoff joins Lomakin's army as a private sol- 
dier—Acts as special correspondent of the Moscow Gazette— 
Skobeleff 's siege of Geok Tepe— Russia determines to secure a 
military survey of Merv— Alikhanoff proceeds to the oasis dis- 
guised as a trader— How he obtained plans of the fortress- 
Persuades Makdum Kuli, the principal Merv warrior, to attend 
the Czar's coronation at Moscow Page I 

CHAPTER II. 

THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 

Russia, angry at our continued occupation of Egypt, resolves to 
seize the gates of Herat — Secret concentration of troops at points 
commanding Merv — Colonel Muratoff goes to the Tejend oasis 
"to return," but remains — Sudden appearance of Lieutenant 
Alikhanoff at Merv — The intrigues resulting in the acceptance of 
the Suzerainty of Russia — Russia promises to place only one of- 
ficer in the oasis — Sudden advance of the Tejend force behind 
the Askabad deputation of chiefs — The Merv Tekkes hurriedly 
resist, but are defeated, and the Russians enter the fortress — 
Alikhanoff made governor of Merv Page 24 



vi CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER III. 

THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 

General Petrusevitch's secret survey of Afghanistan in 1878 — His 
suggestion that Russia, after occupying Merv, should insert a 
wedge between Herat and Meshed — Concentration of troops 
at Merv — General Komaroff seizes Old Sarakhs — Alikhanoff 's in- 
trigues with the Sarik Turcomans — His attempt on Penjdeh — 
Lumsden finds the Russians advancing up the Hari Rud, and 
posted at Pul-i-Khatun — Russia delays the despatch of Gen- 
eral Zelenoi in order to push further toward Herat — Occupation 
of the Zulfikar Pass, Ak Robat, and Pul-i-khisti Page 49 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 

Russia's claim to the gates of Herat— The original agreement be- 
tween England and Russia as to the Afghan frontier— The dis- 
puted territory— Discrepancies in English official maps— The 
frontier generally recognised by the two countries — Skobeleff's 
map of Merv and Herat, showing what Russia regarded as the 
frontier in 1881 — Lessar's mission to London — The Russian 
claims impartially considered Page 79 

CHAPTER V. 

HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 

Misconceptions respecting Herat — What Russian and English gen- 
erals really mean when they call it the Key of India — The mid- 
way camping-ground between the Caspian and India — Russia's 
intrusion on the camping-ground — Character of the country 
claimed or occupied by Russia — Impossibility of severing it from 
Herat — No mountain barrier whatever between Herat and the 
new Russian outposts — The tribes on the Russo-Afghan frontier 
— Russia's design on Afghan Turkestan Page 96 



CONTENTS. Vii 

CHAPTER VI. 

skobeleff's plan for THE INVASION OF INDIA. 

Skobeleff's great aim in life — The solution of the Eastern Question 
on the Indian frontier — His plan for invading India in 1876 — 
Adopted before the walls of Constantinople in 1878 — Kaufmann's 
advance toward India — Great changes in Central Asia since — 
Were Skobeleff alive, his plan would be totally different now — 
What it would probably be— Feasibility of the invasion of India 
from the point of view of various Russian generals Page 126 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT AND INDIA. 

The advance of the Russian locomotive — Immense changes it will 
occasion in Central Asia — Inevitable junction of the Indian and 
European railway systems via Candahar and Herat — Only 
£4,000,000 needed to complete the link — Charing Cross to India 
in nine days — Statistics of the line Page 149 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 

Impossibility of maintaining the Afghan barrier as it is — The Sepoy 
must confront the Cossack — The expansion of Russia — Will 
Russia let us garrison Herat ? — Skobeleff's Afghan programme 
— England must herself organize the Afghan frontier, and man 
it with troops Page 164 



LIST OF MAPS AND PORTRAITS. 



Map of the Russo-Afghan Region <. .Frontispiece. 

General Kouropatkin Face page 8 

Major Alikhanoff " 36 

General Alexander Komaroff " 56 

Major-General Sir Peter Stark Lumsden, 

K. C. B., C. S. L " 64 

Map showing the disputed Territories " 84 

General Sir F. S. Roberts, V. C, K. C. B " 142 

Lord Dufferin " 182 



The Russians at the Gates 
of Herat. 

CHAPTER I. 

HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 

The landing of the Russians at Krasnovodsk— Early Turcoman 
campaigns — Alikhanoff joins Lomakin's army as a private sol- 
dier — Acts as special correspondent of the Moscow Gazette — 
Skobeleff's siege of Geok Tepe — Russia determines to secure a 
military survey of Merv — Alikhanoff proceeds to the oasis dis- 
guised as a trader — How he obtained plans of the fortress — 
Persuades Makdum Kuli, the principal Merv warrior, to attend 
the Czar's coronation at Moscow. 

There are two Russian movements in the direction 
of India. One originated at Orenburg, and had for 
its objective Cabul. Commencing before the Crimean 
war it rapidly developed itself afterward, and engulfed 
in succession the Kirghez tribes and the khanates of 
Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva. Practically speaking, 
this movement ceased shortly before the last Turkish 
war, and has. not been continued since. The interest in 
Turkestan for the moment, therefore, being purely his- 
torical, we may exclude an account of the advance in 
the direction of Cabul from this volume. 



2 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

The second movement was from the Caspian, and had 
for its objective Herat. A deal of confusion and bad 
statesmanship has arisen from confounding this advance 
with that made from Orenburg and Tashkent. The 
troops have been always different, the officials different, 
and conditions regulating the advance different. We 
have only to specify one popular error to show how 
essential it is that the public should clearly realize the 
difference between the two movements. For instance, 
it is often said that colossal mountain ranges bar the 
Russian advance to the Indian frontier. This is quite 
true as regards troops marching from Tashkent and 
Samarcara upon Cabul and Peshawur. The lofty Hin- 
doo Koosh, that must be traversed to reach the Ameer's 
capital, ranges in height from 15,000 to 20,000 feet. 
But there is nothing of the kind between the Caspian 
and Herat, nor yet again between Herat and the Indo- 
Afghan frontier. Setting out from Krasnovodsk, a 
Russian could drive a four-in-hand all the way to the 
Indian frontier near Quetta. 

If this fact be clearly borne in mind, the reader will 
readily understand how rapid the Russian advance has 
been since Skobeleff broke down the Turcoman barrier, 
and how essential it is that the disadvantage of there 
being no physical obstacle to a powerful military move- 
ment from the Caspian should not be enhanced by 
allowing Russia to secure the great midway camping 
ground of Herat. 

In the time of Peter the Great, and again in the reign 
of Nicholas, Russia seized points on the East Caspian 
Coast, but the so-called Caspian advance toward India 
did not definitely commence until a descent was made 
upon Krasnovodsk in 1869. In the autumn of that 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 3 

year a flotilla left the Caucasus port of Petrovsk, and 
landed on the opposite side of the Caspian a few Cos- 
sacks and infantrymen, and half a dozen guns. Attached 
to this expedition were three men who subsequently 
figured prominently in Central Asian history. One was 
Stolietoff, the envoy Russia sent to Cabul in 1878, the 
second Grodekoff, who made a famous ride to Herat in 
the same year, and the third Captain Skobeleff, then a 
harum-scarum subaltern. 

" We made a great mistake when we landed at Krasno- 
vodsk," said the latter to me, shortly before his death. 
" Instead of going ahead we dawdled about, reconnoit- 
ring the country. A strong forward movement was not 
approved of by the Government. The result was, we 
gradually taught the Turcomans how to fight, and at 
last they fought so well that it needed a series of great 
campaigns to crush them." 

Our space is too limited to describe in detail those 
reconnoitrings and skirmishes which, during the period 
from 1869 to 1878, converted the Tekke Turcoman from 
an undisciplined horseman into a skilful builder of big 
redoubts. No headway whatever was made after 
Skobeleff left in 1873 to join the expedition to Khiva, 
and a long series of reverses culminated in a crushing 
defeat and rout of the Russians at Geok Tepe in the 
autumn of 1879. 

This was the campaign in which two notable per- 
sonages participated — Mr. Edmund O 'Donovan, and Pri- 
vate Alikhanoff. The former was attached to General 
Lazareff's force, and spent the whole of the summer in 
the Caspian. Unluckily he fell ill when the advance 
took place, and was thus debarred from seeing anything 
of the fighting. What we know of the campaign is 



4 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

mainly derived from the letters of a few Russians 
attached to the force. The best appeared in the col- 
umns of the Moscow Gazette, and were signed " Arsky." 
The writer was Alikhanoff, the present Governor of 
Merv.* 

This Alikhanoff is a very remarkable man. He was 
born at Baku, and by birth is a Daghestani. Russia's 
Asiatic subjects have a happy way of identifying them- 
selves with their masters, which our language renders 
impossible in the case of India— they turn their names 
into Russian ones, by placing an " off " (son) at the end 
of them. Alikhanoff is simply Ali Khan, with an " off " 
added to it. When Sir Peter Lumsden proceeded to the 
Afghan frontier, he took with him from London a very 
accomplished Indian official as interpreter, also, curiously 
enough, one "Ali Khan." But England had failed to 
effect such a transformation in her Ali Khan as Russia 
has with hers. I saw him depart from Charing Cross. 
He was highly educated and thoroughly devoted to 
England ; but he had never thought of identifying him- 
self with us by changing his name from Ali Khan into 
Mr. Alikhanson, or, better still, Mr. Alison. 

The case is totally different in Russia's Asiatic prov- 
inces. The people not only identify themselves with 
the Russians, but the Russians identify themselves with 
the people Englishmen would never think of, placing 
their home army under a Sikh or a Mahratta, or per- 
mitting a Bengali to become a Cabinet Minister. An 
Indian has practically no career in England ; on the 
other hand, every avenue in Russia is open to the Cau- 
casian. The Armenian, Louis Melikoff, rises there to a 

* See " The Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Turco- 
mans." London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1880. 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 5 

position next to that of the Czar. Generals Tergouka- 
soff and Lazareff, two other Asiatics, commanded Rus- 
sian troops in the Turkish war of 1877-78, and when 
Alikhanoff accomplished his famous raid upon Merv, 
the exploit is extolled as a Russian exploit, and not as 
the achievement of a mere native. 

Alikhanoff received a good education, and developed 
a remarkable talent for drawing. Skilful with pen and 
pencil, had he lived in England he would have doubtless 
become one of the foremost correspondents of the day. 
At an early age he entered the army, and after serving 
in the Khivan expedition as a captain of the cavalry 
under Skobeleff, received the appointment of aide-de- 
camp to the Grand Duke Michael, Viceroy of the Cau- 
casus. At the close of the Turkish war he suddenly fell 
into disgrace. A quarrel occurred between him and a 
superior officer, and he challenged him to fight a duel. 
The true particulars of this affair have never publicly 
transpired. Some say Alikhanoff was a boisterous officer, 
given to insulting people when in his cups, others that 
his superior officer was a scamp, hated by everybody in 
the regiment. Whichever story was current, Alikhanoff 
was tried by court-martial, deprived of all his appoint- 
ments and decorations, and reduced to the condition of 
a common soldier. 

" You need to measure soldiers by a different stand- 
ard from that which you apply to civilians," said 
Skobeleff to the writer in 1882. " I have had much ex- 
perience in warfare, and have found that the men who 
fight best are precisely those who are apt to be trouble- 
some in time of peace. A government should be 
always very indulgent to its troops in time of peace. 
Those who are most difficult to deal with in time of 



6 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

peace often prove to be the best fighters in time of 
war." 

Skobeleffs remarks referred to General Valentine 
Baker, whom he characterised as our " one good gen- 
eral." We were discussing the different modes of treat- 
ing officers in disgrace adopted by England and Russia. 
In England we dismiss an officer who has made a false 
step from the army, and however good a man he may 
be professionally, he is practically lost to the country. 
In Russia, on the other hand, he is simply reduced to 
the ranks, stripped of his titles, and sent to some frontier 
district in Asia to serve as a private soldier. Such a man 
naturally becomes a desperado, and forms capital ma- 
terial for leaders of the stamp of Alikhanoff. In many 
cases they retrieve their reputation, and it is the cus- 
tom, if they display extraordinary courage, or render any 
particular service, to restore them at a stroke to their 
former position. This was done in the case of Alikhan- 
off, when he successfully accomplished his swoop upon 
Merv. It is obvious that the presence of such inflamma- 
ble materials on the Russian frontier is even far more 
dangerous to peace than the predatory characteristics 
of the Afghan tribes Russian diplomats make so much 
fuss about. 

Alikhanoff fell into disgrace about the time General 
Lomakin returned to the Caspian from an unsuccessful 
attack upon the Tekke stongholds in Akhal. He at once 
elected to be sent to Tchikishlar to join the expedition 
General Lazareff was preparing to lead against the 
tribesmen. There he met O'Donovan, and one of the 
last letters that lamented correspondent wrote to me be- 
fore proceeding to the Soudan contained a request that 
I should give his hearty wishes to Alikhanoff if I met 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 7 

him during my journey in the Caspian. He said Ali- 
khanoff was a "capital fellow, a brave and capable 
soldier, and much liked in the camp." 

During this campaign Alikhanoff attained the highest 
rank as a non-commissioned officer. When Skobeleff 
arrived the following year to retrieve the broken fortunes 
of the Lazareff-Lomakin expedition, he was accorded 
every opportunity of distinguishing himself. However, 
attached to the force were so many heroes, as dashing 
as himself, that his exploits were lost among the crowd 
of great achievements. 

The history of Skobeleff 's siege of Geok Tepe yet re- 
mains to be written. . O 'Donovan saw nothing of it, ex- 
cept the final rout through a telescope from a hill on the 
Perso-Turcoman frontier. Hence he left it undescribed 
in his book on Merv. None the less, it was a campaign 
full of exciting incident, and a clear account of it would 
be very popular in this country. 

Retreating from their line of settlements, stretching 
along the Akhal frontier, from Kizil Arvat to Geok 
Tepe, the Tekkes collected to the number of 40,000 
families at the latter place, and forming a camp, with 
tents pitched closely one against the other, built round it 
a huge clay wall, reminding the Russians of an immense 
railway embankment. The defence was mainly con- 
trolled by two chiefs, Mahdum Kuli Khan and Tekme 
Sardar. The latter had submitted to Russia the year 
before, but being badly treated by Lomakin, had fled 
the camp and joined his countrymen afresh. There he 
instructed in the art of building rapidly large earth- 
works, after the manner he had observed practised by 
the Russians during their advance. 

The expedition the previous year had been despatched 



8 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

up the Atrek river, from its mouth at Tchikishlar. Sko- 
beleff changed the base to Krasnovodsk, or more prop- 
erly to Port-Mechaelovsk, a small harbor on the south- 
east side of Krasnovodsk, and considerably nearer 
Akhal. It is from this point that the railway now runs 
in the direction of India. 

At that time the Turcoman barrier was considered so 
difficult to break down that Russia was ready to resort 
to extraordinary efforts to hasten the submission of the 
tribes. During the debates on Candahar, Lord Salis- 
bury said that he had always believed that the Turco- 
man barrier would last his lifetime. Even in Russia, so 
severe was the resistance apprehended, that General Ter- 
goukasoff, Skobeleff 's predecessor, did not think that the 
barrier could be broken with less than three years' hard 
fighting. To quicken matters, Russia therefore selected 
Skobeleff for the task, and very wisely gave him .carte 
blanche as to the resources he was to employ to accom, 
plish it. 

Stowed away in the magazines at Bender, on the 
south-west frontier, were one hundred miles of railway, 
which Russia had purchased to use in the Balkan cam- 
paign in the event of a failure of the Berlin Congress. 
At Skobeleff's request, the material was shifted to the 
Caspian, and laid down in the direction of Geok Tepe\ 
In this casual manner originated the Russian railway to 
India, which has effected so many changes in Central 
Asia, and promises to completely revolutionize the re- 
lations of England and Russia with the region. 

The railway, however, proved of very little service in 
the actual campaign, and we must, therefore, reserve an 
account of it for a future chapter. While.it was being 
built Skobeleff pushed on a force to Bami, the first 




General Kouropatkin. 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 9 

stronghold of any size in the Akhal oasis, and there 
gradually accumulated the munitions of war and food 
supplies essential for the siege. When everything was 
ready he advanced to Geok Tep£, and, seizing a fortified 
point close to the walls, commenced attack upon the 
fortress. 

The Tekke stronghold was fully as difficult to take as 
the Russians had expected. Their artillery made no 
impression with the huge clay rampart ; they had to re- 
sort to every form of siege operations to reduce the 
fortress. The conflict lasted nearly a month, during 
which the Russians suffered heavy losses, and expert 
enced severe privations. Step by step, however, Sko- 
beleff pushed his way entil he got close enough to sink a 
mine, which was carried to the foot of the rampart. At 
the same time, his 69 guns fired daily from 100 to 500 
shots into the place, and the expenditure of ammunition 
by the infantry ranged from 10,000 to 70,000 rounds a 
day. 

The brunt of the attack fell upon General Kouropat- 
kin, commanding the Turkestan Contingent. As this 
officer is spoken of as likely to command the Russian 
arms, in the event of a conflict at the gates of Herat, it 
may be well to take advantage of the opportunity to say 
a few words about him. 

Among rising Russian generals, there is probably no 
one more admired by the army than Kouropatkin. He 
was Skobeleff's right hand man in most of his cam- 
paigns. He served with him in the Khivan expedition, 
and in the Khokandese campaign. He acted as chief of 
his staff at Plevna, and during the march upon Constan- 
tinople, and he exercised immediate control, under Sko- 
beleff, of the forces before Geok Tepe\ 



10 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

When Skobeleff was appointed to the charge of the 
army against the Turcomans, one of his first acts was to 
telegraph to Kouropatkin, then in the Kuldja frontier, 
to join him with a contingent of Turkestan troops. 
His march across Central Asia excited universal admira- 
tion at the time. After being weeks on the road, pro- 
ceeding from Tashkent to Khiva, Kouropatkin had to 
accomplish a difficult march across the desert, by a route 
almost unknown, to the concentrating point of Bami. 
General Annenkoff was at Bami at the time and went 
out to meet him. " Kouropatkin," he said to me, in 
dilating enthusiastically on this achievement — " Kouro- 
patkin had been twenty-six days marching over a sandy 
and waterless desert ; yet his force marched in clean 
and trim, and as fresh as a daisy." 

When, at the invitation of Skobeleff's friends, I ac- 
companied the funeral party, conveying the body of that 
great hero from Moscow to its last resting-place at Spass- 
koe Selo, in South Russia, in 1882, I was thrown for 
several days among Skobeleff's favorite officers ; and 
more than once I heard a controversy among them as to 
whether Kouropatkin was not almost as good a leader 
as their lost general. " Kouropatkin," said a Turkestan 
officer to me during one of these discussions, " possesses 
all the characteristics of Skobeleff, cast in a cooler 
mould. They worked admirably together, Kouropatkin 
imparting coolness and calculation to Skobeleff, and 
Skobeleff fire and enthusiasm to Kouropatkin. I am 
quite desolate now that Skobeleff is gone " — here his 
eyes filled with tears — " but it is a consolation to all of 
us that we have still got Kouropatkin. He is now the 
Skobeleff of Russia." 

During the first few days succeeding Skobeleff's death 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. II 

a strong and angry feeling prevailed in Russia against 
the Government. It was felt that the deceased hero's 
merits had never been properly appreciated by the 
State, and I encountered various officers at Moscow who 
were persuaded he had been poisoned. To appease the 
army the Emperor felt he could not do better than sum- 
mon Kouropatkin from Central Asia and give him a 
high appointment at home. Since then he has been 
treated as a favorite at Court, and, if he has secured no 
notoriety abroad, it is simply because he has always de- 
voted himself to his profession and left politics alone. 
Skobeleff had in him all the elements of a great states- 
man as well as of a great general. His political influ- 
ence was becoming positively embarrassing to the Czar's 
ministers when he died. Kouropatkin has never sought 
to form a party in Russia — he is quite content to be a 
great general, and nothing more. 

During the siege of Geok Tepe he had charge of the 
advanced positions and displayed extraordinary coolness 
and courage. Unobtrusive almost to a fault, he care- 
fully supervised the mechanical parts of the siege opera- 
tions, while Skobeleff applied himself to keeping the 
troops in that rollicking, reckless mood he considered so 
valuable in the presence of the enemy. Seated at the 
mouth of the mine, Skobeleff used to time the progress 
of the sappers underground tunneling in the direction 
of the fortress. If the officer in charge accomplished 
the specified portion in less than the time fixed, he was 
kissed and caressed, and perhaps treated to champagne 
or vodky ; if- the reverse was the case, he was roundly 
abused before all the soldiers. 

Throughout the greater part of the siege Alikhanoff, 
who was now a cornet of the Pereslaff Dragoons, was 



12 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

employed in foraging operations, or reconnoitring that 
portion of the fortress facing the desert, which was un- 
invested by the Russians. 

At length the day of the assault arrived. More than 
a ton of gunpowder was laid at the head of the mine, 
immediately under the rampart, and, on being fired, laid 
bare a broad entrance into the enemy's defences. 
Through this, and another breach made by the artillery, 
the Russians rushed into the place, and perpetrated all 
the horrors usual when orders are given to infuriated 
and semi-barbarous troops to give no quarter to either 
sex. 

Even when the Turcomans, no longer offering resist- 
ance, streamed out in a disorderly mob across the desert 
in the direction of Merv, men, women, and children min- 
gled together, no mercy was shown to them. Artillery 
followed in their rear, and mowed them down, until 
darkness put an end to the pursuit. During that short 
few hours' chase the 1,000 pursuing Russians slaugh- 
tered 8,000 of the fugitives. Hundreds of women were 
saved. 6,500 bodies were also afterward found under 
the fortress. At Kertch the year before last I met an 
Armenian Jew, Samuel Gourovitch, who had accompa- 
nied as interpreter a secret Russian mission to Cabul in 
1882, and was present at the sack of Geok Tepe. He 
told me that the carnage was fearful. 

" One thousand Russians cut down 8,000 Turcomans 
in a few hours. The whole country was covered with 
corpses. The morning after the battle they lay in rows, 
like freshly mown hay, as they had been swept down by 
the mitrailleurs and artillery. I myself saw babies bayo- 
neted or slashed to pieces. Many women were ravished 
before being killed." 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 1 3 

" But Skobeleff told me that not a woman had been 
dishonored." 

" Lots were," he replied, energetically. " They were 
ravished by the soldiers before my eyes. Skobeleff may 
not have known it. I could tell you many horrible 
things that took place ; but (tapping his lips signifi- 
cantly) it is better to be silent in this world. The plun- 
der at Geok Tepe was immense. The troops were 
allowed to get drunk, plunder, and kill for three days 
after the assault." 

During the assault, and in the subsequent pursuit, the 
infantry engaged fired 273,804 rounds, the cavalry 
12,510, and the artillery 5,864 rounds; 224 military 
rockets were also expended. The total loss of the Tur- 
comans during the siege was estimated by Skobeleff at 
20,000. In other words half the defenders perished. 

The two leaders, Tekme Sardar and Makdum Kuli, 
escaped, and fled to Merv. Pushing on their rear, 
Skobeleff occupied Askabad, the capital of the Akhal 
Tekkes, twenty-seven miles east of Geok Tepe, and 
despatched Kouropatkin thence almost half-way to the 
Merv oasis. It was these reconnoitrings of Kouropat- 
kin that occasioned so much excitement at the time. 
The belief was general that Skobeleff would occupy 
Merv. 

It is almost unnecessary to state that he did not ; but 
it is well to disperse any doubts that may exist as to the 
reason he did not push on any further. It is generally 
supposed that a disinclination to displease England, and 
a desire to keep his promises, caused the Emperor to 
restrain the ardor of Skobeleff. This is a mistake. By 
the terrific blow he struck the Akhal Tekkes at Geok 
Tepe, Skobeleff shattered to pieces the Turcoman bar- 



14 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

rier Lord Salisbury had fondly believed would last his 
lifetime ; but he was too mauled to reap the full advan- 
tage of it for the moment. He only had a striking force 
of 2,000 men after he occupied Askabad, and having 
used up nearly all his ammunition during the siege, he 
was not in a condition to push on to an unknown oasis, 
and expose himself to a repetition of the hard knocks he 
had received at Geok Tepe. 

So he returned home ; but before he left Akhal an in- 
cident occurred which shows what a deep personal 
interest he took in the Central Asian Question. In 
spite of Russia's avowed intention of keeping the coun- 
try she had won, and notwithstanding that the Turco- 
man barrier had been shattered, the English Govern- 
ment decided to evacuate Afghanistan. The ablest 
English writers on the Russo-Indian Question were 
averse to surrendering Candahar, but the Government 
persisted in its policy, and it received the warmest con- 
currence of the Marquis of Ripon. 

Speaking at Leeds, on January 28, 1885, the Ex- Vice- 
roy said : " We withdrew at a time which suited our 
purpose, and which we believed to be to the advantage 
of the Afghan people ; and as our troops marched away 
with steady steps from Candahar, no voice was lifted 
against us, and no dog barked at our heels." 

Yet, as a matter of fact, a voice was lifted against us, 
and poisoned the motives of our departure. That voice 
was Skobeleff's. In an official account of Skobeleffs 
campaign, General Grodekoff, the chief of his staff at 
Geok Tepe, has just published, the following passage 
occurs : " To raise Russia's prestige in Central Asia and 
to depress that of England, General Skobeleff sent na- 
tive agents into the bazaars of Central Asia to spread 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 1 5 

throughout the region the report that it was the White 
Czar who had compelled England to evacuate Afghan- 
istan." 

Such a revelation cannot be very pleasing to those 
who held at the time that we were conciliating Russia 
by evacuating Candahar. As a matter of fact, our re- 
tirement encouraged the Russians to advance. They 
thought we had had enough of Afghanistan and would 
never enter the country any more. In an official Rus- 
sian account of the war which I have in my possession, 
and which is to be found in every military library in Rus- 
sia, the writer, General Skobeleff, asserts that we retired 
because we were so repeatedly defeated by the Afghans ; 
that the people of India were excited to a mutinous 
condition by our disasters. If our army had not fall- 
en back in time the whole of India would have risen 
against us ! 

It is the publication of such words as Skobeleff's 
" Anglo- Afghan Conflict " and Skobeleff's plans for in- 
vading India that has stimulated so strongly the de- 
sire of Russian military men to upset our Eastern 
India. 

Just before the evacuation of Candahar took place, a 
clever caricature was published in Russia entitled " Eng- 
land and Russia in Central Asia." This represented 
two feet : one, English shod, stepping off a piece of 
ground marked "Afghanistan," and another, encased in 
a big Russian boot, advancing closely upon it, with the 
evident intention of administering a kick to the retiring 
party. I had several thousand copies of this caricature 
struck off, and distributed them to Parliament and Press 
during the Candahar debate ; but I did not imagine at 
the time — nor yet, I suppose, did anybody — that the 



1 6 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Russian artist had so correctly represented in a sketch 
meant to be humorous what Skobeleff had actually- 
done. 

The brilliant and dashing general having administered 
a parting kick at us, returned home, and Russia pro- 
ceeded to organize her new possession. In the mean 
while O'Donovan made his famous. dash to Merv, and 
during his five months' stay wrote those wonderful let- 
ters which will never perish so long as any record exists 
of British travel. 

But Mr. O'Donovan did more than simply pen letters 
to the Daily News. He endeavored to persuade the 
Turcomans to cease their attacks upon the Russians and 
avoid giving them any offence. These efforts were to a 
large extent successful, and from the time he left the 
oasis until the Russians occupied it the only outrage the 
Merv Tekkes perpetrated was the attack on the Parfe- 
noff surveying party in 1882. This outrage, however, 
was due to some bad characters, and was so quickly and 
promptly disavowed by the tribe that the Russians ex- 
pressed themselves perfectly satisfied with the repara- 
tion made by the Mervis. 

After O'Donovan had left the oasis, the Russian au- 
thorities decided they would thoroughly establish their 
influence there. Tekme Sardar, one of the two Tekke 
chiefs defending Geok Tepe, had already surrendered 
to them, and had been sent to St. Petersburg to be 
tamed by a sight of Russia. The second, Makdum 
Kuli, O'Donovan's friend, they tried to win over through 
their secret agents, but failed. 

One of these secret agents was Fazil Beg, a Russian- 
ized Khivan. He used to go backward and forward 
between Merv and Askabad and encouraged all the 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 1 7 

Tekkes he could to visit the latter place to traffic at the 
bazaar the Russians had erected. 

The Russians are well aware of the value of a bazaar 
as a means of exercising influence in the East. Directly 
they finished their fort at Askabad, they erected a 
bazaar there, and encouraged Armenians from Baku and 
Tiflis to establish shops in it. Before long the Tekkes 
of Merv, attracted by the high prices the Russians gave 
for their supplies, began to appear at Askabad, first, 
singly, and somewhat shy, afterward in bands, when 
they found they were well treated. 

In course of time the richer and more influential of the 
Mervis followed suit. As all arrivals at the bazaar were 
notified to the Russian authorities at once, they extended 
a warm hand to every Tekke who possessed any influ- 
ence whatever at home, and in this manner created a 
pro-Russian party at Merv. 

Herat is about as close to Merv as Merv is to 
Askabad. It is well to bear in mind that the moment 
the Russians occupied Merv they established a bazaar 
there with Armenian traders from Baku, and commenced 
applying to the tribesmen of the Murghab those tactics 
so successful at the capital of the Akhal Tekkes. But 
for the opportune arrival of Sir Peter Lumsden last 
autumn there might have already been a pro-Russian 
party at Herat. 

As soon as events had sufficiently matured, the 
authorities at Askabad decided to send an officer to 
Merv to obtain secretly a military survey of the oasis. 
Alikhanoff was the person chosen. To facilitate his 
operations a caravan was fitted out, commanded by an 
Armenian trader named Kosikh, representing in Central 
Asia the Moscow firm of Konshin and Co. Kosikh was 



1 8 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

already known at Merv to many Tekkes who had trans- 
acted business with him in the Askabad bazaar. 

Alikhanoff played the part of clerk to Kosikh the 
trader, and also acted as interpreter. It was a great ad- 
vantage to him in his expedition that he spoke the lan- 
guage of the Turcomans quite fluently. To assist him 
in his survey a cornet of the Cossacks, Sokoloff, was ap- 
pointed, and was also disguised as a caravan clerk. 

To prevent any possibility of a failure of the enter- 
prise, the Russians decided that they would not ask the 
permission of the Merv Tekkes to visit them, but would 
pounce upon them unawares. Alikhanoff, England 
knows to her cost, is an expert in effecting surprises, and 
his audacity was never better displayed than in his 
caravan journey to Merv. 

Quitting Askabad early in February, 1882, the caravan, 
consisting of a few camels escorted by half a dozen well- 
armed Turcoman horsemen, set out for Merv via Kahka 
and the Tejend oasis. The distance by this route is 
about 230 miles, and is divided into six marches. The 
distance from Merv to Herat is 240 miles. 

Fazil Beg, the spy, went on to Merv beforehand to 
secure some guides for the expedition, and arrange with 
the pro-Russian party for the protection of the traders 
as far as he could. During the journey Alikhanoff made 
a thorough survey of the country, exploring parts un- 
visited by Mr. O'Donovan, and, entering Merv at night, 
encamped in the midst of the Tekkes, without anybody 
being aware of it except the chiefs in Russian pay. 

The next morning, of course, there was a great hubbub 
at Merv. The people were not quite so staggered as 
when Mr. O'Donovan put in his sudden appearance 
among them, for many had become acquainted with the 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 19 

Russians in the interval ; but they were more angry, 
and had not Alikhanoff possessed influential supporters 
among the chiefs, things would have fared badly with the 
caravan. At the least, they would have been expelled 
at once from the oasis. 

As usual, a meeting of the khans and elders was con- 
vened the moment the presence of the Russians became 
known, and the latter were summoned to appear before 
it. The meeting took place in a large kelrtka or tent, to 
reach which the Russians had to pass through an " im- 
mense " crowd of sightseers. " Entering the kelrtka," 
says Alikhanoff, " Kosikh, extending to every one his 
hands, which were shaken very unwillingly, sat down, as 
befits a rich Russian merchant, side by side with Mah- 
dutn Kuli. I, as interpreter, sat on a felt at the entrance. 
The silence continued. Waiting some time for some 
one to speak, I decided to break it myself. I therefore 
commenced with something like the following ha- 
rangue : — 

" ' From the letters you have received, you doubtless 
know the aim of our journey. My master, Severin Beg, 
is a rich Russian merchant. He enjoys the greatest re- 
spect of our authorities, and hence they instructed him 
to give their salaam to the people of Merv. Deciding 
to establish commercial intercourse with you, Severin 
Beg has come here to find out, on the spot, whether he 
can buy and sell in your markets. The Russian Gov- 
ernment fully sympathizes with this action, since it antic- 
ipates from it mutual advantages, so desirable for the 
friendly and peaceful relations of neighbors. Thus, the 
sole object of our journey here is trade, and we should 
like to know what your views are upon the point, and 
how you mean to regard it.' 



20 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Another prolonged silence, broken at last by an old 
man, who said, — 

" ' Commerce is a good thing, but we fear to draw up- 
on us the responsibility which will arise if any attack is 
made upon you by those bad men who exist among us, as 
everywhere. Go back to Askabad to negotiate with our 
delegates. Fix our relations, and when both people are 
united, trade as much as you like,' etc., of an equally 
evasive character. 

" ' I tell you we are traders,' I rejoined ; ' it is not our 
affair to join or disunite peoples. For that, apply to 
the Russian Government, send it your envoys if you like. 
As regards us, there is nothing undetermined in our re- 
lations. The Russians are at peace with you. The 
Askabad bazaar is filled with traders from Merv. We 
did not see, therefore, any reason why we should not 
come here, and hence resolved to come. Give us a 
decided answer. Will you let us unpack and commence 
trade, or do you demand our return ? But mind, I 
warn you beforehand that your action will be viewed 
in its proper light by General Rohrberg, if you close to 
Russians alone that route which is freely made use of 
by the rest of our neighbors, Bokharans, Khivans, Per- 
sians, and Afghans. Just think what your relations 
will be with a powerful neighbor if the authorities at 
Askabad reply to your conduct by refusing to allow a 
single Mervi to put his foot on Russian soil ? Who will 
be the loser then ? ' 

Again a profound silence, broken at last by a discus- 
sion of the chiefs as to whether delegates should be sent 
to Askabad or not. 

" ' We don't value the trade of Merv so much as all 
that,' I said at last, 'we are not disposed to waste our 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 21 

time running backward and forward. If we go back 
this time without selling our goods, you won't see our 
faces any more. I should like to ask you to tell me 
whether you assemble and debate every time a caravan 
arrives, or only do this to the Russians ? ' 

" ' No, we would not assemble thus,' replied an elder. 
1 If anybody were to fall upon the caravan of any other 
country, if they were to rob it before my eyes, I could 
not even wink my eyes. We are not afraid of them ; 
but we don't want anything to happen to you, the mer- 
chants of the great Padishah. ' 

" < The people are ready to obey us,' added Kara Kuli 
Khan ; i we have no doubts on that score. But there are 
not a few kaltamans in the oasis — robbers from whom 
we ourselves are not safe. They might fall on your 
packs and on you yourselves.' 

" ' If we do not meet with any hostility on the part of 
the people,' I replied, 'we will answer for the rest. Our 
arms and our escort will keep the robbers in order.' 

"Again a profound silence. Makdum Kuli exchanged 
significant glances with his neighbors. 

" ' I have said all I have to say,' I continued ; ' we 
will now await your answer. If it be the same as before, 
we shall prepare for the journey back to Askabad.' 

" I felt sure that the previous answer would not be 
repeated. 

" After another discussion Makdum Kuli said : ' Tell 
the trader, that we are only influenced by fears for his 
safety, otherwise, we have nothing against him, and he 
may stop here forever if he likes.' 

" ' God forbid ! ' I replied. ' It will be quite enough 
to stop here two or three market days to see what your 
trade is.' 



22 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

"'In that case, here is our answer,' said Makdum 
Kuli. 'Let him remain here two or three market 
days, and afterwards return to Askabad with the dele- 
gates.' " 

This was agreed upon, and the assembly broke up. 
Alikhanoff s account of the discussion throws a broad 
light upon his adroitness in managing Asiatics. He 
thoroughly understands their ways. 

The Russians stayed a fortnight at Merv, during 
which Alikhanoff made as many friends as he could, and 
intrigued against those who were disposed to interfere 
with the accomplishment of his great aim. Disguised 
afresh as a Tekke, he availed himself of every opportu- 
nity to explore the oasis, and by stealing out at early 
dawn secured unobserved a survey of the fortress of 
Merv. 

He himself was quite at home among the Tekkes, but 
Kosikh grew nervous after hearing that some of the 
people had been plotting against his life, and hastened 
the departure of the caravan. Alikhanoff took advan- 
tage of the return journey to survey another route 
between Askabad and Merv. 

Shortly afterward, another Russian officer, a Mussul- 
man, named Naserbegoff, who had accompanied Stolie- 
toff to Cabul as topographer, was sent to Merv in dis- 
guise, and pushed on thence to the Oxus. By this time 
the Tekkes had lost so much of their hostility to the 
Russians, that it was felt that an agent might be sent 
there openly. Lessar was selected for this mission, and 
passed through Merv to Khiva without exciting any ani- 
mosity. In this manner Russia secured within a twelve- 
month a survey of all the roads converging from the 
Turkestan and Transcaspian oasis upon Merv, and dis- 



HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MERV. 23 

pelled the disinclination of the people to receive Rus- 
sian visitors. 

Another success followed upon this. Alikhanoff, who 
had maintained close relations with Makdum Kuli, per- 
suaded that chief to throw in his lot with Russia, and 
proceed to Moscow to witness the Czar's coronation. 
His submission was considered a great gain for Russia. 
He had been the soul of the defence of Geok Tepe, and 
the authorities at Askabad had always feared that he 
might repeat that terrible resistance at Merv. His de- 
parture from the oasis left the people without a leader, 
and henceforward the Russians felt that they could 
afford to play a bolder game. 

I saw Makdum Kuli several times at the Czar's coro- 
nation. He lodged with other Asiatics at a hotel opposite 
the rooms assigned to me by the Russian Government. 
The splendor of the Kremlin festivities thoroughly 
tamed him, and when he returned with the rest of the 
Turcomans to Askabad he was as little disposed to fight 
Russia any more as Cetewayo after his trip to London. 

Knowing how great his personal influence at Merv 
had been, Alikhanoff induced him to pay a visit there 
on his return, to describe to his fellow-countrymen 
what the glories of Russia were like. His descrip- 
tions of the sight he had seen at Moscow exercised 
a most depressing effect upon the anti-Russian party, 
while at the same time the handsome Russian uniform 
he wore, and the account he gave of the favors con- 
ferred upon him by the Emperor, provoked a desire 
among other chiefs to make the acquaintance of such 
generous masters. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 

Russia, angry at our continued occupation of Egypt, resolves to 
seize the gates of Herat — Secret concentration of troops at points 
commanding Merv — Colonel Muratoff goes to the Tejend oasis 
"to return," but remains — Sudden appearance of Lieutenant 
Alikhanoff at Merv — The intrigues resulting in the acceptance of 
the Suzerainty of Russia — Russia promises to place only one of- 
ficer in the oasis — Sudden advance of the Tejend force behind 
the Askabad deputation of chiefs — The Merv Tekkes hurriedly 
resist, but are defeated, and the Russians enter the fortress — 
Alikhanoff made governor of Merv. 

Just then the Egyptian question was exciting a good 
deal of attention. Our active interference in Soudan 
affairs had not yet begun, and during the lull preced- 
ing it a general European discussion was prevailing as 
to whether England should or should not evacuate 
Egypt. Russia had never concealed her opposition to 
our being there at all, and she therefore threw herself 
vigorously into the controversy. 

To understand her feelings properly we must en- 
deavor to examine things a little from her stand-point. 
Russia makes no secret that she is determined some day 
to have Constantinople. Her longing for the Bospho- 
rus is as great now as it ever was in her career. The 
most resolute opponent to her arms is England. Aus- 
tria and Germany she believes may be " squared "; but 
up to now it has been impossible to buy off England. 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 2$ 

Still, Russia has always nourished a hope that when 
matters reached a decisive stage, our acquiescence 
might be purchased by allowing or assisting us to annex 
Egypt. Cairo was the price to be paid for Constan- 
tinople. 

I have no space to go fully into the details of this 
policy ; but I have said enough to indicate that Rus- 
sian statesmen could not be pleased at our occupying 
Egypt and offering them no compensation. We ap- 
propriated the power of Egypt ; we assumed control of 
the Suez Canal ; and still we as fiercely as ever refused 
to allow Russia to advance upon Constantinople. 

I shall be told that Russia had no right to be angry 
at our occupation of Egypt, since we had no intention 
of annexing the country. In reply, I must ask that 
matters be again looked at from the Russian stand-point. 
Russian policy is dictated by the impressions and the 
feelings of Russian statesmen, not by the impressions of 
Englishmen. The general impression in Russia at the 
time was that England had virtually annexed Egypt, and 
that the fluctuations and contortions of Mr. Gladstone's 
policy masked a cut and dried plan for permanently 
retaining the country. 

Anybody who has lived in the military states of Eu- 
rope can easily understand how such an impression 
should have arisen. The statesmen of Russia, Germany, 
Austria and France usually formulate a policy long in 
advance of current events, and resolutely apply them- 
selves to deliberately working it out. English states- 
men, on the-other hand, mostly live from hand to mouth. 
The occupation of Egypt was the result of no deep 
" design," using the term in the continental sense. Eng- 
land floundered into the Egyptian embroglio, and yet 



26 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

the errors of her statesmen did more to root her influ- 
ence and authority in the country than the cleverest 
scheming could have done. Now, men who make events 
are apt to think that others make them also. Russia, 
at first disposed to treat Mr. Gladstone's disinterested 
policy as generously as that statesman's Liberal support- 
ers, observed after a while that England benefited so 
largely by his blunders that she began to ascribe them 
to a deep and clever plan. 

When England first sent troops to Egypt there were 
three great obstacles to a prolonged or permanent oc- 
cupation of the country. In the first place, the English 
public generally were averse to it ; in the second, the 
Egyptian people, it was thought, would never tolerate 
a foreign ruler ; in the third, most politicians held that 
all the Great Powers would oppose it. 

The first two obstacles had practically disappeared 
by the autumn of 1883. After the collapse of Arabi 
Pacha's army the whole of Egypt proper submitted with- 
out a struggle to English authority. Excluding the 
Soudan, the country proved amazingly easy to rule. 
The people, in short, appeared to be so utterly unable 
to do without their new masters that England began 
to look upon herself as marked out by Providence to 
control the country. 

Of course she only meant to control it for a time, but 
to Russia, who had opposed any occupation at all, it 
was as obnoxious that she should remain in Egypt three, 
five, or fifteen years, as forever. What England con- 
sidered a troublesome burden, Russia regarded as a 
splendid acquisition — a grand dependency possessing all 
the elements of a second India. Our continued occu- 
pation, therefore, displeased her. Finding we were in- 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 27 

disposed to evacuate the country at once, she decided 
she would establish a counterpoise in the East. She re- 
solved to reopen the Central Asia Question. 

The Emperor was perfectly aware that Merv was no 
counterbalance to Cairo, or Sarakhs to Alexandria ; but 
what he had in view was the creation of a new base that 
would enable him to reopen in turn the Eastern Ques- 
tion on advantageous terms. Merv, if a " mere collec- 
tion of mud huts," as the Duke of Argyll expressed it, 
was the stepping-stone to Herat, and at Herat he would 
be able to put the screw on England if her policy in 
Egypt continued to displease him. 

I have been at pains to describe the influence the 
Egyptian Question had on the occupation of Merv, be- 
cause, if it be clearly appreciated, the subsequent move- 
ment to the gates of Herat will be found to contain a 
larger amount of menace than is commonly imagined. 
The swoop upon Merv was no hap-hazard event. No 
local reason whatever provoked it. Russia was not 
forced to occupy Merv by any circumstance on the spot 
compelling her, against her wish, to violate her numer- 
ous assurances to this country. I believe that I am 
acquainted with everything that has been published in 
Russia — official or non-official — bearing upon the occu- 
pation of Merv. This published literature does not con- 
tain a single charge against the people of Merv, in 
excuse for the annexation. 

Therefore, all that has been written in England by 
writers ignorant of the course of events in Russia, ex- 
tenuating the annexation on the grounds of the difficulty 
of keeping the Merv Tekkes in order except by annexa- 
tion, is theoretical nonsense. The Merv Tekkes were 
in excellent order at the time, so far as Russia was con- 



28 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

cerned. They had committed no outrages on Russia, 
and were committing none. It was as safe for Russian 
caravans to journey from Askabad to Khiva, across a 
desert which, anterior to the previous campaign, had 
been a prey to disorder, as to journey from Tashkent to 
Samarcand, or Tiflis to Baku. The Merv Tekkes scru- 
pulously avoided attacking Russian subjects, and it was 
a matter of common notoriety that these man-stealers 
of the Asiatic steppes, finding their occupation as such 
gone, were becoming quiet, hard-working, industrious 
peasants. 

It is true that there were small forays now and again 
against the Persians of the Atak oasis, a district stretch- 
ing from the Russian frontier to Sarakhs ; but they 
were a mere bagatelle compared with the great plunder- 
ing expeditions the Tekkes twenty years previous had led 
in different directions, and Russia herself was indirectly 
responsible for them. 

The Atak oasis was an integral part of Persia. The 
Shah's right to it was never questioned until Russia oc- 
cupied Askabad. The Alieli and other Turcomans paid 
tribute regularly to the Shah's representatives, and ap- 
pealed to them for help when they quarrelled with the 
Tekkes of Merv. If that help was not always forth- 
coming, it did not demonstrate that the Atak was not 
part of Persia, for the people of the oasis were as much 
given to forays as the Tekkes, and, as often as not, were 
themselves the offenders. 

To put an end to this condition of things, Persia pre- 
pared, after the occupation of Askabad, to exercise more 
stringent authority over the people of the Atak. The 
Shah felt that, if he only kept them in ordor, and pre- 
vented them perpetrating small raids upon Merv, the 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 29 

people of Merv in turn, having no provocation for their 
forays, would suspend their outrages. The Persian 
authorities admitted that their Atak subjects provoked 
the raids, and one has only to refer to O'Donovan's 
book to see how exasperating they could be toward 
their Merv neighbors across the desert. 

But I wish it to be clearly understood that, after all, 
these raids were very rare subsequent to the occupation 
of Askabad — say half-a-dozen times in the course of a 
season, and that only a few individuals participated in 
them. The Persian border from Askabad to Sarakhs 
was incomparably quieter than it had been in O'Dono- 
van's time, and had the Shah's troops occupied two or 
three points in the oasis, the last vestiges of border 
turbulence would have disappeared. Russia allowed the 
troops to almost reach the district, and then delivered a 
sort of ultimatum, forbidding them to enter it. 

The English Government protested strongly against 
this. It demonstrated clearly enough the Shah's claim 
to the territory. It showed how great would be the 
benefit to the people of Atak and Merv if the frontier 
were properly administered. Russia refused to listen to 
any arguments. She would not occupy the district her- 
self, and she would not allow Persia to do it. She kept 
open this tiny sore on the Persian frontier in order that 
if ever she wanted a pretext for occupying Merv one 
would be immediately forthcoming.* 

Of course this was not the sole reason ; there was an- 
other and greater one. The easy road from Askabad to 
Herat, via Old Sarakhs, runs through this Atak oasis. 
Had Russia let Persia assume definite control over it, 

* The negotiations on the question of the Atak oasis will be 
found in Blue Book, Central Asia, No. 1, 1884. 



30 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

the advance upon India would have been blocked. Rus- 
sia could have only advanced with the permission of the 
Shah or by violating his territory. This circumstance 
gave an importance to the Atak oasis out of all propor- 
tion to its intrinsic worth. It was, from the Russian 
stand-point, absolutely essential to Russia. 

From what I have said, which, in common with the 
greater part of this book, is based on Russian informa- 
tion, it will be seen that there was no tribal turbulence 
on the Russian frontier at the time the swoop was made 
upon Merv; and that, as regards the Persian border, 
the old raids had dwindled down to petty pilferings, 
which could have been suppressed at any moment if the 
Emperor had allowed the Shah to keep his subjects 
under better conrtol. 

So insignificant were these pilferings, that Russia has 
never attempted to cite them as an excuse for the occu- 
pation of Merv. It is only a few English writers who 
have put forward the plea, and they have done so be- 
cause they were ignorant of the true state of affairs on 
the Russo-Turcoman frontier in the autumn of 1883. 

To me it has always appeared ridiculous, as well as 
unpatriotic, for Englishmen to invent pleas for Russia's 
aggressiveness based on mere theory, which Russia her- 
self does not take the trouble, or is unable to put for- 
ward, in extenuation of her advances toward India. 
Tribal turbulence provoked the conquest of Geok Tepe, 
and Russia's contention on this score I have always de- 
fended. But tribal turbulence did not provoke the oc- 
cupation of Merv, and those who fancy it did should 
just remember that Russia herself has never sought 
justification on these grounds. 

Nor is the plea that Alikhanoff and Komaroff acted on 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 3 1 

their own responsibility any sounder. Russia herself has 
never advanced this excuse. It is only English writers who 
have done so, and done so without the slightest basis for 
their erroneous assertion. I can prove this at a stroke. 

In the spring of 1883 the garrison of Khiva, located 
at Fort Petro-Alexandrovsk, consisted of the 4th Regi- 
ment of Orenburg Cossacks, the 5 th and 13th Turkestan 
line battalions, and the 6th battery of artillery. This 
was the strength of the garrison according to the offi- 
cial report published in Russia early in the year, and it 
tallied, I have good grounds for believing, with the list 
in the possession of the military authorities at Simla, 
derived from non-Russian sources. In the autumn 
of 1883 the garrison was increased by the arrival of the 
17th Turkestan line battalion from Samarcand. 

I only knew of this last year, after the occupation of 
Merv was an accomplished fact. Every day I received 
from Russia the principal newspapers, including those of 
the Caucasus and Turkestan ; and one morning, glancing 
through the Moscow Gazette, I saw that among the suf- 
ferers from a flood at Fort Petro-Alexandrovsk were the 
men of the 17th line battalion. Now this battalion be- 
longed to the garrison of Samarcand, distant at least a 
month from Khiva, by the quickest possible means of 
conveyance — how, therefore, had it come to be shifted 
to the latter place, and for what reason ? 

This was explained in an equally casual manner a 
short time afterward. Writing from Fort Petro-Alex- 
androvsk to the same paper, a correspondent, signing 
himself Gospodin Tchursin, mentioned, among Other 
things, the suicide of Lieutenant Bodisco, of this same 
17th battalion, " who had been in a state of deep melan- 
choly from the time, six months previous, when the bat- 



32 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

talion had been sent from Samarcand to Khiva to be 
despatched to Merv, and who had preferred blowing 
out his brains to accompanying it any further." 

This 17th battalion, therefore, was sent to Khiva from 
Samarcand, in the autumn of 1883, to take part in the 
occupation of Merv. As soon as Alikhanoff induced 
the Merv Tekkes to submit, it marched from Khiva to 
Merv, via Tchardjui, on the Oxus, and now forms part 
of the regular garrison of the place. Bodisco, who was 
homesick, refused to accompany it any further, and 
committed suicide. The demonstration is clear, conse- 
quently, that Alikhanoff 's swoop upon Merv was not a 
filibustering exploit, carried out by him and other fron- 
tier officials on their own personal responsibility. Ali- 
khanoff and Komaroff were under the control of the Gov- 
ernor-General of the Caucasus, Prince Dondukoff-Korsa- 
koff. The 17th line battalion, on the other hand, was 
under the control of General Tchernayeff, the Governor- 
General of Turkestan. The two administrations are as 
widely distinct as the Governments of India and Can- 
ada. To secure the simultaneous action of the two 
administrations in support of one another, the impulse 
must proceed from St. Petersburg. As a matter of fact, 
the 17th battalion was marched to Khiva by the order 
of the Minister of War, and, to cut unnecessary argu- 
ment short, the whole of the operations culminating in 
the occupation of Merv were directed by the authorities 
at the Russian capital. 

It is well to bear in mind that although this stealthy 
movement of troops in Turkestan was not known to the 
public of this country, the military authorities in India 
were cognizant of it. Through the Hindoo traders 
arriving from Turkestan and other sources the Intelli- 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 33 

gence Branch was placed in possession of information, 
difficult to disbelieve, that the Russians were moving 
toward the Afghan and Turcoman Territories. The 
military authorities appealed to the Marquis of Ripon 
to take timely precautions against this move, but their 
warnings were pooh-poohed and their counsels disre- 
garded. 

While the Turkestan authorities were concentrating 
troops to take part in the occupation of Merv, the offi- 
cials of the Caucasus were not idle. 

In October our Minister telegraphed from Teheran 
that the Governor of Askabad, General Komaroff, had 
sent a force to the Tejend, and established a fort there. 
The Tejend may be roughly described as the midway 
oasis between Askabad and Merv. It is there that the 
Hari Rud or Tejend, the river watering Herat and Sa- 
rakhs, buries itself in the Turcoman sands. Although 
larger than the Merv oasis, it was practically unoccupied 
until after the fall of Geok Tepe. The Persians would 
not let the Mervis settle there, and the Mervis would not 
let the Persians. After Skobeleff took Geok Tepe Gen- 
eral Kouropatkin pushed on to the place, and found 
there several thousand fugitives. These submitted, and 
either returned home or settled down along the Tejend 
River, Russia promising to protect them from the Per- 
sians. As the Tejend oasis was a no man's land before 
then, their submission conferred upon- Russia, in her 
opinion, a sort of right to the country. 

From Askabad to the Tejend oasis is about 120 or 
130 miles, the road running along the Russian oasis of 
Akhal and Persian oasis of Atak to Kahka, a large Atak 
settlement 80 miles from Askabad, and then turning off 
at right angles across the plain to the Tejend, 50 miles 
3 



34 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

to the north. Readers of O'Donovan's book will re- 
member that the dashing Irishman made a halt on the 
banks of the Tejend. He quitted the Persian frontier 
at Mehne, 53 miles to the east of Kahka, and traversed 
the 50 miles to the Tejend in a night. From the Tejend 
to Merv the 80 or 90 miles' distance is usually done by 
the Turcomans in a day or a day and a half. 

After things had settled down in Central Asia, subse- 
quent to the English evacuation of Afghanistan, and the 
Russian annexation of Askabad, a small Cossack force 
was periodically sent to the Tejend. The excuse for 
this movement was that the new settlers there were 
Russian subjects, and that Russia required a proper 
topographical knowledge of the oasis. 

At first the Merv Tekkes were extremely alarmed at 
the approach of the Cossacks so close to their country, 
and assembled in thousands to bar the way across the 
plain to the Merv oasis. But when, time after time, the 
Cossacks returned without advancing beyond the Tejend, 
they grew less suspicious. They were gradually lulled 
into a false security. In this manner when, at length, 
the Russians sent a larger force than usual to the Tejend, 
in the autumn of 1883, the Merv Tekkes went about their 
ordinary occupations, and made no preparations for de- 
fence. They had at Merv a fortress far larger and 
stronger than the one at Geok Tepe Skobeleff had 
nearly broken his army to pieces in battling his 
way into, and, what was more, they had cannon ; but, 
not imagining that the Russians had any immediate 
designs on their oasis, they undertook no measures of 
defence. 

It is well to bear these facts in mind, because Russia 
is endeavoring to secure in the Badgheis district of 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 35 

Afghanistan a pouncing position similar to the one on 
the Tejend. Ak Robat is even closer to Herat than 
Kari Bent, on the Tejend, is to Merv. Russia, in 1883, 
lulled the Mervis until she had got them completely off 
their guard, and then she pounced upon their strong- 
hold, regardless of all her assurances to England. In the 
same manner, if we let her retain the gates of Herat, she 
will wait until a favorable moment occurs, and then the 
key of India will be carried by a sudden coup de main. 

The military movement in the direction of the Tejend 
did not escape notice in England. A discussion arose 
as to whether the expedition to the Tejend did not con- 
stitute a violation of Russia's assurance not to advance 
beyond the limits of the last annexation. Thereupon the 
Journal de St. Petersbourg, which must surely have told 
more fibs in its time than any existing newspaper, pub- 
lished an indignant denial of the reports in circulation. 
The movement of troops to the Tejend was not an " ex- 
pedition " ; it was simply a reconnaissance. It then 
drew a fine distinction between the two expressions. An 
" expedition," said the organ of the Russian Foreign 
Office, " always goes and stops, but a reconnaissance 
always returns ! " 

Considering that Russia had already mapped every 
inch of the Tejend region, and knew through the ex- 
plorations of Alikhanoff, Lessar, Nasirbegoff , and others, 
the whole of the surrounding country, the necessity for 
even a " reconnaissance " was not very apparent ; above 
all, a reconnaissance by a force, which, according to our 
Minister at Teheran, comprised 1,000 infantry, 500 
cavalry, and 10 guns. 

Our ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Edward 
Thornton, was thereupon instructed to make inquiries 



36 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

at the Russian Foreign Office. In reply he wrote: 
"His Excellency, M. Vlangaly, said that he was not 
aware of any force having been sent in that direction,* 
but he was not surprised at learning it. He said that on 
the occasion of the raid which had been made about two 
months ago into Persian territory by Turcoman raiders, 
when they carried off a number of cattle, etc., and, as he 
believed, some men, the Persian Government had ap- 
pealed to the Imperial Government to use their influ- 
ence for the recovery of their cattle, etc., which had 
been taken. Instructions had consequently been sent 
to the commander of the forces at Askabad to do his 
best to meet the wishes of the Persian Government. 
M. Vlangaly supposed that it had been impossible to do 
so without the use of force, and that a small detachment 
had consequently been despatched for that purpose ; 
but his Excellency doubted whether it could be nearly 
so large as I had mentioned, nor could he answer my 
inquiry as to the particular direction which the force in 
question would take." 

It must not be supposed that this raid was a very large 
one, simply because the Shah had appealed to Russia 
for redress, or that the Shah could not have himself se- 
cured reparation if he had applied direct to the Merv 
Tekkes. The simple fact is, that Russia had not only 

* The conversation took place Jan. 2, 1884. Yet the organ 
of the Foreign Office had said, Nov. 10, 1883 : "II y eu en effet 
une reconnaissance faite sur le Tejend (there has been, in fact, a 
reconnaissance made on the Tejend)," so that he could not have 
been totally unaware of it. However, his memory brightened up 
when Sir Edward gave him to understand that we knew what was 
going on, although he refused to impart any information, or admit 
more than was squeezed out of him by our ambassador. 




LlEUTENANI AlIKANOFF. 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 37 

prevented the Shah from administering the Atak fron- 
tier, but had also severed the close relations previously 
existing between Merv and Teheran. 

As is well known to readers of Oriental history, Merv 
was once a dependency of Persia. After the Russian 
movement toward India commenced from the Caspian, 
British diplomacy for years did its utmost to get the 
Shah to establish a Persian protectorate over Merv, and 
the Merv Tekkes to acknowledge it. It was a very 
foolish policy, because, to put the matter briefly and 
forcibly, English statesmen tried to place the desert lion 
under the control of the Persian jackass. A far more 
sensible plan was that suggested by Colonel Valentine 
Baker when he visited the Perso-Turcoman frontier 
in 1873. This was, to place the Mervis under the 
Afghans. 

Readers of Vambery's delightful " Travels in Central 
Asia " cannot have forgotten the amazing instances he 
gives of Persian cowardice. A dozen or more Persians, 
attacked by two or three Turcomans, would not only 
throw down their arms and beg for mercy, but also ask 
for the cords and bind each other prisoners, without 
making the slightest attempt at resistance. The 
Afghans, on the contrary, were quite a different people 
to deal with. The Merv Tekkes always admitted that 
they were braver men than themselves. 

The notion of passing under the rule of the Ameer 
was therefore not distasteful to them. After Valentine 
Baker's return, the Government sent on a special mission 
to the Perso-Turcoman frontier Major Napier, son of 
Lord Napier of Magdala. This was what he reported 
home : 

" The occupation of Merv by an aggressive power 



38 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

will open the way to further extensions of influence on 
what has always been the weak side of Afghanistan, the 
side of Herat. As to the reasons underlying the evi- 
dent desire of the Tekkes for an Afghan alliance, there 
is a very general impression abroad that an alliance with 
Afghanistan — the Afghans are their co-religionists — 
means an alliance with England. I received " (from the 
various Tekke chiefs he saw) " abundant proof of their 
desire for a direct connection with us, and I believe that 
they might be turned into a peaceful, honest, and pros- 
perous community, and would prove a real strength to 
the border and to the empire." 

Not long afterward General Sir Charles MacGregor 
paid a visit to Sarakhs and Herat, and also advocated 
the enclosure of Merv within the political limits of 
Afghanistan ; but his words fell flat on the ears of the 
authorities. England persisted in weaving her ropes of 
sand for binding Merv to Persia, and only left off when 
Russia sharply declared after the annexation of Askabad 
that she would not tolerate any more efforts on the part 
of the Shah to establish his influence there. 

An intimation, in effect, was conveyed to Persia that 
if she wished to carry on diplomatic intercourse with 
Merv, it must be done through the medium of the Aska- 
bad authorities. Previously the Shah and the Mervis 
had settled their quarrels themselves, by the short and 
summary process of retaliation one against the other, 
varied by occasional truces, during which they ex- 
changed prisoners and hostages. The Shah had now to 
appeal to Komaroff. In this manner, Russia secured 
for herself a pretext for meddling with the affairs of 
Merv. If the Mervis failed to raid against Russia, the 
latter could always harass them by bringing them to 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 39 

book for their raids on Persia — raids, be it remembered, 
largely occasioned because Russia would not allow the 
Shah to put his frontier districts in order, and keep his 
own subjects from raiding against Merv. 

Now this particular raid mentioned by Vlangaly hav- 
ing occurred, and Persia having appealed to Komaroff 
for redress, all that the latter needed to do was, to send 
a message to Merv, when reparation would have been at 
once forthcoming. The attack the previous year on the 
Parfenoff surveying party was a far grosser outrage ; yet 
"the tribe disavowed it at once, on receipt of Russia's de- 
mand for the offenders. In the interval Russia's influ- 
ence had become immensely more powerful at Merv. 
This is avowed by Lessar and others. But Russia needed 
a pretext, and this not to justify herself in the eyes of 
the Tekkes, but to blind England as to her intentions 
on the Tejend. She did not wish her projected coup de 
main to be frustrated by the action of England. 

On the spot, Russia did not trouble herself about the 
pretext at all. When the force proceeded to the Tejend, 
no ultimatum was sent to Merv, nor was any attempt 
made to settle the matter promptly. As a matter of 
fact, the sufferers had already done that themselves. 
They had seized some camels belonging to the Mervis, 
and squared their own loss by inflicting another on their 
neighbors. 

Undeterred by England, therefore, Russia was able to 
consolidate her position on the Tejend, and await events. 
By the end of the year everything was ready for the 
swoop. AH that was now needed was some complica- 
tion that would divert England's gaze, and minimize the 
force of her indignation on finding the annexation of 
Merv an accomplished fact. 



40 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

The occasion was found early in 1884. The long pent 
storm in the Soudan had burst, and the Government 
were seriously embarrassed. Baker Pasha had just 
gone to the East Soudan to relieve Sinkat, and General 
Gordon was on the point of starting for Khartoum. The 
belief was general that our troubles were only just com- 
mencing in the Soudan, and in no country was this im- 
pression stronger than in Russia. 

Events, consequently, were ripe for the swoop. The 
decisive moment, for which the Russian Government 
had deliberately prepared by assembling forces on the 
Turkestan and Transcaspian sides of Merv, had at 
length arrived. The signal was given for delivering 
the blow. 

Acting on the orders transmitted to him by General 
Komaroff, Alikhanoff started off for Merv, accompanied 
by a few horsemen and the hero of Geok Tepe, Makdum 
Kuli Khan. Arrived there he put up for the night at 
the tent of Yousouf Khan, one of the four chiefs of 
Merv, and brother to Makdum Kuli. Yousouf, like 
many of the leading men, had already been bought over 
to Russia. 

The next morning a public meeting was convened, 
and Alikhanoff read out to the people Komaroff 's ulti- 
matum. Immediate submission was demanded, and, to 
enforce his threats, Alikhanoff pointed to the Tejend 
and announced the force established there to be simply 
the vanguard of a greater army then advancing toward 
the oasis. 

That the submission was not a purely voluntary one 
is proved by the following passage occurring in the Rus- 
sian Graphic ( Vsemirnaya Illustratsid), from the pen of 
Gospodin Krijanovsky, a Russian officer of Askabad, 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 41 

who sent that paper a sketch showing the submission of 
the Merv chiefs in General Komaroff' s drawing-room. 
He says : " General Komaroff, wishing to take advan- 
tage of the impression which had been produced on the 
Tekkes by the despatch of a detachment of our troops 
to the Tejend, ordered Lieutenant Alikhanoff and Major 
Makdum Kuli Khan to proceed to Merv, and invite the 
Mervis to beg for mercy and become Russian subjects." 
The Svet, which is edited by the brother of Komaroff, 
supports this by its disclosure of the threats which Ali- 
khanoff used with reference to the Tejend column being 
the vanguard of an advancing army. 

Having already created a strong pro-Russian party 
by his intrigues, Alikhanoff experienced very little diffi- 
culty in persuading the people to accept the suzerainty 
of Russia. His arguments were no doubt strongly 
backed by the renegade, Makdum Kuli, who was prob- 
ably compelled to dilate on the glories of Moscow, 
where, among other things, he had witnessed, within a 
few paces of Lord Wolseley, the feeding of half a mill- 
ion people and the review of 100,000 troops. 

According to reports prevalent in Russia, Alikhanoff 
secured acquiescence all the more readily by wrapping 
up his terms in tissue paper. He repudiated any inten- 
tion of occupying the country with a large garrison. 
All that Russia would do if they submitted, would be to 
send a governor with two or three assistants, and things 
would go on the same as before. 

England was treated in a similar fashion. When M. 
de Giers officially informed our ambassador of the sub- 
mission of Merv, Feb. 15, he intimated that, in accept- 
ing it, the Emperor would simply send " an officer " to 
administer the government of that region. He added 



42 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

that " this officer would perhaps be accompanied by an 
escort of Turcomans ! " 

The solitary Russian officer proved to be as expansive 
as the famous four and a half battalions sent to Khiva 
a decade earlier. " To give an idea of the Khivan Ex- 
pedition," said Count Schouvaloff to Earl Granville, 
January 8th, 1873, " it was sufficient to say that it would 
consist of four and a half battalions." In reality Russia 
sent to Khiva 53 companies of infantry, 25 sotnyas of 
Cossacks, 54 guns, 6 mortars, 2 mitrailleuses, 5 rocket 
divisions, and 19,200 camels, with a complement of about 
14,000 men. 

At the bidding of Alikhanoff, the principal chiefs and 
elders signed a parchment deed he had brought with 
him, and selected a deputation to proceed to Askabad. 
On the way the party was joined by Colonel Muratoff, 
the commander of the Tejend force, and arrived at Aska- 
bad on the 6th February, two days after the annihilation 
of Baker Pasha's army at Tokar. The next morning, 
at 11 o'clock, the four chiefs and twenty-four notables 
took the oath of allegiance to the White Tsar in Gen- 
eral Komaroff's drawing-room. 

When the ceremony was over, Komaroff made a short 
speech to them, in which he declared that now they had 
made their submission to Russia, they would find the 
White Tsar a valiant protector of their interests. " To 
prove this to you," he said, " I telegraphed this morn- 
ing to Teheran, demanding that the Persians should 
give up to you the hundred camels they took the other 
day, and I have just received a message from the Shah 
acceding to my request." * 

Not a word was said about the cattle taken from the 

* Krivanovsky's narrative. 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 43 

Persians, which had served Russia as a diplomatic pre- 
text for assembling Muratoff's force on the Tejend. 
That was conveniently consigned to oblivion. 

Russia, in a word, having made use of a Persian 
grievance to steal the independence of Merv, rounded 
on the Shah the moment the theft was accomplished, 
and treated him in turn as a delinquent. One can easily 
understand the Mervis exclaiming, " How great a ruler 
is this Russian general ! He has only got to send a 
message to the Shah, and the sovereign of Persia sub- 
mits at once to his dictation ! " 

Several days were spent in feasting, and then came 
the denouejnent. General Komaroif decided to proceed 
to Merv, and this was made the pretext for dispatching 
more troops — as a guard of honor ! — -to the Tejend. 
Arrived there, the whole available force was set in 
motion behind the returning deputation, and Fort Kari 
Bent being only three marches from Merv, the Russian 
army was already close to the oasis before its approach 
was known. 

The elders were the first to arrive. They confirmed 
the reports that the Russian army was advancing, and 
asked the people to take out water to the troops. A 
tumult arose. A strong party, headed by Kajjar Khan, 
protested against the invasion, and threatened to kill 
anybody who obeyed the elders' request. They then 
applied themselves to the discussion of the best means 
of repelling the Russian advance. 

The Merv oasis is not very large, and it is surrounded 
on all sides by barren plain or desert. Retreat from it 
was practically impossible. The Russians controlled 
three sides, and the Sariks — bitter enemies of the Tek- 
kes — the fourth. To defend themselves against an 



44 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

invader the Tekkes had built an immense clay-ram- 
parted enclosure, capable of accommodating the entire 
population with their herds and cattle. But there was 
no time to assemble the people inside it before the Rus- 
sians arrived. The Mervis felt that they had no course 
open to them but to surrender. 

The reports current in Russia that Alikhanoff tricked 
the people into submission by promising that no garri- 
son should be installed, are strongly supported by this 
tumult. If the army had been expected, the so-called 
" anti-Russian party " would have organized resistance 
and made a stand somewhere. As it was, nothing what- 
ever was done, and when the intelligence arrived that 
the Russians were already close at hand, the only thing 
the Mervis could do was to go out on horseback, and 
fire a few ineffectual shots into the column by way of a 
protest. 

While the excitement was still prevailing, Alikhanoff 
entered the oasis with a sotnya of Cossacks and endeav- 
ored to allay it. The attitude of the people, however, 
was so defiant that he thought it prudent to take the 
advice of his Merv friends and fall back upon the Rus- 
sian army, then camping for the night twelve miles 
distant from Merv.* 

After dark Kajjar Khan, with several thousand horse- 
men, made an onslaught on the Russian camp, but was 
repelled with heavy loss. The next morning (March 
1 6) the Russians marched early and occupied the for- 
tress without serious resistance. Lessar says that alto- 
gether there were three fights or "skirmishes." The 

* Some of these particulars are taken from the narrative of a 
Turcoman eye-witness, published in an Indian paper, They curi- 
ously tally with Russian reports. 



THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 45 

Russian loss, he adds, was " one man." Kajjar Khan 
fled to Afghanistan. 

The fortress was far too large to afford security to 
the Russian force. General Komaroff, therefore, im- 
pressed several thousand Mervis at once, and compelled 
them to build, under the supervision of his officers, a 
regular fort on the European principle. The comple- 
tion of this sealed the fate of Merv. 

In reward for his successful swoop Alikhanoff received 
back the rank of major, and all his decorations ; he 
was also made Governor of Merv. Makdum Kuli was 
rewarded by being appointed head of the Tejend oasis. 
Komaroff received the Order of the White Eagle, his 
district was raised to the rank of a province equal to 
that of Turkestan, and he himself was made governor- 
general. 

To further add to his importance, he was assigned 
permission to carry on diplomatic intercourse direct 
with the neighboring states of Persia and Afghanistan. 
In other words, if he wished to intrigue with the Ameer 
without resorting to the instrumentality of the Foreign 
Office at St. Petersburg, he was at liberty to do so. 
Lessar was appointed his diplomatic agent for this 
purpose. 

The news of the occupation of Merv excited a storm 
of indignation in England. At first, the artful manner 
in which the Russian Government represented the an- 
nexation as a " voluntary submission " provoked a few 
excuses. It was said that as the people of Merv them- 
selves had asked to become Russian subjects the Em- 
peror was, to a certain extent, justified in relieving 
himself of the burden of his assurances to England. 
" After all," it was a happy ending to the Turcoman 



46 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

question, and Russia, having got Merv and rounded off 
her frontier, would trouble us no more. 

Before a week was over, however, Komaroff 's brother 
had let the cat out of the bag. The editor of the Svet, 
himself a military officer, was so proud of the cleverness 
displayed by his brother in accomplishing the swoop, 
that he published an account of the operations on the 
Tejend, and the audacious threats of Alikhanoff that had 
brought about the submission of Merv. 

From this account sprang the impression that Ali- 
khanoff and Komaroff had acted as filibusters, and forced 
the hands of their Government, but the facts I have 
given demonstrate this impression to be totally wrong. 
It is an impression which has never prevailed one mo- 
ment in Russia. There is nothing in the Svet narrative 
to justify its existence, and the account I have given 
of the concentration of troops in Khiva disposes of the 
notion completely. 

To be short and plain, Alikhanoff and Komaroff sim- 
ply acted according to the instructions telegraphed to 
them to Askabad, and no more anticipated the desires, 
or forced the hand of their Government, than Lord 
Wolseley did when he invaded Egypt and conquered 
Arabi Pasha. If Alikhanoff's diplomacy at Merv was 
shady, it was not a whit darker in hue than the diplo- 
macy exercised by the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at St. Petersburg. 

The annexation of Merv was deliberately planned by 
the Russian Government, and carried out in strict ac- 
cordance with its orders. The coup de mai7i was totally 
unprovoked by the Tekkes ; it was done in violation of a 
whole series of solemn assurances to England ; and the 
blow was struck in a treacherous and cowardly manner, 






THE SWOOP UPON MERV. 47 

dishonorable to a nation that had produced such a hard- 
hitting, fair-fighting hero as Skobeleff. 

When Russia annexed Askabad, I defended her ac- 
tion against the whole English Press. When the excite- 
ment took place over the A trek boundary convention 
with Persia in 1882, I issued a map to Parliament and 
the Press, based on the new treaty with the Shah, show- 
ing that Russia had done no evil. In my various writ- 
ings on Central Asia I have always justified her policy 
when I thought it fair, and have never hesitated to 
condemn the policy of England when I considered it 
stupid or selfish. 

I can fairly claim, therefore, that when I denounced 
the annexation of Merv, on the news becoming known 
in this country last year, I did so without any avowed 
animus as a Russophobe. I felt that the Emperor had 
broken his solemn promises, and the promises of Alex- 
ander II., without the slightest measure of justification. 
Nothing has been published in Russia since to shake 
this conviction, while the facts that have come to light 
have only strengthened what I believe to be a fair and 
impartial view of the transaction. 

There had been two widely distinct and clearly op- 
posed views of the Russian advance, among members of 
the House of Commons, up to the time of the annexa- 
tion of Merv. The debate that took place when the 
news became known, was the first that found the two 
sides united as to the necessity for disregarding further 
assurances, and opposing a firm and unsevered front to 
Russian aggression. 

According to the Newcastle Daily Chronicle, this una- 
nimity was, to a certain extent, due to a pamphlet I cir- 
culated in the House among all the members just before 



48 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

the debate began, giving an account of Merv and the 
results which I believed would inevitably spring from 
the annexation. In that pamphlet, which served as a 
handbook to the debate, I drew particular attention to 
the open character of the country lying between Merv 
and Herat, and I printed in large type this warning : * 

" That the annexation of Merv, being inevitably at- 
tended with the incorporation of the Sarik Turcomans, 
will extend Russian rule up the Murghab to Penjdeh, at 
the foot of the Paropamisus, to within 140 miles of the 
Key of India, England, at the same time, being still 
posted at Quetta, 514 miles from Herat." * 

How I came to predict so correctly the second Rus- 
sian advance, from Merv to the gates of Herat, can be 
best described in another chapter. 

* Five hundred copies of the pamphlet, " The Russian Annexa- 
tion of Merv," with three maps, and a frontispiece illustrative of 
Merv, were struck off in twenty-four hours. There being no time 
to post them, they were distributed in the members' lobby. " Soon 
after the House assembled, half the persons in the lobby might have 
been seen with the orange pamphlet in their hands. As the House 
filled, a demand arose for copies among the minor members who 
had not received them, and Mr. Marvin, who was in the lobby, dis- 
patched a special messenger for a hundred more. In this manner, 
when the debate actually did come off, nearly everybody used it 
as a handbook, and there can be hardly a doubt that it secured a 
very important effect upon the speeches, observable in the una- 
nimity with which the members of both parties insisted on the ne- 
cessity of trusting Russia no more, and the imperative need of firm 
and decisive measures on the part of the Government. During the 
debate, Mr. Marvin sat under the gallery, watching the effect of his 
pamphlet." — Newcastle Chronicle, February 28, 1884. The pamph- 
let was translated into German ; and in India an eminent military 
officer, well known for his patriotic interest in the Central Asia 
Question, published, at his own cost, an edition at Bombay, and 
distributed copies throughout the Peninsula. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 

General Petrusevitch's secret survey of Afghanistan in 1878 — His 
suggestion that Russia, after occupying Merv, should insert a 
wedge between Herat and Meshed — Concentration of troops 
at Merv — General Komaroff seizes Old Sarakhs — Alikhanoff 's in- 
trigues with the Sarik Turcomans — His attempt on Penjdeh — 
Lumsden finds the Russians advancing up the Hari Rud, and 
posted at Pul-i-Khatum — Russia delays the despatch of Gen- 
eral Zelenoi in order to push further toward Herat — Occupation 
of the Zulfikar Pass, Ak Robat, and Pul-i-khisti. 

When, in the early part of 1 881, exciting telegrams 
were arriving every day from Russia, describing Skobe- 
leff's terrible conflict with the Tekkes at Geok Tep6, it 
may be remembered that one of those messages recorded 
the death of a general, who fell in a night assault upon 
the fortress. The name of that general was Petruse- 
vitch. So far as I am aware, he was the first to suggest 
the idea of thrusting the Turcoman wedge from Merv 
to the Paropamisus mountains, and under cover of it 
securing the gates of Herat. 

Petrusevitch was quite a different type of officer from 
Alikhanoff or Komaroff. Honest, truthful, averse to in- 
trigue, and devoted to his duty, he was, in one word, a 
representative in actual life of that ideal of an Indian 
administrator which is commonly held in this country. 
The district he governed in the Caucasus for many 
years was a model of good order, and he was so deeply 
4 



50 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

respected by the hill tribes, although not a fighting man, 
that when he fell at Geok Tepe they sent a deputation 
to the scene of the conflict, to beg of Skobeleff the body 
of the deceased general, to bury it in their midst. 

Petrusevitch was first despatched to the Transcaspian 
region in 1874, and there is every reason to believe that 
he pushed his explorations into Afghanistan as far south 
of Herat as Seistan. In subsequent years he undertook 
other journeys along the Perso-Turcoman frontier, from 
the Caspian to Sarakhs, and in 1879, just before he re- 
ceived the appointment of Governor of Krasnovodsk, in 
succession to the defeated general, Lomakin, he penned 
an exhaustive report upon the Turcomans. 

In this report he traced, in dealing with the Turco- 
man tribes of the Merv- Herat region, the Afghan and 
Persian frontiers in such a fashion as to leave open the 
gap which Russia has just occupied. Up to then it had 
been accepted both in England and Russia that the 
Afghan dominions extended from the Oxus to Sarakhs. 
Petrusevitch was the first to bulge back the frontier to 
the hills at the rear of Penjdeh, less than one hundred 
miles from Herat. 

A copy of this report reached me from the Caucasus. 
and I made it the backbone of a work I was then pre- 
paring on the Turcomans. To me this hint or claim of 
Petrusevitch's seemed so ominous, that I drew a series of 
maps to illustrate the menace it conveyed to the security 
of Meshed and Herat. 

Respecting his contention I said, in translating his 
words in full : " Particular attention should be paid to 
this passage by political writers. The attempt to force 
a recognition of a ' no man's land ' between Meshed and 
Herat is, in reality, nothing more than an effort to ex- 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 5 1 

tend the Turcoman region wedge-fashion between Persia 
and Afghanistan. Russia, in occupying Merv, will in- 
evitably claim the right to extend her power along this 
wedge also. The conquest of Akhal extends her rule to 
Gyaoors — the conquest of Merv will extend it to Penj- 
dehr * 

My work was published in 1881, and was purchased 
for the Government Departments in London and Simla. 
It cannot, therefore, be said that the Government were 
unaware as to the serious results that would inevitably 
attend an occupation of Merv. To prevent all pos- 
sibility of Russia advancing her present claims to Penj- 
deh and other gates of Herat, I urged that the Afghan 
frontier from Sarakhs to the Oxus should be organized 
without delay, and the gap indicated by Petrusevitch 
closed up before the Russians occupied Merv. 

" Do what we can," I wrote, " we can never prevent 
the inevitable junction of the Russian and English 
frontiers in Asia. It would be difficult to do so, even 
with Russia's help. It is impossible without it. . . . If 
we wait till Russia enters Merv and posts Cossacks on 
the Paropamisus ridge, we shall have to accept, at the 
dictation of Russia, her delimitation of the two empires, 
with the dishonorable drawback of having to cede the 
best of the India-menacing points to her^-as the power 
in possession. Since the junction of the frontiers of the 
two empires must some day take place ; since we know 
that on the occasion of the next great war between the 
two powers, Russia will attempt to strike at our em- 
pire in India ; since we have evidence beyond dispute 

* " Merv, the Queen of the World ; and the Scourge of the 
Man-Stealing Turcomans." 450 pp., 11 maps. London : W. H. 
Allen &Co., 1881. 



52 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

that there exists an easy road of invasion — is it too 
much to demand of the rulers of our empire that they 
arrange at once our border line in Central Asia ? Is it 
too much to ask of thinking Englishmen that they shall 
individually do their utmost to preserve the empire 
from the madness of masterly inactivity ? " 

These words were written four years ago, but they 
produced no effect upon the Government. The im- 
pression prevailed that a great mountain barrier, 10,000 
or 15,000 feet high, intervened between Merv and Herat, 
and that even when the Russians secured the former 
they would fail to have easy access to the latter. 

Yet our ablest authorities had done their utmost to 
disabuse the minds of English statesmen of this disas- 
trous error. Colonel Valentine Baker, on his return 
from the Perso-Turcoman frontier in 1873, had pointed 
out the ease with which a military movement could take 
place from Merv to Herat, up the valley of the Murghab. 

"Merv," he said, "with its water communication 
nearly complete, lies only 240 miles from Herat, to 
which place it is the key. There can be no doubt that 
Merv is the natural outwork of Herat, with the advan- 
tage of water supply all the way between the two cities. 
Strategically, the Russian occupation of Merv would be, 
so to say, the formation of a lodgment on the glacis of 
Herat. It would place Herat completely at her mercy." 

General Sir Charles MacGregor, chief of Roberts's 
staff at Candahar, and since then Quartermaster-Gener- 
al of India, went closer to the Paropamisus ridge than 
Baker, penetrating in 1875 to within a few miles of 
Herat. What he wrote on his return was plain enough 
for any man to understand. 

" A Russian authority, M. Tchichacheff," he observed 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 53 

in his Khorassan, " declares that Herat would be in no 
danger even if the Russians were in possession of Merv, 
because the road between these places lies over an im- 
practicable range of mountains. I must, however, take 
leave to deny this statement in the most decided man- 
ner. I have been to the Herat valley, and have fol- 
lowed a considerable part of one of the roads to Merv, 
and I have made the most careful inquiries from people 
on the spot who were in the constant habit of riding 
over the rest of the distance. Yet there is so little im- 
pression of difficulty on my mind, that I would under- 
take to drive a mail coach from Merv to Herat by this 
road." 

Still, English statesmen persisted in placing faith in 
great mountain barriers between Merv and Herat, and 
the Duke of Argyll, pooh-poohing Valentine Baker and 
MacGregor, cracked an elephantine joke by telling the 
public not to be " Mervous " about the fate of " a few 
mud huts." The Russians were welcome to Merv : 
when they got there they would be as far off India as ever. 

Much of the bad statesmanship of the time, as I have 
already said, must be ascribed to the confusion existing 
in the minds of English politicians with regard to the 
double character of the Russian advance. There were 
two movements, from bases thousands of miles apart, 
running in the direction of India ; one from Orenburg 
and Tashkent over a colossal range, 15,000 to 20,000 
feet high ; the othe'r, from the Caspian over a plain and 
occasional hills. English politicians, Conservative as 
well as Liberal, mixed up one with another. Because 
the Turkestan line of advance was difficult, therefore the 
Caspian line of advance was more or less impracticable. 
One has only to read the Candahar debates to see how 



54 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

widespread this confusion was, and how little even tal- 
ented Conservative politicians realized the real bearings 
of the new advance. Lord Salisbury was the only one 
who thoroughly grasped the facts of the situation. 

The " Paropamisus bugbear " was finally disposed of 
in 1882, when Lessar explored the country from Sarakhs 
to Herat, and discovered the mountain range, 15,000 
feet high, to be simply a ridge of hills, with passes only 
900 feet above the surrounding locality. Across those 
passes from Sarakhs to Herat, and from Merv to Herat, 
he found that a vehicle could be driven without the 
slightest difficulty. Practically, there was no barrier at 
all intervening between Herat and Merv. 

Lessar's discovery provoked great attention on the 
part of experts in this country, but nothing was done by 
the Government to fill in the gap to which Petrusevitch 
had given prominence. * The Marquis of Ripon, ignor- 
ing General Roberts's appeal that he should do so, gave 
the Ameer a subsidy and some arms, but this was all. 
No steps appear to have been taken to induce the Ameer 
to bulge out his Herati administration to the propor- 
tions indicated on English official maps, until after the 
occupation of Merv. 

We thus see that the Government were well warned 
as to the danger the gates of Herat would run of being 
captured after the conquest of Merv, and upon the 
Marquis of Ripon and the Gladstone Cabinet must rest 
the blame of having refused to take any steps to pro- 

* A full account of Lessar's explorations, together with Alikhan- 
off's narrative of his journey in disguise to Merv, was published in 
" The Russians at Merv and Herat " in the spring of i883~by the 
writer. Most of the twenty-two illustrations accompanying it are 
from the talented pencil of Alikhanoff. 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 55 

tect them. From the time Petrusevitch gave England 
the hint of what Russia would do with the Turcoman 
wedge, up to the actual seizure of Merv, was a clear in- 
terval of three years. That precious period was allowed 
to pass away without the slightest effort to organize the 
Afghan frontier north of Herat. 

Consequently, when Komaroff occupied Merv in force 
on the 1 6th of March, 1884, and turned his face toward 
Herat, the country lay practically open to him to the 
very walls of the Key of India. 

It was the consciousness of this that rendered the 
annexation of such serious import to me. I knew that 
Petrusevitch's suggestion that Russia should advance 
from Merv to the gates of Herat had been borne well 
in mind by the Russian Government, and I was well 
aware that the Marquis of Ripon had done nothing to 
anticipate this movement. It was for this reason that, 
in issuing my new pamphlet, I printed in capital letters 
the warning that " The annexation of Merv, being in- 
evitably attended with the incorporation of the Sarak 
Turcomans, will extend Russian rule to Penjdeh, or 
to within 140 miles of the Key of India." 

The warning had but very slight effect upon the Gov- 
ernment. Four or five months later the Ameer occu- 
pied Penjdeh, but — if the Times is to be believed — 
entirely on his own initiative. Considering the impor- 
tance the Government suddenly attached to the gates 
of Herat after the Russians had occupied them, would 
it not have been more sensible to have forestalled the 
aggressors ? There was no one to prevent the Afghans 
occupying Ak Robat, Zulfikar, and Pul-i-Khatum months 
and months before the advance from Merv took place ; 
and, had the Government given the Russian menace 



$6 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

adequate heed, they would have advised the Ameer to 
have done so instead of leaving him to act upon his 
own initiative. 

To prevent England adopting a course of this kind 
the Russian Government embarked upon a series of 
negotiations, which dawdled on through the summer 
and enabled it to consolidate its position at Merv. 

As might be expected, when Komaroff occupied 
Merv in March, the feeling of the people for a time ran 
very strong against the Russians. The least impulse 
from without would have set the Turcomans in revolt. 
This was the proper period for the Ameer to have 
moved down the Hari Rud and Murghab to the limits 
assigned him on the Russian official maps — Sarakhs and 
Imam Bukash — and the question of delimitation could 
have been settled afterward. Such a move could have 
been easily accomplished in a week or ten days. On 
neither river was there a man to oppose this advance, 
and it could have been effected without spilling a drop 
of blood or wasting a single rupee. Under the super- 
vision of two or three English officers, the occupation 
of the Badgheis territory could have been carried out in 
such a manner that Russia would have been left with- 
out the slightest cause for just complaint. 

The Turkomans of Merv would not have resented 
the approximation of the Afghans, and if Russia had 
sought to oppose the step, we could have responded 
to her threats by an intimation of the ease with which 
she could be turned out of the district she had just 
annexed, contrary to the feeling of the inhabitants. 

But a manly and statesmanlike policy was hardly to 
be expected from a Cabinet which by its vacillation 
had involved us in so many difficulties. In India it is 




General Alexander E-omarofp. 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 57 

an open secret that Sir Frederick Roberts, Sir Charles 
MacGregor, and other eminent generals, appealed in 
the strongest terms to the Marquis of Ripon to secure 
the gates of Herat before the Russians had time to 
advance from Merv. The Viceroy refused to take any 
action in the matter. 

Thus the sore and hostile feeling of the Tekkes was 
allowed to die away, and Komaroff was left unchecked 
to consolidate his hold upon the newly conquered 
country. 

As soon as possible, the troops that had been con- 
centrated in Khiva were dispatched to Merv. The 
Caucasus Regiment of Kuban Cossacks was also dis- 
patched from the Caucasus to reinforce the garrison. 
In May Prince Dondukoff-Korsakoff, the Governor- 
General of the Caucasus, himself set out to visit Merv. 
The prince travelled through Turkmenia in a calash, and 
it may be interesting to mention, that if, when he quit- 
ted Askabad, he had turned his course toward India 
instead of toward Merv, he could have travelled all 
the way in that same calash to the Chaman outposts of 
Quetta. 

Advantage was taken of the presence of the prince 
to accept the submission of the Sarik Turcomans dwell- 
ing at Youletan. This place naturally belongs to the 
Merv oasis, and the annexation of the few thousand 
Sarik families dwelling there, consequently, was almost 
a matter of course. 

The case was different with Old Sarakhs, which was 
formally annexed by General Komaroff immediately 
afterward. Sarakhs, like Merv, had been dubbed by 
military men the key of Herat. To a force advancing 
from Turkestan to Herat Merv is the key ; to a force 



58 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

advancing from the Caspian the key is Sarakhs. The 
two points are about 80 miles apart ; Merv is 240 miles 
from Herat, and Sarakhs 202. Whatever may be the 
views of party politicians, the leading military men of 
England and Russia have long regarded "Sarakhs and 
Merv as the two keys of Herat — the two points where 
troops could concentrate and rest before making their 
final advance upon the Key of India. 

Russia, through her diplomatic organs, intimated her 
intention of annexing Old Sarakhs in advance of the 
actual occupation. The news excited interest second 
only to that provoked by the seizure of Merv, At 
this juncture, Lord Fitzmaurice exhibited a lamentable' 
amount of flippant ignorance in replying to questions 
put to him in the House of Commons. First, he did 
not appear to know that there was such a place as Old 
Sarakhs, although it had been marked on Russian maps 
for years. Then, when the Foreign Office discovered 
the whereabouts of Old Sarakhs, the excuse was gratu- 
itously put forward on behalf of Russia that the point 
annexed was of very little importance. It was only a 
heap of ruins ! 

What I said at the- time, in contending with this view, 
will bear repetition now.* " From a strategical point 
of view, the one town is as good a base as another. 
To put the matter plainly, if London were Herat, and 
North and South Woolwich Old and New Sarakhs re- 
spectively, the menace to the city would be just as great 
from the Woolwich on the one side of the river as from 
the Woolwich on the other. The circumstance of Old 
Sarakhs having been the first site occupied in ancient 
times, would appear to indicate that it is the best spot 

* Morning Post Leader, May 26, 1884. 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 59 

in the locality for a town. New Sarakhs was simply 
erected on the west side of the river by the Persians 
(who besieged and destroyed Old Sarakhs fifty years 
ago), because the river formed a protection against the 
Turcomans of Merv. Hence, although the Russians 
are taking possession of a lot of ruins, they have pre- 
sumably secured the best site for an administrative 
centre, where they will be able to draw away all the 
importance from the dirty, straggling Persian town 
lying across the water to the west." 

The error current at the moment was the ascribing of 
the strategical significance of Sarakhs to the site of the 
actual town instead of to the locality generally. There 
is a danger that this may be repeated in the case of 
Herat also, and what I said in continuation may there- 
fore be appropriately repeated : 

" Even had the Russians annexed the new town, they 
would have had to build their own cantonments, as at 
Tashkent ; hence it is an altogether immaterial point 
whether they have got Old or New Sarakhs. They have 
secured all that they wanted, and all that English strate- 
gists sought to deprive them of — a lodgment in the Sa- 
rakhs district — and from this new base they will be only 
202 miles, or five marches, distant from Herat. Of these 
two hundred and two miles, 130 are uninhabited ; con- 
sequently, the Russians can roam over the plain to Ku- 
san, 70 miles from Herat, without being checked by a 
single Persian, Turcoman, or Afghan. Lord Fitzmau- 
rice seems to imagine that English diplomacy has done 
enough in preserving New Sarakhs from Russia, or, ra- 
ther, that Russia has been considerate enough in taking 
the old' site — for English diplomacy preserves nothing. 
Never was there a greater error. So little is Persian 



60 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Sarakhs important as a fortified point, so little advan- 
tage has it over half a dozen other spots in the same 
locality, that General MacGregor recommended that the 
Persians should shift the fort some miles from the pres- 
ent spot. 

" Hence it is no gain whatever to England that Rus- 
sia should have spared New Sarakhs. If she be allowed 
to settle down on the old site, she might just as well be 
allowed to have the new town as well. Seven hundred 
Persian soldiers are no menace to Russia, and directly 
she establishes herself at Old Sarakhs the Persian fort 
will become as valueless as the Martello towers on the 
English coast. On this account, looking at the matter 
from a broad, comprehensive, military and political 
point of view, and ignoring the barley-corn measure- 
ments of English diplomacy, the occupation of Old Sa- 
rakhs by Russia possesses all the significance, and em- 
bodies all the menace, that has been ascribed to the act 
by the ablest generals of England and Russia." 

Apart from its military significance, Old Sarakhs was 
important politically, owing to the circumstance that 
the Afghan frontier was supposed to touch the Persian 
border near this point. For years the Persians had con- 
trolled the district, and Old Sarakhs was looked upon 
as indisputably theirs. The Afghan frontier was re- 
garded as commencing alongside it. 

By the submission of Youletan and Old Sarakhs, Rus- 
sia secured the whole of the region of Central Asia 
lying outside the Afghan frontier marked on Russian 
and English official maps. She obtained thereby an 
excellent frontier, well rounded off, and there was ab- 
solutely no reason why she should have stepped across 
it into Afghanistan. England was angry that she should 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 6 1 

have seized Merv and Sarakhs in violation of her prom- 
ises, but still, now that Central Asia was blotted out, 
the public were ready to condone the past. They ad- 
mitted that there were plenty of excellent reasons to 
justify the annexation of the steppes and khanates of 
Central Asia, and so long as the Afghan frontier was 
respected, they were prepared to overlook all that had 
been done to bring the Cossack cordon flush with the 
Ameer's dominions. 

On this account, England received with satisfaction 
the announcement that Sir Peter Lumsden had been 
appointed to proceed to Sarakhs to define the Russo- 
Afghan frontier to the Oxus. In order that the work 
might be well done, the Government assigned the envoy 
a brilliant staff of assistants. 

Sir Peter Lumsden was an officer of thirty-seven 
years' standing. He had seen service in various Indian 
frontier expeditions, the Central India campaign, under 
General R. Napier, and in the China war. He served with 
several expeditions against the frontier tribes between 
1852 and 1856 ; was present as deputy quartermaster- 
general at the action of Punjhao in April, 1852; at Nowa- 
dund and other operations in the Renanzi valley in May, 
1852 ; against the Bori Afridis in 1853 ; at Shah Mooseb 
Kheyl against the Meranzi tribe in April, 1855 ; against 
Bussy Khilut Alum in 1855 ; and the Meranzi and 
Kooroon expedition in 1856 (for which he received the 
special thanks of the Local and Supreme Governments). 
He was a -member of the special military commission 
to Afghanistan in 1857-58, and again received the thanks 
of the Supreme Government, and was awarded a medal 
with clasp. He accompanied the expedition to China 
in i860, and was present at the actions of Singho and 



62 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Janchow, the assault and capture of the Taku forts, and 
the advance on Pekin, in connection with which opera- 
tions he was mentioned in the despatches, received a 
medal with two clasps, and obtained the brevet of major. 
His latest active service was with the Bhotan field force 
in 1865, where he gained an additional clasp. From 
the foregoing summary of his career it will be seen that 
the commissioner possessed a considerable experience 
of Afghanistan and frontier affairs. He was also a 
member of the Indian Council. 

In India the appointment provoked expressions of 
disappointment. The press, almost without exception, 
had selected General Sir Charles MacGregor for the 
task. This gallant and distinguished officer, the Sko- 
beleff of India, possessed special qualifications for the 
mission. He had seen as much fighting service as 
Lumsden, and while the active military operations of 
the latter had terminated in i860, MacGregor had par- 
ticipated in warfare so recently as 1879-81, acting as 
chief of the staff to General Roberts in Afghanistan. 
His reputation, therefore, stood high in Russia. 

I say " therefore," because, while for our Afghan war 
as a whole Russia entertains a contempt, Roberts's opera- 
tions have always been singled out for special admira- 
tion. Skobeleff, and all of Skobeleff's set, were never 
tired of extolling the march from Cabul to Candahar. 
" It was a splendid march," said Skobeleff to me. " It 
was a grand operation of war," said Grodekoff. When 
I attended Skobeleff's funeral, I was repeatedly ques- 
tioned about the march by his officers, and Roberts's 
name was never mentioned without respect and admi- 
ration. 

Skobeleff always thought that he should some day 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 63 

lead an army against India. His opponent in that case, 
he believed, would be Roberts. Being a great man, in 
every sense of the term, and not a mere military wasp, 
like our arch-hater, General Soboleff, he took a gener- 
ous interest in the fortunes of his Indian rival, and I 
have every reason to believe that this generosity was 
reciprocated. I can say, at least, that the feeling was 
prevalent among Roberts's lieutenants. Shortly after 
Skobeleff s death, Sir Charles MacGregor, in expressing 
to me his regret at his untimely end, said that he ad- 
mired the brilliant young Russian general so much, that 
he had been anxious to undertake a journey to Europe 
solely and expressly for the purpose of making his ac- 
quaintance. 

Besides being Roberts's ablest lieutenant, MacGregor 
was the hero of an exploit which should endear him to 
every patriotic Englishman. In 1875, having just fin- 
ished for the Indian Government an elaborate gazetteer 
of Afghanistan and Central Asia, which revealed the 
many serious gaps that existed in our knowledge of that 
region, he set out, at his own cost and risk, to make a 
survey without precedent in modern times. Riding 
from the Persian Gulf, he made his way to Herat, then 
worked round to Sarakhs, afterwards pushed along the 
Turcoman frontier to the Caspian ; and when this 3,000 
miles' ride was done, he quietly travelled on to the 
Caucasus and South Russia, and effected a survey of the 
Russian base also. Had he not been foolishly ordered 
home by the. Government, he meant to have surveyed 
the country just seized by Russia, from Herat to Merv, 
and in that case the Paropamisus bugbear would have 
been exploded long before the Afghan war, and the 
evacuation of Candahar rendered impossible. 



64 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

After this grand survey, for which, I may add, he was 
snubbed instead of being thanked by the authorities, 
he explored Beluchistan, fought alongside Roberts, and 
was then made head of the Intelligence Branch and 
Quartermaster-General of India. In India it was a 
matter of notoriety that MacGregor had studied the 
Central Asian Question more thoroughly than any mili- 
tary man living, and having a keen perception of good 
strategical points, it was felt that he would have secured 
for Afghanistan the strongest possible frontier. Hence, 
when the Government selected Lumsden, a compara- 
tively unknown man, there was a cry of bitter disap- 
pointment in India. The Government, it was said, was 
going to patch up the Afghan frontier anyhow, as they 
had patched up everything else. 

As I do not know the actual reasons that impelled the 
Government to choose Lumsden and reject MacGregor, 
I should be sorry to condemn the selection. I have al- 
ways had a warm admiration for MacGregor, which has 
been repeatedly expressed in my works, and I con- 
sidered him the right man for the task. But the Govern- 
ment having, from reasons of their own, selected Sir 
Peter Lumsden, it would have been unpatriotic and un- 
generous to have cavilled at the appointment. 

Before Sir Peter Lumsden left for the frontier, I had 
the pleasure of a long conversation with him on Central 
Asian affairs generally. In order that it should be free 
and unrestricted, it was agreed that the discussion 
should be confidential. I am, therefore, precluded 
from going into details, but I may state that I was 
thoroughly pleased with the Commissioner's clear ap- 
preciation of the issues at stake, and his determination 
to safeguard English interests. There were no traces 




Major-General Sir Peter Stark Lumsden, K.C.B., C.S.L. 



COMMANDER OF THE AFGHAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION. 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 65 

of Russophobia in his talk, and I felt that if Russia 
were as really desirous of harmoniously arranging the 
frontier as she made out, there could be no possible 
hitch between him and his Muscovite colleague. 

I may point out one very important advantage that 
has resulted from sending Lumsden to the frontier in- 
stead of MacGregor. The former had published noth- 
ing on Russia that intriguers in this country could use 
against him, while the latter had expressed opinions in 
his books which, if detached and garbled, could have 
been made to convict him of Russophobia. Had the 
Skobeleff of India been therefore sent, ail the complica- 
tions that subsequently arose on the frontier would have 
been laid to his door, as a hater of Russia. This possi- 
bility was prevented by sending Lumsden, and not being 
able to blacken that prudent officer, the Russians have 
had to pile all the blame on the Afghans and his subor- 
dinates. 

Very luckily, as events turned out, the Government 
provided the envoy with a splendid staff. Let me de- 
scribe some of the members. Among those who pro- 
ceeded from England, or joined the General on the way 
to Sarakhs, were Major Napier, Colonel Patrick Stewart, 
Mr. Condie Stephen, and Captain Barrow. Napier, as I 
have already said, had been to the Perso-Turcoman 
frontier in 1874. He was there repeatedly in subse- 
quent years on behalf of the Government, and thus was 
not only familiar with the region, but was also intimate 
with the leading Turcoman chiefs, and knew thoroughly 
the recent history of the contested country. 

Colonel Patrick Stewart was an Indian officer who 
had done a very patriotic thing in 1880. At that time 
Skobeleff was massing his forces for the purpose, it was 
5 



66 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

believed, of marching to Merv ; and, in spite of the 
excitement provoked in this country thereby, the Gov- 
ernment resolutely refused to send anybody to the fron- 
tier to find out what he was actually doing. Whereupon, 
Colonel Patrick Stewart, being at home on furlough, 
quietly proceeded via Turkey, at his own expense, to the 
East, and, having by a circuitous route reached Ispahan, 
doffed his European garb, and departed disguised as an 
Armenian horse-dealer. Speaking Armenian well, and 
being thoroughly acquainted with Eastern habits, Stew- 
art preserved his disguise so well, that when, after twenty- 
six days' riding, he reached the frontier, close to Geok 
Tepe, and took a shop in the bazaar, he lived alongside 
Mr. O'Donovan three weeks without the latter being 
aware that he was an Englishman. 

At length the Government got to know that he was 
stalking Skobeleff, and, to conciliate Russia, ordered 
him home ; but they were so pleased with his conduct 
that they sent him out soon after to Khaf, a Persian 
town near Herat, where he could act as English agent 
for Western Afghanistan and watch Russia's operations 
without exposing England to the danger that might 
arise from having a political resident installed in the key 
of India. 

Stewart was acquainted with the Russian language, 
and so also was Captain Barrow, another Indian officer 
of great ability, who, after studying it at the Staff Col- 
lege, had gone to Russia and buried himself for three 
months at Moscow to render his knowledge more per- 
fect. There is little doubt that a distinguished career 
lies before him. The official Russian scholar, however, 
was Mr. Condie Stephen, Second Secretary to the Le- 
gation at Teheran. He had acquired the language so 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 6? 

perfectly while attached to the Embassy at St. Peters- 
burg, that he had been able to render into English a 
splendidly spirited translation of Lermantoff's great 
poem, " The Demon." He likewise had travelled along 
the Sarakhs frontier, and had been grossly insulted by 
a Russian official in 1882 in making his way to the Atak 
oasis, for which M. de Giers had made a lame and inade- 
quate apology. Napier, Stewart, and Condie Stephen 
were thus three frontier experts, equal in knowledge and 
experience to any Russia could dispatch to confront 
them. Russia was perfectly aware of this. She there- 
fore made no attempt to send any at all, and, instead, 
shot Gospodin Lessar into London. 

The escort and the surveying staff were furnished by 
India, and had to march through Afghanistan to Herat, 
and join Sir Peter Lumsden on the Perso-Afghan fron- 
tier. The contingent was composed of the following 
persons : — 

Chief Political Officer : Lieutenant-colonel J. West 
Ridgeway. Political Officers : Captain E. L. Durand, 
Captain C. E. Yate, Mr. W. K. Merk, Captain de Sces- 
soi. Survey Officers : Major J. Hill, R.E.; Captain St. 
G. Gore, R.E.; Lieutenant the Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E. 
Intelligence Department : Captain P. J. Maitland, Bom- 
bay Staff Corps ; Captain W. Peacock, R.E. Natural- 
ist : Dr. J. E. T. Aitchison, .CLE. Medical Officers : 
Dr. C. Owen, CLE.; Dr. Charles. Native Attaches: 
Sirdar Mahomed Aslam Khan, Rissaldar Baha-ud-kin 
Khan, Rissaldar Major Mahomed Hussain Khan, Sir- 
dar Sher Ahmed Khan. 

Colonel Ridgeway, the officer in charge, was a man 
of great experience. He received his military training 
in the 98th Regiment, and was appointed to the political 



6S THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

service fifteen years ago by Lord Mayo. During the 
Afghan war he acted as political officer to Sir Frederick 
Roberts, and took part in all his military operations. At 
the close of the campaign he was made Foreign Under 
Secretary to the Government of India. In this manner 
he was intimately acquainted with the outer politics of 
India, and knew thoroughly the views of the Govern- 
ment. 

Captain Durand was a son of the hero Sir Henry 
Durand, and for several years had been acting as politi- 
cal agent attached to the ex- Ameer Yakoob Khan, the 
ruler who connived at Cavagnari's murder at Cabul. 
Captain Yate had been political agent at Kelat-i-ghilzai 
during the Afghan war, and had been besieged there by 
the enemy. Merk was a wonderful linguist, and was 
noted for his skill in dealing with hill tribes. Scessoi 
was a Danish officer, who had once served in the Shah's 
army. Maitland and Talbot, Gore and Talbot, were 
Intelligence and Survey officers, noted for their pluck 
and capacity. The whole of the officers were picked 
men, and there was not one who had not participated 
more or less in hard fighting. 

As regards the native members, they were all gentle- 
men of distinguished character and antecedents, and 
most of them were Afghans. Sirdar Mahomed Aslam 
Khan was a brother of the British agent at Cabul, and 
had charge of the local tribal levies of the Khyber. 
Rissalder Major Mahomed Tlussain Khan had been 
employed for years on various delicate political mis- 
sions. Rissalder Major Baha-ud-din Khan had served 
in every Indian campaign for thirty years, and was Sir 
Frederick Roberts's faithful henchman at Sherpur and 
Candahar. Sirdar Sher Ahmed Khan was a cousin of 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 69 

the Ameer and a son of the present Afghan Governor 
of Candahar, and had served as Ridgeway's assistant 
at Cabul. These native colleagues of the English 
" politicals " were thus not only most of them old per- 
sonal friends and fellow-workers of the latter, but were 
also closely connected with the Ameer's officials at Cabul 
and Candahar. This was an immense advantage. 

But this was not all. The Afghan Governor of Herat, 
the Naib-el-Hakmut Mahomed Sarwar Khan, was like- 
wise an old friend of Ridgeway's. The mission was 
thus certain of a warm reception at Herat. Some troub- 
lesome tribes had to be passed at one section of the 
road (a very small and insignificant section), but every 
assistance was to be expected from the Ameer's officials. 

To protect it against those tribes and any troubles 
that might arise on the Turcoman frontier, the mission 
was furnished with an escort composed of 200 men, 
splendidly mounted, of the nth Bengal Lancers (better 
known as " Probyn's Horse") and 250 bayonets of the 
20th Punjab Infantry, than which no native regiment in 
the service contains men of finer physique and bearing. 
Major Ironside Bax was placed in command. 

A correspondent who accompanied the mission says 
of these Indian troops, " The infantry were almost all 
light-hearted, cheery Afreedees of the Khyber Pass. 
They walk with extraordinary rapidity, and are big men. 
Their march is as quick as the ordinary pace of the 
cavalry ; they are fine high-spirited, free-spoken men, 
who cheer to the pipes' tunes as they march, and they 
come in at a swinging pace, with pipes playing, on each 
camping ground. The cavalry, Sikhs and Rajputs, are 
also splendid men, possessing excellent spirits, and are 
well equipped for the journey." 



70 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

As usual, there were a large number of followers, and 
these swelled the total to 35 Europeans and 1,300 
natives. The transport consisted of 1,300 camels and 
400 mules. 

To avoid any chance of complications, the mission 
was ordered to proceed to Herat, not by the direct Can- 
dahar road, but by a more circuitous route through 
country comparatively unpopulated, and consequently 
free from fanatics. 

Quitting Quetta on the 2 2d September, the party 
reached Herat on November 17th, having traversed 
over 700 miles,* at the average rate of eighteen miles a 
day, with relatively little hardship, and without any un- 
pleasantness to speak of with the natives. The march 
was attended with a very important discovery. A route 
which had been hitherto treated as almost impracticable, 
was found to be available for the advance of a large 
army. 

In other words, if the Russians penetrated to Herat 
by the easy roads Lessar had discovered, and we allowed 
them to remain there, they would be able with very little 
difficulty to advance into the heart of Afghanistan by the 
route opened up by Ridgeway's party. Hence the dis- 
covery of the practicability of the Nushki route for a 
large force rendered Herat all the more significant as 
the Key of India. 

Arrived at Herat, Ridgeway was received in the 
heartiest manner by the Afghan Governor. " The two," 
says an eye-witness, " shook each other warmly by the 
hands. The Naib was in the best of humor ; his full 
jovial face, of an olive tint, had a merry look, and his 
large soft eyes beamed a genial welcome. He looked 

* 767 from Quetta to Kusan. 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 7 1 

such a Governor as he was reported to be — mild in his 
rule, and in his acts showing good sense and practical 
justice. The good spirits of the Naib appeared to have 
affected the soldiers and irregular troops. They per- 
formed the exercises which we could see they thought 
would please us most. They were very anxious to win 
our opinion, and there was something very naive in the 
manner in which they tried to gain it. After the Naib 
and Colonel Ridgeway had shaken hands, the Afghan 
infantry were put in fours and marched by companies in 
front of the mission, with the cavalry in the rear ; with 
each movement the bugles — sweet sounds they were, too 
— sounded. As the troops marched by, the buglers be- 
gan to play a lively martial air with a French ring. The 
little we heard of the bugle march was most effective. 
Many of the men wore woolly hats, which gave them a 
swaggering look. They were warmly clad and a large 
number had Sniders. The cavalry were well equipped 
and capable of going anywhere." 

Another officer present says : — " The artillery, consist- 
ing of mountain guns, marched past first. The guns 
appeared to be in good order. The cavalry were rather 
mounted infantry, and, so far as dress and horse accou- 
trements, they were perfectly equipped and were much 
admired by our officers. The irregular horse were bet- 
ter mounted, having larger horses, and had a gallant 
appearance. They rode by in a free easy pace, moving 
as if carefully trained. The officers were of many types, 
but the one who attracted our attention most was a cap- 
tain, who wore a felt hat, which, if not disrespectful, I 
should call a billycock hat with a stiff rim and a gold- 
colored spike on the top. The other portions of the 
captain's dress were equally original and displayed much 



72 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

character. He had an Irish-American look, which was 
exaggerated by a chin tuft, for the captain shaved his 
cheeks. It was a much-disputed point whether the cap- 
tain was an Irishman or not. I think he was not ; but 
what do ye faithful of Hind say to this ? The captain 
had a bulldog, and an excellent one, that ran at his heels 
and followed him at the side of his Herat regiment. 
And all this under the shade of Sheik Abdulla Ansari in 
the Herat valley ! It only shows in another way that 
the Afghans are not all the intolerant fanatics they are 
supposed to be in England." 

Between 2,000 and 3,000 troops mustered on the 
ground, and their march past was an event of the highest 
political significance. For the first time, after two gen- 
erations of war, the Afghans passed in review before 
and saluted a British officer. 

While the Afghans and the Indian contingent were 
fraternizing in sight of Herat, Sir Peter Lumsden was 
hastening to join them from Sarakhs. On the 19th of 
November, after a journey of 1,000 miles from Resht, 
on the Caspian, he joined Ridgeway's party at Kusan, 
70 miles west of Herat, close to the Persian frontier, 
greatly to the relief of the Afghan Governor, for already 
events had occurred which had occasioned him deep 
anxiety. 

Without waiting for the English and Russian frontier 
commissions to arrive upon the spot, General Komaroff 
had occupied Pul-i-Khatun, on the Hari Rud, and Ali- 
khanoff was advancing up the Murghab. The gates of 
Herat were in danger. 

It has been said that the Afghans provoked this ad- 
vance by seizing Penjdeh, but there are one or two facts 
that will effectually clear the ground of this contention. 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 73 

Penjdeh was occupied by the Afghans in June or July, 
1884. Lumsden left London in September. The oc- 
cupation of Penjdeh had been announced in English 
papers a long time before he left, and had been officially 
admitted by the English Government. There was no 
secret whatever about it. Why did not the Russian 
Government raise and settle the question before Lums- 
den left England ? They had already selected their 
commissioner, General Zelenoi,* and there was no rea- 
son why he should not have arrived at Sarakhs in ad- 
vance of Sir Peter Lumsden. Instead of which they 
kept him back on various pretexts, and when ours began 
to approach the frontier from Teheran, they pushed on 
their troops to Pul-i-Khatun, and endeavored to carry 
Penjdeh by a coup de main. 

Why the Russians should have made this dash at the 
gates of Herat is capable of simple explanation. 

We have seen that for some time after their seizure of 
Merv their position at Merv was unsafe. It was in 
March when they effected their swoop ; it was in May 
that Youletan submitted — the Afghans occupied Penjdeh 
late in June or early in July. Writing from Merv in 
May a correspondent of the Tiflis Kavkaz stated that 
there was still a considerable amount of discontent in 
the Tekke oasis. Until this feeling subsided more, it 
was hardly safe to make a fresh advance. 

Still, Alikhanoff was not a man to rest inactive. The 
moment the Sariks of Youletan submitted, he com- 



* It was erroneously stated, shortly after Lumsden left, that Rus- 
sia had insulted England by appointing Alikhanoff as the frontier 
commissioner. There was no ground for this statement. Sir Peter 
Lumsden himself told me, before his departure, that Zelenoi had 
been chosen for the post. 



74 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

menced intrigues with the Sariks of Penjdeh. As I 
have already stated, Youletan is geographically part 
of the Merv oasis. The 4,000 Sarik families dwelling 
there consequently had always been on good terms with 
the Merv Tekkes, and the fortunes of the two conse- 
quently travelled together. But Penjdeh is 80 miles 
distant from Youletan, and the interval is an interval of 
desert. The fertile ground lies behind Penjdeh, to- 
ward Herat. Thus, geographically, Penjdeh is to Herat 
what Youletan is to Merv, and the 8,000 Sarik families 
dwelling there had not only paid tribute to the Ameer 
for years, but were the fiercest enemies of the Merv 
Tekkes.* In this manner the submission of the Youle- 
tan Sariks in no wise carried with it the submission of 
the Sariks of Penjdeh. Had Alikhanoff advanced at 
once up the Murghab, the Afghan Sariks would have 
doubtless resisted his attempts to annex them. 

Aware of this, Alikhanoff sought to buy them over. 
He sent agents to Penjdeh to endeavor to persuade the 
people to declare for Russia. Reports of this reaching 
the Afghan Governor of Herat, he marched a small 
force to the place, and, with the perfect concurrence of 
the inhabitants, erected a fort at Ak Tepe to protect 
them from Alikhanoff. 

Considering the treacherous trick Alikhanoff had play- 
ed on the people of Merv, and which was better known to 
the surrounding people than to this country, was there 
anything aggressive or unwarrantable in this ? To my 
view, it was an unostentatious measure of defence of the 
most legitimate character, and no more carried with it 

* See Petrusevitch's report in "Merv, the Queen of the World," 
and Lessar's accounts of his own explorations, in the " Russians at 
Merv." 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. 75 

any menace to the security of Merv than the English 
occupation of Cairo in 1881 interfered with the interests 
of Timbuctoo. Russia was chagrined at the failure of 
her intrigues at Penjdeh, but she masked her anger for 
the moment. She allowed two months to pass, appar- 
ently acquiescing in the occupation of Penjdeh, and at 
any rate refraining from the projected swoop upon 
the other gates of the Key of India. She refrained, 
partly because she wanted to make her Merv base safer, 
but mainly because she believed that the Indian contin- 
gent would never traverse Afghanistan without a com- 
plication of some kind with the natives. 

It may be remembered that just before the departure 
of Ridgeway, frequent reports reached India of the 
presence of Russian secret agents at Cabul. How far 
these were true it is difficult to say. One thing, how- 
ever, is certain. Russian officers in disguise have un- 
questionably visited Cabul since we installed Abdurrah- 
man as Ameer,* and as their presence was attended by 
the receipt of similar reports in India, it is not improb- 
able that some were there again last year. At any rate, 
Russia believed for a long time that the Ameer would 
refuse to allow the Indian mission to pass through his 
dominions, and when his permission was given they 
relied upon the treachery of his officials and the hos- 
tility of the people to prevent it ever reaching Herat. 
When these expectations failed to be realized, decisive 
action was decided upon. Moving 40 miles south of 
Old Sarakhs, where he had established 200 infantry and 
several hundred Turcoman horse, General Komaroff 
placed a Cossack outpost at Pul-i-Khatun. 

* See narrative of Samuel Gourovitch, interpreter to the Venk- 
hovsky secret mission of 1882, in " The Region of Eternal Fire. "' 



?6 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

This marked the beginning of the Russian advance 
from the Merv-Sarakhs bases upon the gates of the Key 
of India. 

Lumsden first heard of the movement at Meshed. 
Proceeding to Pul-i-Khatun he found the Cossacks 
established there, and pushing on to Sarakhs (Nov. 8) 
obtained a promise from Komaroff that there should 
not be any further advance, pending the settlement of 
the frontier question by their respective governments. 
Alikhanoff was with Komaroff at the time, and rode 
right through the English camp one day without taking 
any notice of the Commissioner. This insult caused a 
great talk at Sarakhs. Directly Lumsden left Sarakhs 
Alikhanoff set off for Merv, and, taking with him sev- 
eral hundred horsemen, pushed up to the Murghab, 
and tried to capture Penjdeh. 

The Afghans, however, were again equal to the occa- 
sion. The moment Yaluntush Khan, Governor of Penj- 
deh, heard of the advance, he sent a message to Ghaus- 
ud-din, Governor of Bala Murghab (on the road to 
Herat), and the latter, with laudable promptitude and 
energy, started off, accompanied by all his cavalry, with 
a foot soldier behind each trooper. At the same time 
he despatched a courier to Herat for reinforcements 
Arrived at Penjdeh, he found Alikhanoff posted at Pul- 
i-khisti, a few miles distant. To him he at once sent 
a message, asking him if he meant to fight or not, 
frankly informing him that he was ready for the con- 
flict. Alikhanoff, disappointed at being outwitted, 
returned a savage and insulting letter to the Afghan 
general, and withdrew. Had he not done so, the 
Afghans were so excited that they would have prob- 
ably attacked him. According to a correspondent, 



f 



THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HERAT. J 1 ] 

their blood was up, and they were most anxious to 
fight. 

Russia, having now cast off the veil, no longer 
attempted concealment. Her Cossacks were pushed for- 
ward as fast as they could, and occupied in swift succes- 
sion the Zulfikar Pass, Ak Robat, and other avenues to 
Herat. 

It has been said that Afghan restlessness provoked 
this advance. This I am able to deny on unquestion- 
able authority. The Ameer's right to Penjdeh will be 
dealt with directly. The annexation of that place, as I 
have demonstrated, provoked no feeling in Russia, and 
evoked no immediate reciprocal move. The real Afghan 
advance that Russia puts forward as excusing her own 
advance, subsequent to Sir Peter Lumsden's arrival, was 
the advance from Penjdeh to Sariyazi, a short distance 
to the south But what are the facts of the case ? There 
was no occupation of Sariyazi in the annexationist sense 
of the term. Hearing that the Russians had advanced 
from Sarakhs to Pul-i-Khatun, and tried to cut off some 
Afghan horsemen, led by an Afghan official, proceeding 
to join Sir Peter Lumsden, the plucky Governor of Bala 
Murghab I have just described thought that the Russians 
meant war. They were advancing up the Hari Rud 
toward Herat ; perhaps they were also moving up the 
parallel River Murghab in the same direction. He was 
in charge of the Murghab line of defence. It was his 
duty to bar the road to Herat. He, therefore, like a 
good soldier, sent out an Afghan picket to Sariyazi, so 
that Fort Ak Tepe at Penjdeh might know in time of 
the advance of the enemy. Sariyazi was not on Merv 
soil, whether it was Afghan or not. Thanks to this 
picket, when Alikhanoff did advance with his horsemen, 



yS THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

his approach was signalled in time, and his coup de 'main 
frustrated. 

Thus there was no restlessness, no aggression on the 
part of the Afghans. They set an example of good order 
and good faith to the Russians, which would have done 
credit to any civilized power. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 

Russia's claim to the gates of Herat — The original agreement be- 
tween England and Russia as to the Afghan frontier — The dis- 
puted territory — Discrepancies in English official maps — The 
frontier generally recognised by the two countries — Skobeleff's 
map of Merv and Herat, showing what Russia regarded as the 
frontier in 1881 — Lessar's mission to London — The Russian 
claims impartially considered. 

Russia's claim to cave in the Afghan frontier appears 
to have been first officially made shortly after the an- 
nexation of Merv, when the Russian General Staff issued 
a sixpenny map, showing the Sarakhs-Oxus border 
bulged in to within 50 miles of Herat. This, I believe, 
was the first official intimation that Russia had adopted 
Petrusevitch's idea. 

I issued a facsimile copy of the map, which found its 
way into the principal English newspapers, and the 
Russian claim was indignantly denounced. Still, none 
the less, the impression prevailed that the map was only 
a feeler. Russia had demanded a good deal, in the 
hope of getting at least some small concession. The 
English Government had a reputation for yielding to 
pressure. -When Sir Peter Lumsden left England, it 
was generally believed by those behind the scenes that 
England had surrendered Pul-i-Khatun. I cannot say 
how far this report was true. I simply record what im- 
pression prevailed at the time. 



80 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

On this account, when the news was telegraphed from 
Meshed that the Russians had occupied Pul-i-Khatun, 
it fell to a certain extent flat. Russia had greedily 
taken in advance what had been promised her after the 
frontier was settled, and the move was simply another 
instance of her barbarous manners. It was never im- 
agined that she claimed all the Afghan territory to the 
gates of Herat. 

At length, after a deal of uneasiness and indignation 
had been expressed at Zelenoi's unaccountable tardiness 
in proceeding to the Afghan frontier, it became suddenly 
known in London that Russia had pushed up to Penjdeh. 
While the excitement was still in progress, the Russian 
Government unexpectedly dispatched the ex-railway en- 
gineer, Lessar, to London to expound its claims. The 
demands of Russia then became public. 

An elaborate account of those demands, with the 
Russian arguments in favor, and the English arguments 
against them, would only tire the reader. Let me, 
therefore, put the case as shortly, but as plainly, as 
possible. 

In 1872 elaborate negotiations took place between the 
Russian and English Governments with regard to the 
north-east Afghan frontier. The Russian advance then 
lay through Turkestan, and the Orenburg Cossacks had 
reached the Oxus. It was necessary, therefore, to de- 
fine in some manner the Oxus side of the Ameer's 
dominions. After long negotiations this was accom- 
plished, and as since there has been no infringement of 
that frontier, we may dismiss it without further remark. 

Respecting the north-west border, from the Oxus to 
Persia, the settlement was not so satisfactory, nor could 
it be so. The Russians even then had designs upon 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 8 1 

Merv, which we wished to treat as part of Afghanistan, 
and they therefore desired to draw the line south of it. 
By assenting to this, it was thought at the time we should 
surrender the Tekke oasis to Russia. Ultimately the 
matter was left open. 

Considering that the Turcoman barrier was still un- 
broken, that Herat was in a turbulent condition, and that 
the Merv region seethed with disorder, this course of 
action on the part of the two Governments cannot be se- 
verely criticised. They had fixed the starting-point of the 
line at Khoja Saleh, on the Oxus, which no Russian has 
since contested, and if the term, " Persian frontier," or 
" Hari Rud," be not a precise termination, we must bear 
in mind that the gaze of the two Governments and the 
two nations was not fixed upon the end of the line, so 
much as upon the middle. There was no quarrelling 
about the termination of the line, only whether the line 
itself should curve north or curve south. If it curved 
north Merv was included in Afghanistan ; if south it was 
excluded from it. As time passed on, the English and 
Russian Governments decided to treat it as excluded 
from Afghanistan, although this country still reserved 
its right to watch the fortunes of the Tekkes. 

As regards the terminal point, discrepancies undoubt- 
edly exist on the official maps of the two countries, but an 
overwhelming majority of both fix it at Sarakhs, and it 
is particularly noteworthy that cartographical harmony 
was arrived at during the period immediately preceding 
the advance upon Merv. The map that Skobeleff used 
in his Turcoman war of 1881 traced the frontier from 
Khoja Saleh to Sarakhs identically with Arrowsmith's 
map of 1875, published in Rawlinson's " England and 
Russia in the East " — that English official text book of 
6 



82 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

the early phases of the Central Asian question— and 
this line was practically admitted by Russian diplo- 
macy. 

We may say, in short, that after Russia began to push 
seriously toward Merv, the Sarakhs-Khoja-Saleh line 
was tacitly adopted by the statesmen of the two coun- 
tries as the north-west frontier of Afghanistan. It is 
well that there should be no misconception about this. 
Russia knew that England considered this line the 
Afghan frontier, and, therefore, when her statesmen 
gave assurance after assurance that they would not 
violate the integrity of Afghanistan, they were aware 
that England accepted those assurances in good faith as 
implying that the Sarakhs-Khoja-Saleh boundary would 
be respected. 

Nay, Russian statesmen themselves by their words 
fixed the line, and showed that they recognized Sarahks 
as the terminal point. Let me quote one instance. 
Early in 1882, a year before the swoop on Merv took 
place, England endeavored to persuade Russia to come 
to some settlement about the Perso-Turcoman frontier, 
stretching from near Askabad to Sarakhs. Russia in 
reply said, in effect, that it was no business of Eng- 
land's, but, if she liked, she would discuss the settle- 
ment of the Afghan boundary beyond, from Sarakhs to 
Khoja Saleh. 

This recognition of the Sarakhs line was made during 
a special interview between Prince Lobanoff 'and Earl 
Granville on February 22, 1882. Directly the Russian 
Ambassador was gone, Earl Granville wrote to Sir Ed- 
ward Thornton as follows : " Prince Lobanoff said he 
had now received the reply of his Government. They 
acknowleged the continued validity of the agreement 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 83 

formerly entered into by Prince Gortschakoff, by which 
Afghanistan was admitted to be beyond the sphere of 
Russian influence. That agreement was, however, as I 
had said, incomplete; and they were ready to supple- 
ment it by a settlement of the frontier of Afghanistan 
from the point where it had been left undefined " (i. e., 
the Oxus at Khoja Saleh) " as far as Sarakhs." Thus 
the Russian ambassador in London treated Sarakhs as 
the ending point. Five weeks later M. de Giers dis- 
cussed the whole subject with Sir Edward Thornton, 
when the Russian statesman stated positively that 
" Russia had no intention of advancing toward Merv or 
Sarakhs, or occupying any territory beyond what was 
already in her possession." At the end of the des- 
patch Sir Edward Thornton observes : " M. de Giers 
added that, with a view to preventing disturbances on 
the borders of Afghanistan, he considered it to be of 
great importance that the boundary of that country from 
Khoja Saleh to the Persian frontier Jn the neighborhood of 
Sarakhs should be formally and definitely laid down, 
and that he had instructed Prince Lobanoff to endeavor 
to induce her Majesty's Government to agree to the 
adoption of measures for that purpose."* 

Thus Russian diplomatists, as well as the official mili- 
tary map-makers, regarded the Afghan frontier as run- 
ning from Khoja Saleh to Sarakhs, and the only point 
really undetermined by diplomacy was, where it crossed 
the Murghab River ; but here, again, as Russian diplo- 
matists followed their military map-makers as regards 
the two terminal points, it was a fair assumption that 
they followed them also in regard to the Murghab sec- 
tion. When English statesmen asked the statesmen of 

*Blue Book, Central Asia, No. 1, 1884. 



84 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Russia for assurances, and the latter gave the solemn 
word of the Emperor that Afghanistan should be re- 
spected, those military maps, English and Russian, were, 
in almost every instance, and probably in all, lying on 
the tables or placed on the walls of the rooms where 
those assurances were given. To say, therefore, that 
Russian statesmen did not have the Sarakhs-Khoja- 
Saleh line in view, and in their minds, when they made 
those assurances, is to say that they were simply playing 
the part of blackleg lawyers, or Jesuits of the darkest hue. 
Now this line not only includes Penjdeh, which is a 
good forty miles to the south of it, and Sariyazi, which 
is at least twenty, but also every point claimed or occu- 
pied by Russia. The Ameer, in occupying Penjdeh 
simply occupied what Prussian maps showed to be in his 
dominions. On the other hand, when Komaroff, many 
weeks later, occupied Pul-i-Khatun, 39 miles from Sar- 
akhs, he occupied what Russian maps excluded from 
Turkmenia and also placed in Afghanistan. He vio- 
lated, in short, the integrity of the territory of the 
Ameer. And the further he subsequently advanced, to 
Zulfikar and Ak Robat, the more he violated that integ- 
rity. In one plain word, he invaded Afghanistan. He 
crossed the line which Russian statesmen, in giving their 
assurances, had always treated as the boundary of the 
Ameer's dominions. Had Skobeleff marched to Merv 
in 1 88 1, his movements would have been regulated by 
that line, for it was marked on the map which he 
used at the seat of war, and which is now in my pos- 
session. It bears the imprint of the Russian General 
Staff, 1 88 1 (copies of it exist at the Foreign Office), and 
it was given me by General Grodekoff, the chief of 
his staff at Geok Tepe, in 1882. 





!;S»->""""" 

bPnl-i-'KhaUiii 



5 / 

|A Znlflkar «^ S%* 

X'^obat Pass 

% 




si 



,*»«/»».»'*- •*«w«'« ? .;^*» 1 *"" ;tt «'m»» "">.;>v\ 

risus Hills ^^^ /^sguu , 

, wrb,a.t A«;; mlw \«,,,.,..// --^ _ 



MAP SHOWING THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES. 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 85 

The occupation of Pen j den by the Ameer having pre- 
ceded by a considerable time the Russian annexation 
of Pul-i-Khatun, let me deal with it first. In starting, 
I would point out that while one or two Russian maps 
anterior to 1881 show discrepancies in crossing the 
Murghab, they all of them unanimously assign Penj- 
deh to Afghanistan. Nor is this remarkable. Before 
the Sariks occupied the place it belonged to the Jems- 
hidis, subjects of the Ameer. The Sariks formerly dwelt 
at Merv. In 1856 the Tekkes migrated thither, and 
after a struggle compelled the Sariks to withdraw higher 
up the Murghab. Part of them, as I have said, stopped 
at Youletan, geographically part of the Merv oasis ; 
but the rest, numbering over 6,000 families, moved 
higher up, traversing the desert section of the Murg- 
hab, and drove the Jemshidis out of Penjdeh. The 
Jemshidis, in their turn, also moved higher up, to within 
a short distance of Herat. 

But it is well to bear in mind that these Sariks, having 
seized Afghan lands, paid annually tribute to the Ameer 
for them. The receipts of the tribute received are con- 
tained in the books of the administrative of Herat, and 
there can be therefore no doubt on this point. It has been 
said that the tribute was not paid without the dispatch of 
troops to the district, but this does not invalidate the 
Ameer's claim. For instance, as I pen this very pas- 
sage, the tax-gatherer has sent in to say that if my taxes 
are not paid within three days he will distrain for them. 
I reply, telling him to be hanged, but this retort to his 
threat of force does not dispose of the right of the Gov- 
ernment to treat me as a subject, and seize my property 
if the taxes are not paid. In Afghanistan, and, in fact, 
in all Eastern countries, the soldier is invariably the tax- 



86 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

gatherer. Throughout the whole of the Russian Asiat- 
ic dominions the Cossack goes round with the tax-gath- 
erer, and, but for the Cossack, the taxes would very 
often not be paid. The collection of taxes or tribute at 
Penjdeh by the occasional dispatch of Herati horsemen, 
therefore, was simply part and parcel of a prevailing sys- 
tem in the East, and not an exceptional case. The con- 
tention that Penjdeh was not an Afghan district because 
the Sariks (like myself) were sometimes remiss in paying 
their taxes, will not hold water one moment. 

Having treated Penjdeh as an administrative part of 
Herat so many years, the Afghan authorities were con- 
sequently within their rights when they sent a small 
force there in June or July, 1884, to protect it from 
seizure by Alikhanoff. They knew how treacherously 
Russia had acted at Merv, and had every reason to be- 
lieve that Alikhanoff was bent upon seizing Penjdeh. 

I have already said that the subsequent advance 
twenty miles to Sariyazi was simply the pushing out of 
a picket to give warning of the expected Russian ap- 
proach, and that had not Russia seized Pul-i-Khatun, 
no such movement would have been made. There was, 
therefore, no provocation on the Afghan side. 

With regard to Russia the case was different. Pul-i- 
Khatun, and the rest of the uninhabited points up the 
Hari Rud south of Sarakhs, had never been part of the 
Merv territory, nor had the Mervis ever had control of 
the districts. Those districts were unprotected, simply 
because the raids of the Tekkes upon Persia had driven 
back the people to the Paropamisus or elsewhere, or had 
exterminated them outright. But although the Mervis 
raided across the country in pushing toward Persia, 
they never attempted to hold it ; for geographically it 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 87 

had no connection with Merv whatever. The argument 
has been put forward that the Russians had a right to 
seize it because it was " unoccupied," but if that argu- 
ment were allowed to pass, a large proportion of the coast 
line of Australia could be seized on the same grounds ; 
and/applying it to Russia, hundreds of miles of coast 
line in the Pacific and on the White Sea would be open 
to seizure, not being occupied or administered. 

If the Afghans had been making preparations to march 
to Pul-i-Khatun, there might have been some justifica- 
tion for Komaroff's occupation of it ; but they were 
quietly posted at Penjdeh, awaiting Lumsden's arrival. 
Before even Lumsden himself could make any prepara- 
tions of the kind, and give provocation thereby, the 
Russians had advanced and seized all the territory they 
could lay their hands on without actually dispossessing 
the Afghans. In some places they pushed behind the 
Afghans, as at Ak Robat, which is considerably to the 
rear of Penjdeh, and within eighty miles of Herat. 

On this account, I hold that this rush to the gates of 
Herat was a violent and treacherous proceeding, having 
all the characteristics of the swoop upon Merv. 

While the movement was being made toward Herat, 
" by the express orders of Prince Dondukoff-Korsakoff," 
as Komaroff gave out, the Russian Government was 
effecting an operation of another kind, which indicates 
the kind of enemy we have to deal with. Imagining 
there were no experts in London, Lumsden having taken 
with him Stewart, Napier, and Condie Stephen to the 
frontier, it suddenly dispatched their own chief agent, 
Lessar, to this country.. 

Russia delights in strokes of this sort. She always 
does "the unexpected." In 1878, v/hen we were in- 



88 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

creasing our fleet to fight her, she suddenly dispatched 
sailors to America and bought ships, with the intention 
of slipping out of the Atlantic ports and preying on our 
commerce. Our fleet she did not mean to notice at all. 
No country is more ready to discover the weak points 
of a rival, and to take advantage of them, than Russia. 
She displayed this clearly enough when she sent Lessar 
to London. 

I say this without making any reflection upon Lessar 
personally, for my high opinion of him has been repeat- 
edly avowed in my books. I may even go so far to 
claim that the reputation which he possessed in the eyes 
of the public and Government of this country, on his 
arrival in February, was largely a reputation of my own 
creation. When Lessar's name was first heard in this 
country in 1882, it was coupled with the epithet of 
"spy" and "secret agent." I defended him against 
those charges. Year after year, as I described his suc- 
cessive explorations in my books,* and expounded their 
importance, I insisted upon the honest, sincere, and un- 
affected character of the clever young explorer. This 
opinion was not simply based upon what had been said 
to me by his superiors in Russia, but upon what I had 
heard from Russian friends of mine, who knew him 
well. I may add that this attitude was not lost upon 
Lessar, for, shortly after his arrival in London, he 
thanked me warmly in a letter for the kindly manner I 
had always referred to his surveys. 

Hence, I wish it to be clearly understood that in say- 
ing what follows, I am inspired by no animus against 
Lessar, nor do I wish to excite any prejudice against his 

* " The Russian Advance," 1882 ; the "Russians at Merv and 
Herat," 1883 ; " Reconnoitring Central Asia," 1884. 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 89 

person. I criticise his mission, and the Government 
that created it ; if my remarks appear to touch Lessar 
himself sometimes, I must ask that they be understood 
as applying to him, not as the eminent explorer, but as 
the mouthpiece of the Russian Foreign Office. 

Up to the time of the swoop upon Merv, Gospodin 
Lessar was simply a railway engineer. It was in that 
capacity he had been dispatched on his first survey in 
the direction of India in 1881, and he was still a 
Tchinovnik attached to the Ministry of Railways. The 
Russian Government was perfectly aware of the high 
estimation in which this railway engineer was held in 
England. It, therefore, suddenly turned him into a 
diplomatist, and, after a decent interval, with equal sud- 
denness sent him to London. 

His proper place, of course, was on the Afghan fron- 
tier, as adviser to Zelenoi. Russia had no intention of 
sending Zelenoi thither. She had certainly appointed 
him before Lumsden left London, but she had only 
done this to gain time to mature her military prepara- 
tions for seizing the gates of Herat. Once those gates 
were seized, she no longer needed a delimitation com- 
mission. What she needed was to break dov/n English 
opposition to that seizure. For this purpose, it was 
necessary to create a u cave " in English opinion : to 
divide the country on the subject, and to force the 
Government to yield to the pressure of accomplished 
facts. 

To realise this treacherous aim Lessar was sent to 
London. 

Without dipping too deeply into a very unpleasant 
subject, I may recall to the reader the very strong pro- 
Russian influence that was exercised in 1877-78, through 



go THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

books, pamphlets, and the press, by Madame de Novi- 
koff, otherwise O. K., and the group of admirers she 
gathered around her. I will not discuss whether that 
influence was good or bad, but I will point out that it 
was a strong influence, and that it exercised an effect 
upon English public opinion and upon the policy of the 
Government. At any rate, that, at least, was the im- 
pression in Russia. 

What, therefore, M. de Giers had in view when he 
dispatched this amiable young traveller, Lessar, to Lon- 
don was, the formation of another pro-Russian party. 
He trusted to winning the battle of the boundaries, not 
on the frontier, but in the midst of distracted England. 

It was rather cruel, using such a weapon against Mr. 
Gladstone. 

Fortunately, party feeling did not run so high as in 
1878, and Lessar found when he arrived a solid block 
of public opinion opposed to his pretensions. Still, he 
was not altogether without success. The Pall Mall Ga- 
zette opened its columns to his pen and became his mouth- 
piece. The wires of the press were pulled, and all man- 
ner of charges raked up against the Afghans. Even Sir 
Peter Lumsden's mission was assailed. 

Let me give an example of some of these unscrupu- 
lous charges. On February 24th the Pall Mall Gazette 
published a long letter from Madame de Novikoff at 
St. Petersburg, in which that lady said that " one who 
is of the highest authority on all matters relating to the 
foreign policy of our Empire " had told her Penjdeh 
had been occupied by the Afghans at the instigation 
of Mr. Condie Stephen and other subordinates of Sir 
Peter Lumsden. "I have just had a most interesting 
conversation," said Madame de Novikoff, "with one 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 91 

who is of the highest authority on all matters relating 
to the foreign policy of our empire. ... I asked him 
to tell me quite frankly the verite vraie about our alleged 
advance in Herat. 'The question,' he replied, 'is as 
simple as possible. We do not want Herat, and we can- 
not get it. If we seized it, "it would bring us into con- 
flict not only with the Afghans but also with Persia {sic\ 
not to speak of England. ' But,' I rejoined, 'have we 
not already made a forward movement which we thought 
unnecessary ! ' ' Yes,' he answered, ' but do you know 
how this came to pass ? Unfortunately, Sir Peter Lums- 
den has taken with him two or three young fellows like 
Mr. Stephen, who speak Russian, and who imagine that 
they can serve their cause, or the cause of England, by 
inciting the Afghans to occupy positions in advance of 
their own frontier. The Afghans, acting under the insti- 
gation of these young Englishmen, occupied a position at 
Penjdeh, in territory which had never been under Afghan 
rule. . . . Our military people, hearing and seeing 
everywhere evidences of English hostility and English 
intrigues, immediately responded to the Afghan advance 
by a further advance on their own account, and they went 
further than was either prudent or useful. Thus a mis- 
take has been made on both sides, but the initiative has 
been taken by the English or by those among them who 
pushed the Afghans forward to go where no Afghan had 
ever been before.' " 

Now there is only one English expression that will fitly 
describe all the foregoing. That expression is a strong 
one, but it is no stronger than any judge would apply to 
it at a court of law. The whole statement is a " pack of 
lies." 

If this expression seems severe, it should be remem- 



92 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

bered that Lumsden and his subordinates, honorable 
English gentlemen, and not intriguers like Alikhanoff, 
were far away from home when their character was thus 
grossly assailed, and that they were traduced by an in- 
triguing agency planted in our midst for the purpose of 
enabling Lessar to secure for Russia what he could have 
never obtained by fair argument on the frontier. 

In the first place, it was announced in all the English 
and Russian newspapers before Sir Peter Lumsden, with 
Mr. Stephen, left England, that the Afghans had occu- 
pied Penjdeh , so that the assertion that Mr. Stephen 
instigated them to do it is absurdly mendacious. Mr. 
Stephen travelled with Sir Peter Lumsden the whole way, 
and it was long before they reached the frontier that they 
heard Komaroff had seized Pul-i-Khatun. The two then 
proceeded straight to Sarakhs to see Komaroff and pro- 
test, and they were told that Komaroff had been ordered 
to advance by the orders of the Russian Government. 
Thus we see that the Russians advanced long before Sir 
Peter Lumsden and his rash "young Englishmen " ar- 
rived on the scene, and the statement therefore that they 
egged on the Afghans, and thereby provoked it, is an 
obvious falsehood. What I say of Lumsden's own party 
applies equally to the Indian contingent. The Afghans 
did not advance an inch after the English arrived at He- 
rat, and as the Pul-i-Khatun movement of Russia was 
made anterior to our arrival, it is therefore false to say 
that we incited the Afghans to aggression. 

It unpleasant to have to say it, but Madame de Novi- 
koff is given to making charges of this kind. It would 
be easy to multiply instances of her " special pleading." 
Let me quote a characteristic instance. In 1881, while 
Skobeleff was besieging Geok Tep6, a certain Captain 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 93 

Butler, out of a desire for notoriety, wrote to the Globe 
intimating that he had helped the Tekkes to fortify the 
place. The assertion occasioned a good deal of annoy- 
ance to our government, and being altogether unfound- 
ed, Butler was placed on the retired list. In Russia, 
what he said was never taken seriously, and not only did 
the press pooh-pooh nis pretensions, but Skobeleff him- 
self laughed at the idea. My conversation with him on 
the matter was published in " The Russian Advance 
Towards India," which book contained further the 
opinions of Grodekoff, etc., completely disposing of 
Butler's claim. Not long afterward Madame de Novi- 
koff published a work called " Skobeleff and the Pan- 
slavist Cause." In this she embodied the whole of my 
conversation with Skobeleff, but suppressed the bit about 
Butler. Then at the end, when she made an onslaught 
on Rawlinson and the Russophobes, she penned this as- 
sertion : " The Atrek frontier was the line along which 
your Central Asians and ours elected to fight. An Eng- 
lish officer, Butler, fortified Geok Tepe ! " 

Yet O. K. knew when she penned this passage that 
Butler did not fortify Geok Tepe, and that her idol, 
Skobeleff, who was surely a good judge, had declared 
he had not. But she wanted to make a case against 
England, and was ready to write that black was white, 
and white was black, in order to further her ends. 

The Pall Mall Gazette proved an efficient organ for 
the pro-Russian party. Day after day it formulated the 
charges against the Afghans, and suppressed facts that 
clashed at all with its views. An illustration may be 
given of this. On February 27th it published an article, 
entitled, "Is Penjdeh in Afghanistan? — by a Russian" 
(ascribed by the Moscow Gazette to Lessar), in which an 



94 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

elaborate attempt was made by references to faulty, ob- 
solete English maps, and the works of two or three care- 
less authors, to prove that Penjdeh was not in the 
Ameer's dominions. I thereupon wrote a short letter 
stating the facts about the Russian official maps I have 
mentioned, and which Lessar had ignored, and I en- 
closed a facsimile sketch of the frontier on Skobeleff's 
map. Both of these were suppressed. 

But this was only a minor matter. On the 12th of 
March it published a special article, with a map, in which 
it claimed that Lessar's demands were moderate, on the 
ground that I myself had assigned to Afghanistan a 
frontier line in 1881 further south than the one he pro- 
posed. 

I have already spoken of Petrusevitch's idea of thrust- 
ing a wedge from Merv and Sarakhs to the gates of 
Herat. That idea, I mentioned, seemed to me so fraught 
with danger, that I wrote a book on it — " Merv the 
Queen of the World " — illustrating the serious character 
of the claim in a series of maps. On those maps I drew 
the Afghan frontier as Petrusevitch desired it to be, and 
I said on the first of the series that the frontier was 
Petrusevitch's. The whole purport of the book, I 
should add, was to expose and denounce this preten- 
sion. Well, the Pall Mall Gazette, ignoring the whole 
book, tore out one of the maps, and declared that " I " 
had assigned the wedge frontier to Afghanistan, and had 
supported it ! 

Now, if the Russian case was so sound, why was all 
this lying needed ? As a retort, let me mention some- 
thing about the Pall Mall Gazette. On the 2 2d Febru- 
ary, 1884, it published an article with a map, in which 
it denounced the fuss about the annexation of Merv, 



THE QUESTION OF THE BOUNDARIES. 95 

implying it would lead to nothing further, and said that 
" Mr. Charles Marvin and Mr. Ashmead Bartlett were 
the only two alarmists in the country." In that map 
the Pall Mall Gazette itself traced the Afghan frontier 
as running from Sarakhs to Imam Bukush, north of all 
the country now occupied by Russia. 

It was by such artifices as the manipulation of my 
maps that the pro-Russian party in London did their 
best to break down English opposition to the Russian 
retention of the gates of Herat. Lessar's mission was 
not wholly without success. If he did not create a cave, 
he made a rift in English public opinion. When he first 
arrived the Gladstone Government angrily demanded 
that Russia should immediately withdraw from the gates 
of Herat. England virtually presented an ultimatum. 
Before he had been a month in London the Govern- 
ment, yielding to the insidious pressure exercised at 
home, and the determined front made by Russia on the 
Afghan frontier, withdrew that ultimatum. 



CHAPTER V. 

HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 

Misconceptions respecting Herat — What Russian and English gen- 
erals really mean when they call it the Key of India — The raid- 
way camping-ground between the Caspian and India — Russia's 
intrusion on the camping-ground — Character of the country 
claimed or occupied by Russia — Impossibility of severing it from 
Herat — No mountain barrier whatever between Herat and the 
new Russian outposts — The tribes on the Russo-Afghan frontier 
— Russia's design on Afghan Turkestan. 

" A body of European troops established at Herat, and 
standing with its front to the southeast, would draw 
upon it the attention of the whole population of India. 
In that lies the significance of a military occupation of 
Herat ; and it is not without reason that a number of 
English experts, knowing India well, have expressed 
their belief that were an enemy to occupy Herat with a 
powerful force, the English army, without having fired 
a shot, would consider itself half beaten." 

These words were penned by General Soboleff in 
1882. He was then chief of the Asiatic branch of the 
General Staff, and exercised a large control over the 
Russian military advance in Central Asia. Subse- 
quently he was appointed Minister of War in Bulgaria, 
where he distinguished himself by his zeal in Russianiz- 
ing the country, with the idea of hastening the time for 
a fresh advance upon Constantinople. More recently 
he has rendered himself notorious by a fierce tirade 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 97 

against England, published in the IZuss about a month 
after the time Komaroff and Alikhanoff insulted Sir 
Peter Lumsden at Sarakhs. 

" Herat is a very large city, and does not cede in size 
to Tashkent. It contains 50,000 people. Among the 
cities of Central Asia and Khorassan, Herat, by its 
buildings, occupies a place next to Meshed. The city 
is surrounded by walls twelve feet high, with a shallow 
ditch outside. There are no outer defences of any 
kind ; nothing that would call to mind the fortifications 
of a European city. In its present condition, Herat is 
not in a position to defend itself against a European 
army, since at a mile to the north it is commanded by 
heights, from which it could be bombarded by artillery. 
It is reckoned to possess immense strategical import- 
ance." 

This brief account was written some years ago by 
General Grodekoff, the officer appointed by Alexander 
II. to act as chief of Kaufmann's staff in 1878, when 
an attack upon India was projected. After peace was 
concluded at Berlin, he rode home from Tashkent 
through Herat, and stayed at the place several days. 
The opinions of Soboleff and Grodekoff, as military 
officers of high rank and capacity, are surely worth con- 
sideration ; yet we have certain political flounderers in 
our midst who say that, " After all, they doubt whether 
Herat is of any real value to India." 

They say this, ignoring what Sir Henry Hamley, Sir 
Frederick Roberts, Sir Charles MacGregor, Lord Na- 
pier of Magdala, and other great English generals have 
spoken or written respecting the " immense strategical 
importance of Herat." The public have their choice. 
On the one hand are the carefully-weighed opinions of 



98 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

a great array of brilliant soldiers, who have fought and 
bled for the Empire; on the other is the hare-brained chat- 
ter of a few political babblers, who have done their ut- 
most to involve that Empire in its present complications. 
Now is the time for England to make up her mind 
about Herat. She can safeguard it, or she can let it 
drift into Russia's possession. One thing, however, she 
would do well to realize in time — if she does not value 
Herat, Russia does ; and Russia values it so much that, 
by hook or by crook, she means to have it. 

To a reporter of the Press Association, Lessar said, 
March 15th : " We have no intentions on Herat, which 
is altogether out of the sphere of our action." 

The same Lessar wrote to the Novoe Vremya in No- 
vember, 1883, when the Russian troops were already 
massing on the Tejend and in Khiva for Alikhanoff's 
dash upon Merv : " The longer Merv remains inde- 
pendent, the better for Russia : its occupation would not 
be difficult, while possession would be extremely un- 
profitable." 

On February 29th, 1882, M. de Giers said to Sir 
Edward Thornton, using the very words employed by 
Lessar : " Russia has no intentions whatever of occu- 
pying Merv and Sarakhs." Within two years from this 
period of " no intentions " Merv was a Russian possession. 

So that it will not do to rely upon Russia's disinter- 
estedness as a safeguard to Herat. The question, 
therefore, to consider is — Is Herat worth safeguarding, 
and can we safely allow Russia to remain in possession 
of its gates ? 

The city of Herat has found an eloquent historian in 
the person of Colonel Malleson, whose " Herat : the 
Granary and Garden of the East " ought to be read by 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 99 

everybody at this juncture. It is one of the oldest 
cities in the East and was once one of the richest. To use 
the words of a Persian geographer, " the city has been 
fifty times taken, fifty times destroyed, and fifty times 
has it risen from its ashes." Six hundred and sixty 
years ago it contained, according to the records of the 
period, 12,000 retail shops, 6,000 public baths, caravan- 
serais, and water mills, 350 schools and monastic in- 
stitutions, and 144,000 occupied houses, and was yearly 
visited by caravans from all parts of Asia. When 
Chingiz Khan passed across the East, devastating the 
region, Herat is said to have suffered by the two storm- 
ings it experienced at his hands a loss of a million and 
a half of men. In subsequent ages its splendor re- 
vived, and it was a great and flourishing city down to 
comparatively modern times. 

Summing up in his masterly manner the career of 
Herat, Colonel Malleson says : " A glance at the 
record of the past will show that from time immemo- 
rial the city was regarded as an outlying bulwark, the 
possession of which was necessary prior to attempting 
the conquest of India ; the holding of which by India 
or by quasi-vassal powers dependent on India, would 
render impossible an invasion of that country. It was 
so considered by Alexander, by Mahmud and his suc- 
cessors, by Chingiz Khan, by Taimur, by Nadir Shah, 
by Ahmad Shah, and by Muhammad Shah, the Persian 
Prince who attacked it in 1837. In the cases of all but 
the last the possession of Herat led to the conquest of 
India ; in the case of the last the successful defence of 
that city rendered invasion impossible. 

" The hasty reader may object — what can the posses- 
sion of one city signify ? A question of this nature 



100 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

touches the real point of the argument Herat is called 
the gate of India, because through it, and through it 
alone, the valleys can be entered which lead to the only 
vulnerable part of India. Those valleys, running nearly 
north and south, are protected to the east by inaccesi- 
ble ranges, to the west by impracticable deserts. No 

ing army could dare to attempt to traverse the 
great salt desert, and the desert immediately south of 
it, the Dasht-i-Xaubad, whilst a British army held 
Herat. As long as that army should hold Herat, so 
long would an invasion of India be impossible. In his 
masterly lecture at the Royal United Institution, in 
November, 1878. General llamley laid down the broad 
principle that if England were to hold the western line 
of communication with India, that by Herat and Can- 
dahar. she need not trouble herself much about the 
eastern, or the Cabul line. On the same occasion, Sir 
Henry Rawlinson declared, in reply to a question put to 
him by Lord Elcho, that rather than allow the occupa- 
tion of Herat by Russia, he would venture the whole 
might of British India. That high authority saw clearly 

I have feebly endeavored to demonstrate in these 
pages — that the possession of Herat by Russia means 
the possession of that one line by which India can be 
invaded : that the possession of Herat by England 
means the annihilation of all the Russian hopes of an 
invasion of India. Let the reader imagine that Can- 
dahar is the frontier British station ; that between 
Herat and Candahar is a long lane, so protected on both 
sides that the man who may wish to traverse any part 
of it to Candahar must enter by Herat. Is it not obvious 
that the power which shall hold Herat will completely 
dominate the lane ? It is this which makes the posses- 
sion of Herat by England a matte r of vital consequence. 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. IOI 

"Another fact illustrates the enormous value of Herat. 
Place an army there, and nothing need be brought to it 
from Europe. Within the limits of the Herati territory 
all the great roads leading on India converge. The 
mines of the Herati district supply lead, iron, and sul- 
phur ; the surface of many parts of the country is laden 
with saltpetre ; the willow and the poplar, which make 
the best charcoal, abound ; the fields produce in abun- 
dance corn, and wine, and oil. From the population, at- 
tracted to its new rulers by good government, splen- 
did soldiers might be obtained. 

" Such are the military advantages presented by 
Herat to the power that shall occupy it. Should that 
power be an enemy, Herat would be to him an eye to 
see and an arm to strike — an eye to pry into every 
native court of Hindustan, to watch the discontents and 
the broodings of the rulers, the heart-burnings of their 
subordinates. From watching and noting to fermenting 
and stirring up there is but one short step. Every court, 
every bazaar, in India, would note the presence on the 
frontier, in a position not only unassailable, but becoming 
every day more and more capable of assailing, of a first- 
class power, the secret enemy of England, and professing 
the most unselfish anxiety to relieve them in their dis- 
tress. An arm to strike, because a few years of intelli- 
gent rule would render the valley of the Hari Rud 
capable of supporting and equipping an army strong 
enough even to invade India. 

" In a third sense, likewise, the possession of Herat by 
an enemy would be not less dangerous to England. The 
roads converging on it, already alluded to, are traversed 
by caravans to which no other route is available. We 
may be sure that the city which successfully resisted the 



102 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

rivalry of Meshed, when Meshed was backed by all the 
influence of the Shahs of Persia, will take a still higher 
position when supported by the might either of England 
or of Russia. The European power whose influence 
shall be paramount in Herat will rule the markets of 
Central Asia. More even than that. The possession 
of Herat by Russia means the exclusion of England 
from the markets of Central Asia." 

The city stands on the right bank of the Hari Rud, 
from which water is brought by several channels. It is 
built in the form of a rectangle, the north and south 
faces being about 1,500, and the east and west faces 
1,600 yards in length. Enclosing the city is an immense 
earthwork about 50 feet high, surmounted by a wall 
ranging from 25 to 30 feet, with a deep moat, which can 
be easily flooded from the Hari Rud. The citadel is sit- 
uated in the centre of the city, and is also surrounded by 
a moat. There are five gates, of which one, however, 
is closed up, and each is flanked by two bastions. The 
city is bridged at each of the four gates by a wooden 
drawbridge, which is raised and lowered by mechanical 
appliances worked from inside the walls. Each face of 
the four walls is furnished with from 25 to 30 bastions. 
On the exterior slope of the embankment, supporting 
the walls, are two lines of shelter trenches, one above the 
other, carried all around the city, except where the gates 
are. A correspondent with Lumsden's mission describes 
the mounted armament as some " twenty guns of varied 
calibres, besides numberless others lying dismounted on 
the ramparts." Twenty guns to defend 3 \ miles of 
wall ! The garrison consists of 4,000 or 5,000 troops, 
exclusive of irregulars. 

It may be mentioned that the Russians have complete 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 103 

plans of the fortifications, obtained by General Grodekoff 
in 1878. 

The estimates of the population show considerable 
divergence. The first during the present century was 
Christie, who visited the place in 1809, and reckoned the 
population at 100,000. Burnes and Shakspeare called 
at Herat on their way north. Conolly was there in 
1828-30, and gives 65,000 as the figure ; while Pottin- 
ger, in 1837-8, states the number at about 40,000 ; and 
Ferrier, in 1845, estimated it as low as 22,000. Whether 
any of the numbers, or all of them, were correct, is im- 
possible to say ; but since Herat is a rendezvous for the 
country people when threatened by the enemy, each es- 
timate may be quite correct for the year stated. Later, 
in 1865, Pollock again gave 100,000 ; and in 1878 Gen- 
eral Grodekoff thought the approximate number was 
close on 50,000. The latter figure is now generally ac- 
cepted by geographers. Candahar has also 50,000 or 
60,000 inhabitants. These are the only two towns lying 
between the Russians and "India. 

To most Englishmen Herat is associated with the brill- 
iant defence of the city which Eldred Pottinger main- 
tained in 1837 against a Persian army of 40,000 men and 
60 guns; commanded by Muhamad Shah. A large num- 
ber of Russian officers participated in the siege, and an 
entire Russian regiment. Pottinger, a young Bombay 
military officer, happened to be exploring in the neigh- 
borhood when they arrived, and persuading the Afghans 
to allow him to control the defence, maintained a despe- 
rate resistance of ten months, when the Persians retired. 
It may be noted that the Persians marched from the 
Caspian via Askabad and Meshed to Herat, by a road 
550 miles long, running parallel with the one vid Kras- 



104 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

novodsk and Askabad. This road was supposed to be 
the best highway of invasion to India, but Lessar's dis- 
covery of the easy section from Sarakhs to Herat proved 
the one now held by the Russians to be superior. As 
the Russians are almost certain before many years are 
past to absorb Khorassan, the second Transcaspian road 
will also come into their possession. 

In 1881, when English people were still incredulous 
as to the practicability of a Russian invasion of India, I 
put forward this argument : that Persia, having in 1837 
marched 35,000 troops and 50 guns (composed of 18 
and 24-pounders) from the Caspian to Herat, and in 
1880, Ayoub Khan 30,000 troops and 30 guns from 
Herat to Candahar, to which point various English 
armies had advanced from the Indus with guns, there- 
fore there was absolutely no physical obstacle to the 
marching of a powerful Russian force with heavy ar- 
tillery all the way from the Caspian to India. The 
terrific mountain barrier many English politicians still 
believe in I asserted to be sheer moonshine. Since then 
this practicable line of invasion has been supplemented 
by the second that the Russians now hold, and of which 
I have said it is so flat and easy that one could drive a 
four-in-hand all the way to the outposts of Quetta. In 
the event of war, both routes would be used by Russia. 

Since 1856, when Persia advanced a second time and 
took Herat, for which we went to war with her and made 
her retire, the Shah's power has been rapidly declining 
in Khorassan. A detachment of 2,000 or 3,000 Russian 
troops — even less — planted at Astrabad and Shahrood 
would sever all communication between Teheran and 
the rotting, misgoverned Transcaspian province of 
Khorassan, and Russia could utilize its resources to the 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 105 

fullest extent for an attack upon Herat. Considering 
how imbecile and corrupt the Shah's rule is notoriously 
known to be, it has always seemed in my eyes an 
astounding piece of bad statesmanship that Lord Lyt- 
ton should have entertained for one moment in 1879 
the idea of severing Herat from Afghanistan, and con- 
fiding it to the care of Nassr-ed-din. One might as well 
have set a mouse to guard a piece of cat's-meat from a 
tabby. 

In its present condition the fortress of Herat is ad- 
mittedly not strong, and it would require a considerable 
amount of exertion on the part of the officers attached 
to Lumsden's mission to render it secure from a Russian 
attack. This admitted weakness has given rise to the 
remark more than once of late that, such being the case, 
we could hardly call it the Key of India. 

But this contention, which is mainly put forward by 
men who have not taken the pains to read the argu- 
ments of Malleson and other authorities, or who, if they 
have, from lack of memory have forgotten them, will 
not bear serious examination one moment. A score of 
the ablest generals of the day, in Russia as well as in 
England, have declared Herat to be the Key of India. 
Do you think that they are likely to be wrong, because 
some mole-eyed man of peace has made the discovery 
that the defences of Herat are a little bit out of repair ? 
Admit that they are ; what then ? Are the military 
resources of the Russian empire so meagre that, after 
the Tsar had seized the place, he cannot apply a few 
patches ? 

But the issue raised is a totally false one. Concen- 
trating their gaze too much upon the town, men over- 
look the locality. What is the Key of India ? On this 



106 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

point a deal of misconception prevails, which I have 
been doing my utmost to dispel for a long time.* 

In England the impression is widespread that such 
English generals as MacGregor and Hamley, and such 
Russian commanders as Skobeleff and Kaufmann, have 
concurred in regarding Herat as the Key of India, solely 
because it is a great fortress, or because it may be made 
to be one. But these generals have always looked at 
Herat in a wider sense, as may be, indeed, almost in- 
ferred from the remarks I have quoted of Malleson. 

Our generals and the generals of Russia value Herat, 
not solely on account of the city, but on account of the 
resources of the district in which it is situated— resources 
in corn and beef, which, if swept into any point of the 
Herat district, not necessarily to Herat itself, would feed 
an army of at least 100,000 men, and sustain them dur- 
ing the final advance upon India. It is this great camp- 
ing-ground, and not exclusively the town of Herat, that 
is the Key of India. If a line be drawn south of Herat 
100 miles to Furrah, a second west 70 miles to Kusanon 
the Persian frontier, and a third 120 miles north, behind 
the points occupied by the Russians, a rough idea may 
be formed of a district as fertile as England throughout, 
and possessing marvellous mineral resources. This is 
the camping-ground, this is the place of arms, which 

* Let me quote two instances. A correspondent of the Times of 
India, accompanying Ridgeway's force, wrote in November that 
the sight of the Herat fortifications disappointed him ; now he had 
seen the place, he doubted whether it was really the Key of India. 
On the 6th of March, Sir George Campbell, speaking at a lecture I 
gave at the Royal Aquarium, also questioned its being the Key of 
India, because " the place is very weak, and could be easily taken 
by a European enemy." 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. I0y 

Russia wants, in order that she may be always able to 
threaten India. There is no such camping-ground any- 
where between the Caspian and Herat, and none again 
between Herat and India. Hence, not without reason, 
have the ablest generals of England and Russia desig- 
nated the district the Key of India. 

General MacGregor put this plainly enough in his 
" Khorassan," in 1875 : " From the fort attached to the 
village I had a fine view of the valley of Herat, which 
stretched in every direction but the south, one sea of 
yellow fields and verdant trees. Without going further, 
it was easy to see the value of Herat to any power with 
intentions on India, and to recognize the justice of the 
dictum which termed it the gate of India. Just as in the 
minor operations of the capture of a city the wise com- 
mander will give his troops a breathe, on their gaining 
the outer defences, so must every general coming from 
the west rest his men awhile in this valley. And no bet- 
ter place could be found for this purpose ; abundance of 
beautiful water, quantities of wheat and barley and rice, 
endless herds of cattle and sheep, good forage, and a 
fine climate — all combine to make the Herat valley the 
most apt place for a halt before entering the desolate 
country between Furrah and Candahar." * 

* MacGregor thus defined, in 1875, why Herat was the Key of 
India : " Because it is the nearest and best point at which an invader 
could concentrate and prepare for an invasion of that country — ad- 
vantages .which it gains from its beautiful valley, the fertility of 
which is unrivalled in Asia ; from its strategical position, which 
gives it the command of all the important roads to India ; from the 
great strength of its fortress, it being, in fact, the strongest place 
from the Caspian to the Indus ; from its admirable climate, and 
from the prestige it enjoys throughout Asia. The fertility of its 
valley, and its capability of maintaining large forces is proved by 



108 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

The significance of the recent Russian advance con- 
sists in this — that the Russians have established them- 
selves inside the very limits of the Herat district ; in 
other words, they have violated the integrity of the Key 
of India. Ak Robat, Pul-i-Khisti, etc., which Russia has 
seized, are inseparable parts of the Key of India. Penj- 
deh, which they claim, is absolutely essential to its 
security. These places are included within the fertile 
zone of Herat. The Russians have crossed the desert 
zone and established themselves upon it. They have 
settled down on the edge of the great camping-ground I 
have described. Shall they remain there ? That is the 
point which England has got to settle. If they do re- 
main — if we resign to Russia the gates of Herat — the 
Alikhanoffs and the Komaroffs will soon possess them- 
selves of the rest of the great camping-ground, and hold 
the Key of India. 

Most unwarrantably, without provocation on the part 
of Englishmen or Afghans, Russia has intruded on the 

the fact that it has been besieged oftener than any other city in 
Asia, and has always afforded supplies for the armies of both be- 
siegers and besieged. And, it must be remembered, the first have 
sometimes reached as many as 80,000 men, and have seldom fallen 
below 30,000 ; while both have always been composed of undisci- 
plined men, who destroyed nearly as much as they consumed. Be- 
sides all the positive and patent advantages which the place itself 
possesses, Russia in Herat would have an unassailable position from 
which to threaten us in India, so as to compel us to keep large 
forces always ready to meet the menace, while she would be able 
to cast abroad throughout India that ' seething, festering mass of 
disaffection/ the seeds of a rebellion that would still further cripple 
us ; she would altogether alienate from us the whole of the Afghans 
and the Persian Khorassanese, and would practically control for her 
own purposes nearly all their military resources." 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. IO9 

fertile zone of Herat. England is within her right in 
demanding that she shall clear off. 

To excuse her seizure, she asserts the necessity for a 
scientific frontier, and contends that the one she pro- 
poses is in every respect as good for the Afghans as for 
herself. Let us see if that be the case. 

Round about Sarakhs, on the Hari Rud, is a certain 
margin of very cultivable ground, broken by a stretch 
of less fertile or sterile ground, higher up the river 
towards Zulfikar. Up the Murghab another, but more 
thoroughly desert district, separates the Merv zone from 
Penjdeh. The Sarakhs zone and the Merv zone thus 
formed two excellent links in the chain of a fortified 
frontier, running from Askabad to Khoja Saleh, on the 
Oxus ; and the line being that recognized by Russian 
diplomacy, ought to have been insisted upon as the 
frontier by the English Government. 

As I understand, this was formerly done, but in order 
not to restrict Russia to an arbitrary line, certain modi- 
fications were admitted to be possible. The very utmost 
limit of those concessions was Pul-i-Khatun, in the Hari 
Rud, and Sariyazi, on the Murghab. This would have 
effectually secured Russia all the country belonging to 
the Sarakhs and Merv districts, with perhaps a trifle be- 
yond ; but the security of Herat would not have been 
so grossly assailed as it is now. 

This concession would not have altogether pleased 
England, for Pul-i-Khatun is a very important strategi- 
cal point. It is only 80 miles from Meshed, and con- 
trols the roads leading thither from Central Asia. Es- 
tablished there, Russia secured a lodgment, so to say, 
in the Meshed district ; and as her designs on that rich 
city are well known, such proximity was not desirable. 



110 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

It further meant bringing the Cossack 39 miles nearer 
the Key of India. Still, as I have said, for the sake of 
an amicable settlement, the country might have toler- 
ated this concession. 

But Russia was not content with this. She stepped 
across this Pul-i-Khatun-Sariyazi line, and traversing 
the country beyond seized a new line of her own, be- 
ginning at Zulfikar and running through Ak Robat to 
Pul-i-khisti. This new new line was on purely Herati 
ground, and concentrating what I have to say upon it, 
I will show what this advanced position is, and how es- 
sential it is that Russia should be compelled to fall back 
to the line which the English Government was, as I 
imagine, prepared to cede to it. 

On the map Herat is shown to have lying north of it 
a mountain range, called the Paropamisus Mountains, 
which shields the Herat valley, and is claimed by Rus- 
sia to be an effectual barrier to the city. Russia knows 
that the English public is slow in ridding itself of geo- 
graphical errors, and she therefore talks plausibly of a 
" mountain barrier, with the passes in Afghan hands," 
as an admirable frontier for Herat. But this is a trifle. 
She audaciously puts forward as the spokesman of this 
pretension the very man who, three years ago, upset 
geography and the policy of Russia and England in 
Central Asia, by demonstrating that the Paropamisus 
was no barrier at all ! That man was Lessar. 

It is well known to politicians what a shock he ad- 
ministered to England in 1882, when he pushed on to 
Herat and found the Paropamisus, hitherto considered 
to be a mountain block, 15,000 or 20,000 feet high, to 
to be but hills 900 feet or so above the surrounding 
locality. Can one call a series of hills, three times the 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. Ill 

height of St. Paul's Cathedral, " a mountain barrier," ? 
One might as well call Shooter's Hill Mont Blanc. 

Let me quote an extract from the Times correspon- 
dent accompanying Sir Peter Lumsden, published March 
1 2th. He says: "You will see on the map that two 
branches of the Paropamisus run from Herat across 
Badgheis to the Hari Rud — one north-west (the Bark- 
hut Hills), and the other west. In reality, only the 
former exists — the southern branch of the Paropamisus 
is a shadow, unless, indeed, it is represented by the gen- 
tle undulations of gravelly soil, covered with camel 
thorn and assafcetida, which intervene between Herat 
valley and the latter. Thus melts away one of those 
stupendous natural obstacles to the invasion of Herat, 
among which optimist imaginations have hitherto gam- 
bolled so gayly." 

Let us have this clear. Between the Russian posi- 
tion, stretching from Zulfikar to Pul-i-khisti, north of 
the Paropamisus, and the Herat valley south of it, there 
is only one "range." That range is full of passes, 
and on one of them (the Sar-i-Chashma) the correspon- 
dent stood, and he tells us what he saw, gazing in the 
direction of the Russian position. "A striking pano- 
rama unfolded itself before us. A vast sea of grassy 
billowy downs swept to the foot of the Djam moun- 
tains in the far west, and to the north rolled away as 
far as the eye could see, its undulating surface being 
only broken by the island hills which enclose the island 
of Penjdeh. This, then, was the bleak, sterile, moun- 
tainous country which we had thought of with a shiver, 
when our eyes, tired of staring, glaring deserts, were 
enjoying the rich fertility of the Herat valley. Mountain- 
ous — as mountainous as the Brighton Downs ! Bleak — 



112 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

the climate of the Engadine in August! Sterile — groves 
of pistachio and mulberry trees, wild rose trees, real Eng- 
lish blackberry bushes, wild carrots, testified to the rich- 
ness of the soil, irrigated in many places by mountain 
streams of the purest water, alive with fish ! And this 
was autumn, the eve of winter ; what then must Bad- 
gheis be in spring ? Why it should be named Badgheis 
("windy") I know not, for since we have crossed the 
Sich Bubak we have been sheltered in its kindly bosom 
from the fierce biting blasts which never ceased to as- 
sail us from Seistan to Kusan. How it has obtained its 
reputation for sterility is not difficult to say. Scarcely an 
acre of this rich soil is cultivated ; scarcely, I say, for a 
few acres to the north of the Chashma Sabz Pass are 
rudely tilled by a Turcoman, who acquainted us with his 
existence by rushing into our camp and throwing him- 
self on the ground with loud cries. It transpired that 
he was a servant of one Aziz Sirdar, an ex-Tekke chief 
of Merv, with whom he had fled from Merv when the 
Russian occupation was imminent. He had left his wife 
and children behind him, and was anxious that when we 
turned the Russians out of Merv we should restore them 
to him. As for Aziz Sirdar, he- befriended the Ameer 
when he fled from Afghanistan and passed through Merv 
on his way to Khiva. When trouble befell Aziz Sirdar, and 
he had to leave Merv, he appealed to the gratitude of 
Abdurrahman Khan, who had become Ameer of Afghan- 
istan, and not in vain, for he was presented with a village 
in the Herat valley and with some land in Badgheis." 

To speak, therefore, of a mountain barrier protecting 
Herat from the Russian outposts is nonsense. It is a 
series of downs, traversed by numerous roads, which 
are only of any difficulty in one or two instances in the 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 113 

section immediately north of Herat. But there is no 
reason why Russia should take these one or two diffi- 
cult roads, when there are, as Lessar admits, a score of 
better ones further west, where an advance can be made 
more easily. It would be impossible for the Afghans to 
protect the whole length of the Paropamisus, and the 
closer, therefore, the Russians get to the downs the 
more quickly they will be able to step across them into 
the Herat valley. If they retain what they have, and 
secure what they claim, the Herat valley will be prac- 
tically at their mercy. 

The fertile country immediately north of the Paropa- 
misus is known as Badgheis, and has always been treated 
as part and parcel of the district of Herat. It was once 
a populous, well-cultivated country, and now that the 
raids of the Merv Tekkes have ceased, tribesmen are 
flowing to it from all parts of Western Afghanistan. 
It has no natural connection with the Merv .district, nor 
yet again with that of Sarakhs. On the other hand, 
there is an inseparable connection between Badgheis 
and the valley of Herat. 

Standing on the summit of the Paropamisus, as the 
Times correspondent recently did, the observer would 
naturally divide Badgheis into two sections. Gazing 
down the slopes, he would have on the right hand the 
Kuskh-Murghab region, the objective of the Russian 
advance from Merv, and the Hari Rud region, the 
objective of that from Sarakhs. The latter Russia 
claims "because the Salors pasture their flocks there ; 
the former she demands with the Sariks. This is what 
she calls her " ethnographical claim." She has annexed 
a number of the Turcoman tribes (in the case of Merv 
fraudulently), therefore she has a right to the rest. If 
8 



114 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

they are not annexed, she says that the frontier will be 
in a state of constant tumult. 

Now, let us see what these turbulent tribes really are. 
First, let us take the Salors, on whose behalf the Rus- 
sians demand the Hari Rud section of Badgheis. 

Once a great tribe, the Salors were shattered by the 
Persians in 1833 in punishment for their raids. After 
this they migrated for a time to the Murghab from 
Sarakhs, where they had been long established, and 
then settled at Zurabad, a district in Persia, on the west 
side of the Hari Rud, not far from Zulfikar. After a 
while they got tired of Zurabad, and returned to 
Sarakhs. Here the Tekkes fell upon them, seized their 
cattle and property, and carried the tribe off to Merv. 
This was in 187 1. The tribe then numbered about 
3,000 families. 

These are facts taken from Petrusevitch's report, 
which is given in full in my " Merv." While O'Dono- 
van was at Merv, in 1881, the Salors, with the consent 
of the Tekkes, took their departure. Their proper 
home was Old Sarakhs, but the Persians would not let 
them settle there, and made them pass on to Zurabad. 

In 1882 Lessar paid them a visit and published a 
report, which is also given in full in my " Russians at 
Merv." He confirmed Petrusevitch's statements, and 
added that they were miserably poor. Altogether the 
whole Salor tribe did not number more than 4,000 
families, of whom 2,000 only were at Zurabad ; 1,000 
were encamped with the Sariks on the Murghab (a 
number of whom appear to have subsequently mi- 
grated to Zurabad), 400 were on Russian soil at Tchard- 
jui, 200 on Afghan soil at Maimene, and 100 at Pul- 
i-Salar, close to Herat. 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 115 

On the 17th of December, 1884, Lessar delivered a 
lecture at St. Petersburg on Merv, which I have before 
me now, and in this he added to the foregoing : " The 
Salors are extremely poor ; they have scarcely any tents ; 
they live in reed huts ; cattle they have scarcely any, 
and their principal occupation is agriculture." 

Now we can smash into the lies that have gathered 
about the Russian claim. First let us put that claim 
in precise language. Russia demands the whole of the 
Hari Rud, or western half of Badgheis, including Pul-i- 
Khatun, Zulfikar, Nihalshini, and practically the whole 
country south of Sarakhs, to the Paropamisus, and east 
to Ak Robat, because, (1) the Salor tribe has from timft 
immemorial pastured their herds there ; (2) because the 
people cannot do without that pasture land ; (3) and 
because the tribe is so turbulent that if it were not an- 
nexed there would be no peace on the frontier. 

In reply, England, basing her rejoinder on Russian 
facts, can say this : That the Salors belong to Old 
Sarakhs, and as that is their favorite district and home 
and there is plenty of land there, thither they ought to re- 
turn. That the fact of their having from time imme- 
morial pastured their flocks in Badgheis is untrue, for it is 
only since 1881 that they have been dwelling at Zurabad, 
excluding a very brief interval twenty years ago. That 
they have hardly any cattle now, and therefore do not 
need the pasture lands. That they are so poor and 
shattered, that they have not perpetrated a raid, or been 
guilty of turbulence, for nearly a quarter of a century. 
Finally, that they are not camped (at Zurabad) on Afghan 
soil at all, but on Persian, and cannot be held to have the 
slightest claim to the unoccupied Badgheis district east 
of the Hari Rud. 



Il6 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

I might add that, so far as is known, the 2,000 or 
3,000 miserable Salor peasants at Zurabad have displayed 
no desire to become Russian subjects. But even sup- 
posing they have acquiesced, are we to surrender the 
whole of the west Badgheis district to Russia on that 
account, with Zulfikar and other gates of Herat? I 
say no ; and if you, reader, say no with equal firmness, 
the Russians shall never retain them. 

Parenthetically, but none the less seriously, let me 
point out a great and growing danger arising out of 
this claim to the Salor Turcomans. If Russia retains 
the West Badgheis district she will also annex, obviously, 
Zurabad, on the Persian side of the Hari Rud, and we 
have no knowledge as to how far that annexation may 
stretch. In all probability it will extend up to within 
a short distance of Meshed, because Petrusevitch, who 
first gave the hint to Russia to push the wedge from 
Sarakhs and Merv to Herat, urged also that the Persian 
frontier should be bulged in from the Hari Rud to the 
capital of Khorassan.* 

Therefore, let it be clearly understood that if we yield 
Zulfikar and the western gates of Herat, we not only 
give Russia control over avenues within one hundred 
miles of the Key of India, but we also seal the fate of 
Meshed and the great Persian dependency of Khorassan 
— the golden country, the granary of Transcaspia. 

On that account, when England is asked to surrender 
a " few miles of barren country " and a " mere bit of 
pasture land " on " ethnographical grounds," it is well 
she should clearly realize what she is really asked to do. 

No diplomatists, as she should surely know by this 

* This is shown in several maps in my " Merv." 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 117 

time, surpass those of Russia in the art of wrapping 
up mendacious claims in cotton wool. 

Having disposed of the Hari Rud section of the 
Badgheis district, let us deal with the Murghab. The 
principal feeder of this river is the Kushk, which rises 
in the Paropamisus immediately north of Herat, within 
forty miles, and, flowing parallel with the Hari Rud, 
joins the Murghab where Fort Ak Tepe controls the 
Penjdeh district. 

The east section of Badgheis is claimed with the Sarik 
tribe and because of that tribe. 

Now, I have already shown that the Penjdeh Sariks 
have never had any wish to be Russian subjects, that 
they hate the people of Merv, that they are naturally 
separated from them by a band of desert intersecting 
the Murghab, which the Russians have crossed ; that 
they have long been subjects of the Ameer, and that the 
lands they hold are Afghan lands. The Russians, there- 
fore, have not the shadow of a claim to this section. 
The Sariks of Penjdeh number eight thousand families, 
and, although they were once great raiders — they were 
always fighting with the Merv Tekkes — they have be- 
come so tame since the Russians occupied Merv and 
the Afghans Ak Tepe, that the frontier is totally free 
from turbulence and crime. A correspondent writes 
from there that scarcely any carry arms ; that they are a 
happy, contented, hard-working people, and that Eng- 
lish officers are able to ride about the country provided 
with no weapons for self-defence. 

Russian writers have stated over and over again since 
1 88 1 that directly Russia suppressed the raids carried 
on by the Tekkes of Akhal, the people immediately sub- 
sided into hard-working peasants. The same has been 



Il8 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

the case with the Sariks at Penjdeh. The contention, 
therefore, that Russia must annex the Sariks, to keep 
them quiet, is preposterous. What is really wanted is 
some one to annex the Russians, to keep them quiet. 
They are the "turbulent tribes" on the Afghan frontier. 

The special correspondent of the Daily News writes 
from Penjdeh, December 7, that he arrived there, ex- 
pecting to find the Sariks savage monsters. " There 
they were before us working in their fields, peaceable, 
good-natured, and smiling fellows. We had seen them 
at work some days back, and found them a simple, 
harmless people. . . . The chiefs of the Sariks have 
manifested the most friendly feelings toward us. They 
all express themselves as being most friendly, not only 
to the Ameer, but also to the British Government." 

Now, since the eight thousand Sank families at Penj- 
deh are quite content with Afghan rule, and are alto- 
gether averse to Russia, why should this country hand 
them over to the Tsar, on "ethnographical grounds," 
for the sake of a frontier which Russian officials candidly 
admit among themselves is only temporary ? If our pres- 
tige had not fallen so low, such a monstrous demand 
would have never been made. Russia has not the 
slightest right to Penjdeh, and if Englishmen put them- 
selves shoulder to shoulder at this crisis she shall never 
have it. But there is one thing which must not be lost 
sight of. In withholding Penjdeh from Russia, we must 
insist on the evacuation of Ak Robat and Pul-i-Khisti, 
the retention of which by Russia would render Penj- 
deh practically worthless. 

It is between the Hari Rud and Kushk rivers that the 
salt lakes lie, which Russia claims with the Sarik Turco- 
mans. If she has no right to the one she has none to 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 119 

the other. It is said that the tribesmen ruled by Russia 
cannot do without these lakes, but this is a wide and 
hazy pretension. There is any amount of salt in the 
Caspian region, and eastward of it towards Merv, thus 
securing Russia's Transcaspian subjects, while, as the 
Sariks of Penjdeh have been the principal users of those 
lakes, "the indispensable necessity" of Russia controll- 
ing them does not appear very apparent. The amount 
of salt used by the frontier tribesmen is extremely insig- 
nificant, and the fact that Russia should include the 
claim at all among her pretensions indicates how weak 
her case is. 

Before dismissing Russia's demand for Penjdeh, a few 
particulars about the locality may not be out of place. 

Ak Tepe is the controlling point of the Penjdeh dis- 
trict, and it was there that the Afghans built a fort when 
they occupied the Sarik locality last year. It is situated 
on a huge mound (hence its name " White Hill ") on a 
piece of flat alluvial ground, round which the Murghab 
passes in a winding course before joining the Kushk. 
The site is on the east, not on the west side of the 
Kushk River, as represented in some maps ; hence, it 
will be seen, the fort not only controls the junction of 
the Kushk and the Murghab, but the whole country in- 
side the two rivers up to the hills overlooking Herat. 
Fort Ak Tepe, with its seventeen guns, is thus in every 
sense a gate to Herat. That gate the Russians would 
have seized if the Afghans had not forestalled them. It 
is included within the territory demanded by Russia. 
The Pall Mall Gazette of March 5 thus described Fort 
Ak Tepe : " The squabble about this trumpery little 
Afghan sentry-box placed in the middle of the Sariks, 
the majority of whom are under Russian authority, - is 



120 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

simply grotesque." This is the pro-Russian way of 
putting the case. There are 4,000 Sariks under Russia, 
and 8,000 under the Ameer. The figures I take from 
Lessar's lecture delivered last year. 

The Penjdeh settlements lie south of the fort, to- 
ward Herat, thickly disposed round the village of Penj- 
deh six miles from Ak Tepe, and afterward stretching 
forty miles or so higher up the Murghab to within 
sight of the Afghan stronghold of Bala Murghab. 
When Russian statesmen speak of Penjdeh, they do not 
mean simply the village of that name, but the whole 
Sarik district, with Fort Ak Tepe. As that fort is the 
principal military point of the district, it would have 
saved some mistakes (?) if more prominence had been 
given to Ak Tepe and less to Penjdeh. Let me cite one 
of these " mistakes." To excuse the Russian advance, 
a certain Radical paper declared that the Afghans had 
advanced thrice toward Merv — first from Herat to Penj- 
deh, second from Penjdeh to Ak Tepe, and third from 
Ak Tepe to Sariyazi ! As a matter of fact, the Af- 
ghans have only made one advance. They planted 
themselves at Ak Tepe last year, and it was only to 
"feel" a rumored Russian advance, after the seizure 
of Pul-i-Khatun, that they threw ahead the temporary 
Sariyazi picket that successfully heralded AlikhanofP s 
raid, and saved Ak Tepe from a surprise. 

Subsequently, however, the Russians seized Pul-i- 
Khisti, or the Brick Bridge, a bridge of nine arches 
spanning the Kushk a few miles from Fort Ak Tepe, 
and leading to the entire Penjdeh district. Its reten- 
tion would render the Afghan fort almost untenable. 
But this is not the worst. They claim Chaman-i-Bed, 
between thirty and forty miles up the Kushk, and have 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 121 

already seized Ak Robat, a place possessing an amazing 
supply of water between it and the Hari Rud at Zulfikar. 
If they be allowed to remain at Ak Robat they might 
just as well have Penjdeh, for they will be able to sever 
it from Herat at any moment. At Ak Robat they are 
within eighty miles of Herat. Penjdeh is variously 
stated to be from ioo to 140 miles from the Key of 
India. The Russians, thus, are a long way to the rear 
of the Afghans. 

Penjdeh is not a simple oasis, like Merv, that can be 
dissevered from Herat. The Sarik settlements stretch 
up to those of the Jemshidis, and the Jemshidis again 
practically up to Herat. One might as well assert that 
the French located at Canterbury would not endanger 
London, as that the Russians at Penjdeh would not be 
a menace to Herat. 

The Jemshidis are very different from what they were 
when Vambery trudged through their country to Herat. 
Even Grodekoff in 1878 spoke highly of them. Writing 
from the spot, the Ti?nes correspondent attached to 
Lumsden's force says of them : " They resemble the 
Turcomans in dress and manners, but they are appar- 
ently a quiet, peaceable people. An English officer 
might safely live among them without any guard, and 
if they have only respite from raids and war they will 
doubtless spread over and multiply in the more healthy 
but deserted lands of Badgheis. They are hardy, clever 
horsemen, and every household breeds its own horses. 
When we were in Kushk the weekly fair was held ; it 
was attended by many Turcomans from Penjdeh and by 
some Firuzkuhis, but by very few Hazaras, with whom 
the Jemshidis are not on very friendly terms. The 
Turcomans brought salt, rice, soap, carpets, horses, 



122 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

sheep, and found for sale in the bazaar ploughshares (of 
cast iron) and hatchets from Maimene ; Russian and 
French loaf sugar, Austrian matches, also Bryant 
and May's, Meshed and Bokhara silk and cotton 
goods. The greater part of the latter was Russian, 
not English — let Manchester draw its own conclu- 
sion." 

Kushk is the central point or capital of the Jemshidis, 
and it is situated on the Paropamisus, close to Herat. 
There are about 4,000 families in the place. Telegraph- 
ing from it some time ago the correspondent of the 
Times of India said : " The climate and temperature are 
delightful. The soil is capable of immense fertility, and 
could support a large population." Even forty years 
ago, Abbott, who traversed the Kushk valley, described 
it to be "highly susceptible of culture, and has been 
once well tilled." 

If the Russians secure Penjdeh, they will have prac- 
tically no obstruction up to Herat, except the Kushk 
Pass, which might be avoided in time of war, while in 
time of peace the intercourse existing between Penjdeh 
and the adjacent Afghan country would enable them to 
diffuse their influence far to the south of Herat. This 
intercourse is not to be lost sight of. The Sariks are 
not within the commercial orbit of Merv, but within that 
of Herat. It requires little imagination to realize the 
advantage Russia would gain for intrigue if we allowed 
her to obtain the district. 

On the Murghab itself Russia demands Marutchak, 
an old Afghan town twenty-eight miles above the settle- 
ment of Penjdeh, and eighteen from the Afghan fort of 
Bala Murghab. Marutchak, on the right or east bank 
of the Murghab, was anciently a large and prosperous 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 123 

town ; " now," says Mr. Simpson, " it is nothing but 
ruins. The Afghans are at present placing it in a 
state of repair. The outer wall is only of mud, or sun- 
dried bricks, and is, in some parts, in a very decayed 
condition. Over these walls the top of the citadel may 
be seen. This is one of the old mounds, of which we 
have observed similar remains in this country. It 
measures about eighty by seventy yards on the top. 
The old walls and towers are now being put in a condi- 
tion of defence. From this citadel there is a great ramp, 
which runs in a circular form, from the north-east corner 
to the south-east corner. It is most probably the old 
wall, inclosing what had been the town at one period ; 
the ramp has much the appearance of being the remains 
of a mud wall which has crumbled down into dust. The 
Afghans are now repairing it all round, so as to make it 
an enciente for barracks, so that it will accommodate 
troops. The outer wall, already described, is to be 
levelled, as being too large for the garrison which the 
Afghans can afford to keep in it. There are the remains 
of a few mud houses within the outer wall ; but, with 
the exception of the Afghans employed on the fort, there 
are no inhabitants." 

Bala Murghab is situated on the high road from 
Afghan Turkestan (Balkh, etc.) to Herat, and thus con- 
trols a Russian advance from that direction. The 
Ameer has recently located 1,000 Jemshidi families 
there, and is doing his best to make it a great strong- 
hold. If, however, the Russians retain Pul-i-Khisti, and 
secure Penjdeh, they will be able to sever Bala Murghab 
from Herat, and the whole of Afghan Turkestan will lie 
open to them. In securing the eastern gates of Herat, 
therefore, Russia will obtain a basis for grasping, in turn, 



124 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

the whole of the Ameer's dominions north of the Hindoo 
Koosh. 

The occupation of West Badgheis is a menace to 
Meshed ; the occupation of East Badgheis a menace 
to Maimene, Balkh, and other outposts of Cabul. The 
occupation of the two districts jointly is a menace to the 
security of Herat. Thus the wedge which Russia has 
driven from. Sarakhs and Merv to the gates of Herat 
opens up a vista of intrigue and annexation to her Ko- 
maroffs and Alikhanoffs, which must be to them and to 
her statesmen positively thrilling. 

Hence the quarrel is something more than a mere 
squabble over an " Afghan sentry box." Without going 
into the wider issues, and confining ourselves to Herat, 
we might, to all practical purposes, allow the Russians to 
occupy the suburbs of Herat as well as let them remain 
where they are. All that would be necessary for Russia 
at any time would be to blockade Herat with a small force, 
and from her numerous new positions she could sweep up 
in a few days the whole of the resources that render Herat 
of value without taking the trouble to fire a shot at the 
city. Were the resources of the Key of India contained 
inside the city of Herat there would be some excuse for 
leaving the Russians at Ak Robat and other Afghan 
points, and contenting ourselves with replacing the mud 
walls with impregnable fortifications ; but, since the re- 
sources lie spread over the great camping ground I have 
described, stretching north and south of the Paropami- 
sus Downs, England cannot but resent attempts to fasten 
a hold upon any part of it. To violate the integrity of 
one part of the Key of India is to impair the value of 
the whole of it. If we ought to fight for the whole we 
ought to fight for the part ; and, since Russia seems de- 



HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 12$ 

termined to follow up every concession by making still 
more exacting demands, she really leaves us no other 
alternative than to resist her claims to the utmost. 

England is most decidedly in the right, and Russia 
most decidedly in the wrong. It is better that we should 
fight her now, when she has only got 10,000 troops in the 
Transcaspian region, and has not thoroughly established 
herself in the Herat district, than give in now, and have 
to fight her next year, or the year after, when she has 
seized the whole of the camping-ground, and concen- 
trated 100,000 troops upon it to drive us out of India. 



CHAPTER VI. 

skobeleff's plan for THE INVASION OF INDIA. 

Skobeleff's great aim in life — The solution of the Eastern Question 
on the Indian frontier — His plan for invading India in 1876 — 
Adopted before the walls of Constantinople in 1878 — Kaufmann's 
advance toward India — Great changes in Central Asia since — 
Were Skobeleff alive, his plan would be totally different now — 
What it would probably be — Feasibility of the invasion of India 
from the point of view of various Russian generals. 

" The probability of our having to struggle for Herat, 
or to defend India from Candahar, is so remote, that its 
possibility is hardly worth considering." 

These words were penned by Sir Henry Norman, in 
a memorandum against the retention of Candahar, Sep- 
tember, 20, 1880. They illustrate, in a plain and forci- 
ble manner, the view of the few, and now utterly dis- 
credited experts, who raised their voice in favor of the 
" scuttle " from Candahar, and invoked the spirit of fac- 
tion to sanction it. 

To-day England is not only morally struggling for 
Herat, but her Sikhs with Ridgeway at Penjdeh con- 
front the Cossacks with Alikhanoff at Pul-i-khisti. At 
any moment shots may be fired, and then the troops 
that scuttled from Candahar will have to rush back " to 
defend India from it." 

On the 10th of January, 1881, the Duke of Argyll 
said, in denouncing Lord Salisbury's avowal of alarm 
at the advance of Skobeleff to Geok Tepe : " We are 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 27 

told by the late Government that the danger they 
wished to guard against was the danger of a military 
basis to be formed by Russia on the Caspian. I hold 
that to be one of the wildest dreams ever entertained." 

In four short years the " wildest dream," which, I 
should point out, was simply the sober military opinion 
of Valentine Baker, Major Napier, and General Sir 
Charles MacGregor, who had surveyed the proposed 
line of advance — in four short years that "wildest 
dream " has become a practical reality, and the public 
read, quite as a matter of course, of Russia's prepara- 
tions for the invasion of India. 

Whether the evacuation from Candahar was politic or 
not in 1881, one thing is certain. Down almost to the 
very last days of his Viceroyalty, the Marquis of Ripon 
refused to take serious steps to render the Afghan 
barrier a real bulwark to our Eastern Empire. The 
Cabinet in London moved somewhat with the times, 
but Lord Ripon and Sir Evelyn Baring resisted every 
change. It is a matter of common notoriety at Simla 
that the appeals of our greatest generals were pooh- 
poohed, and that to the very moment of the departure 
of the Baboo Viceroy from Bombay, the advice of 
heroes who would have to defend Afghanistan to- 
morrow, if attacked, was contemptuously rejected for 
the ear-whisperings of two or three insignificant men, of 
ignominious sentiments. 

Why those generals — who, by the way, are now the 
chief advisers of Lord Ripon's sagacious successor — 
should have been so uneasy during the last few years, 
will be apparent in the following pages. 

Until the time of the arrival of the Stolietoff Embassy 
.at Cabul, the idea of a Russian attack upon India was 



128 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

generally scouted in this country ; and even those who 
urged the stemming of the Russian advance did not 
treat an expedition against us as a matter of the imme- 
diate present, but as belonging to the future. In Rus- 
sia, military opinion was more advanced. While war 
was still undeclared against Turkey in 1876, and Eng- 
land was hoping that the conflict might be averted by 
peaceful, diplomatic means, General Skobeleff, then 
Governor of Ferghana, the Turkestan district nearest 
India, forwarded to Kaufmann an elaborate plan for a 
Central Asian campaign. Even when summoned to 
Europe to take part in the operations there, he used his 
utmost influence at Court to put the Turkestan forces 
in motion, and finally achieved his object in sight of 
Constantinople, when, after several councils of war, it 
was decided that if the Congress at Berlin failed, an 
attack should be made upon India. 

Accordingly, Colonels Stolietoff and Grodekoff left the 
camp for Central Asia, the former charged with a mis- 
sion to Shere Ali, and the latter — Skobeleff 's oldest and 
most trusted friend — carrying Skobeleff's secret plans, 
and for himself the special appointment as chief of 
Kaufmann's staff. One other agent was also sent from 
the camp — Pashino, an ex-diplomate, who had served as 
interpreter at Samarcand to the present Ameer, Abdur- 
rahman Khan, and possessed a knowledge of India from 
a journey he had undertaken through the peninsula a 
few years earlier. His mission was to proceed to India 
and secretly ascertain the condition of military and tribal 
affairs on the frontier, and afterwards push his way 
through the Khyber and join the Russian mission at 
Cabul. 

The outcome of the enterprise is well known. Kauf- 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 29 

mann marched with the invading force to Djam, on the 
Bokharan frontier, and marched back again when the 
Treaty of Berlin became known. Stolietoff penetrated 
to Cabul, and occasioned the Afghan war. Grodekoff 
returned to Europe by a famous ride through Herat, and 
is now Acting-Governor of Turkestan. Finally, Pashino 
was arrested at Peshawur, and, in spite of his outcry, 
was sent back to Russia. 

Most of these facts are known to the public, but Skobe- 
leffs proposed plan of operations has never received due 
attention, even at the hands of those commonly sup- 
posed to be interested in Central Asian affairs. Briefly, 
the plan was this : Kaufmann was to have led an army 
to Cabul, almost denuding Turkestan of its garrison, and 
was to have there organized the Afghan forces for an 
attack upon India, while Russian emissaries stirred up 
the natives to a mutiny. If the people failed to respond 
to the Russian appeal, Kaufmann was to tie the English 
army to India by threatening it from Cabul, and, in the 
event of a rising, he was to push on to the frontier, and 
attack the English on one side while the mutineers ad- 
vanced and harried them on the other. Supposing the 
attempt failed, Kaufmann was to retreat, not upon Tur- 
kestan, in case the sight of his shattered forces should 
cause Bokhara to rise, but upon Herat and the Caspian ; 
being met on the way by a succoring army advancing 
via Askabad and Meshed. 

Such was Skobeleff 's daring scheme, the revelation of 
which, since his death, has exercised a remarkable effect 
upon the imagination of Russian generals, and caused a 
longing to lead or participate in a campaign offering so 
many chances of distinction and glory. Had the Con- 
gress of Berlin failed, the impression is general among 
9 



130 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Russian military men that SkobelerFs plan would have 
been crowned with success. Their belief in the cer- 
tainty of a mutiny in India is one that Englishmen will 
not generally share, and hence the probability of an ac- 
tual irruption into India will be contested ; but there is 
one matter upon which not much difference of opinion 
can prevail. The Afghans would have doubtless fallen 
in with the Russian plans, and by their co-operation tied 
the English troops to the frontier ; thereby preventing 
the reinforcements being sent to Europe. This alone 
would have been a success of no mean order, for it is no 
secret that Russia was greatly disturbed by the idea of 
Sepoys being despatched to Turkey to assist in the 
defence of Constantinople. 

Strangely enough, Skobeleff 's plan of invasion has only 
excited Russia and England since his death. The act- 
ual march by Kaufmann toward India provoked little 
or no attention in this country, and, the details being 
suppressed in Russia, it was treated as a simple demon- 
stration intended to give weight to Stolietoff's mission. 
That it was really a serious move, inspired by the dead- 
liest intentions against our rule in India, was only to the 
most limited degree realized even by the oldest politi- 
cians in this country. The military movement was looked 
upon as subsidiary to the political mission at Cabul, in- 
stead of the latter being, as it really was, a pioneering 
feeler of the former. This indifference to Kaufmann's 
march was increased by the English disasters in Afghan- 
istan and Lomakin's failure to conquer the Turcomans. 
It was asserted that while the Afghan and Turcoman 
barriers existed India was perfectly safe from attack. 
Then stress was laid upon the Hindoo Koosh, and poli- 
ticians overlooked the looming advance from the Cas- 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 3 1 

pian. Even Skobeleff s decisive success at Geok Tepe 
did not shake the belief of the Gladstone Cabinet in 
the sound and permanent character of the barriers be- 
yond, intervening between Askabad and India. The 
Duke of Argyll said that the new advance was not to be 
compared with the older ones, and that we had nothing 
to fear from Skobeleff s triumph. But for the energy 
displayed by Lord Salisbury, the fall back from Canda- 
har would have been followed by the evacuation of 
Quetta. 

It was while things were in this condition that Mr. 
Joseph Co wen, M.P., asked me to proceed to St. Peters- 
burg to ascertain the Russian view of the position in 
Central Asia from the lips of the principal generals and 
statesmen. Of all the generals I saw, Soboleff was the 
only one who would agree with the opinion I strongly 
held at the time, and which was well known to them, 
that a Russian attack could be made upon India from 
the Caspian. General Skobeleff was the most incredu- 
lous of all. He would not hear of a Russian attack. 
" The Central Asian difficulty is all humbug," he said. 
" I do not think a Russian invasion of India would be 
feasible. I do not understand military men in England 
writing in the Army and Navy Gazette, which I take in 
and read, of a Russian invasion of India. I should not 
like to be commander of such an expedition. The dif- 
ficulties would be enormous. To subjugate Akhal we 
had only_ 5,000 men, and needed 20,000 camels. To get 
that transport we had to send to Orenburg, to Khiva, to 
Bokhara, and to Mangishlak for animals. The trouble 
was enormous. To invade India we should need 
150,000 troops — 60,000 to enter India with and 90,000 
to guard the communications. If 5,000 men needed 



132 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

20,000 camels, what must 150,000 need ! And where 
could we get the transport ? We should require vast 
supplies, for Afghanistan is a poor country, and could 
not feed 60,000 men ; and we should have to fight the 
Afghans as well as you. If we bribed one Sirdar, you 
would bribe another ; if we offered one rouble, you 
would offer two ; if we offered two, you would offer 
five — you could beat us in this. No ; the Afghans 
would fight us as readily as they fought you. I believe 
the new frontier is quite permanent, and that we shall 
hear no more about Central Asia for many years to 
come." 

" But in regard to the possibility of invading India, 
General Soboleff expressed to me a clear conviction that 
Russia could march an army on India if she chose." 

" That was diplomacy," replied Skobeleff. " Of course 
it is possible — all things are possible to a good general 
— but I should not like to undertake the task, and I do 
not think Russia would. Of course, if you enraged 
Russia — if, by your policy, you excited her — if you made 
her wild — that is the word — we might attempt it, even 
in spite of all the difficulties. For my part, I would 
only make a demonstration against India, but I would 
fight you at Herat." He said this with great animation, 
but very good-humoredly. " Do you know, I was very 
much interested during your war whether you would 
occupy Herat or not. It would have been a mistake if 
you had done so. It would be difficult to march an 
army from the Caspian to Herat to fight you there, but 
we should be tempted to do it in the event of a war." * 

Whether these were really the sentiments of Skobeleff 
at the moment, or whether he was purposely minimizing 

* "The Russian advance toward India," page 105. 



SKOBELEFF' S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 33 

the possibility of attacking India, in order that England 
might not be terrified into preparing against it in time, 
is a matter over which much argument might be ex- 
pended without leading to any satisfactory result. I will 
not attempt to discuss the point. I will simply point out 
one or two facts, which are of more importance at the 
present moment. 

After Skobeleff had finished his conversation with me 
he repeated it to Captain Masloff, one of his favorite 
officers. Masloff published an account of it in the 
Novoe Vremya which tallied with my own, and he subse- 
quently told me that Skobeleff had spoken of my re- 
port as perfectly accurate. The part I have repeated 
in this book was triumphantly quoted by Madame de 
Novikoff (otherwise O. K.), two years ago as demon- 
strating the madness of the Russian scare in this country. 
But O. K. has never said since that these utterances of 
Skobeleff fell completely flat in Russia. No Russian 
newspaper, and no Russian military writer has ever re- 
ciprocated those views, or, indeed, ever noticed them at 
all. On the other hand, Skobeleff' s opposite opinions 
in favor of an expedition to India, which began to ap- 
pear a few months after his death and have been seeing 
the light at intervals since, have exercised an enormous 
influence on the Russian military mind. Many of the 
documents published were written anterior to his con- 
versation with me, but while the latter is ignored and 
forgotten, the former are incessantly being cited in proof 
of what Russia can effect against India. 

Several other circumstances have contributed to add 
to the effect of Skobeleff's aggressive views. A few 
months after his death General Soboleff published his 
" Anglo- Afghan Conflict," a bulky three-volume work, 



134 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

compiled by the Chief of the Asiatic branch of the 
General Staff before proceeding to Bulgaria as Minister 
of War. This work was a sort of official history of our 
Afghan campaign, based on English sources, and was 
recommended by the General Staff as a standard work 
for military libraries. His recent utterances in the Russ 
have shown that General Soboleff looks at things 
through very peculiar spectacles. He is dominated by 
the bitterest hatred against England, and believes every- 
thing said or written to her disadvantage. In this his- 
tory he sought to make out, or, it would be better to 
say, did make out, to his own satisfaction, that the Afghan 
war was too large an enterprise for us, that we were 
defeated by the Afghans throughout the campaign in- 
stead of being mostly victors, and that we were com- 
pelled at last to withdraw owing to the damage inflicted 
on our prestige and the fear of a rising in India.* 

An English reviewer, noticing Soboleff 's work, said it 
was made up of "lies and nonsense." Upon him, of 
course, the work make no favorable impression, and he 
was disposed to minimize its importance. But, as a 
matter of fact, the book exercised an influence which is 
displayed pretty clearly to-day. To Russian officers who 
had not studied the subject, or who had only derived 
their impressions of the war from the jaundiced state- 
ments in the Russian press, the book appeared as worthy 
of credence as any official work could possibly be. It 
had been compiled by the Chief of the Asiatic branch 
of the General Staff, whose express duty it was to watch 
the war on behalf of the Government and obtain all 
possible information from England — perhaps India — 

* A translation of all that is essential in this work is given in 
"The Russians at Merv and Herat." London : W. H. Allen & 
Co.; 1883. 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 35 

bearing upon it. If such an official did not know what 
he was writing about, who in Russia was more compe- 
tent than he ? Thus Soboleff's book was eagerly read 
and widely read, and strengthened to a remarkable de- 
gree the feeling already prevailing that we were a very 
weak military power, and only maintained our hold on 
India by a miracle. 

Skobeleff's opinion that we could be expelled from the 
peninsula by means of a hard blow struck in front, si- 
multaneously with a fomented mutiny at the rear of the 
Indus, has excited more and more attention as Russia 
has approached nearer our outposts. The belief in its 
feasibility that has steadily developed in Russia, since 
his plan of 1876 became known in 1883, has received a 
considerable impulse from the disappearance of the 
physical obstacles already existing. Skobeleff's main 
argument against the feasibility of an invasion, when he 
discussed the subject with me, was the difficulty of trans- 
port, but this is a difficulty that has been daily wearing 
away ever since. When he proceeded .to Geok Tepe 
in 1880 it took nearly a month for the troops of the Cau- 
casus army to march from Tiflis to the Caspian to join. 
By the opening of the Tiflis-Baku railway, since his 
death, the journey can now be done between sunrise and 
sunset. When he ferried those troops across the Cas- 
pian he had to contend with a very limited marine. By 
the development of the Baku petroleum industry fifty 
powerful steamers, 150 to 250 feet long, have been 
added during the last few years to the shipping of the 
Caspian, and can now convey the largest conceivable 
army across the sea to Krasnovodsk. The Transcas- 
pian railway, again, was not finished to Kizil Arvat until 
long after he left Geok Tepe. It is now being pushed 



136 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

on to Askabad, and Lessar has stated that whether there 
be peace or war, it will be continued to Sarakhs — with- 
in six marches of the Key of India. Finally, Skobeleff 
imagined, or said he imagined, a difficult road to exist 
between Askabad and Herat. Lessar has since discov- 
ered that it is one of the easiest in Asia. 
- Thus, by Russia's resolute destruction of the Turco- 
man barrier, and by the rapid disappearance of a series 
of obstacles, things have come to this pass — that a land 
march upon India to-day is an enterprise less difficult to 
the Russian military mind than the march upon Con- 
stantinople in 1877. 

Such an enterprise might take two forms. Either 
Russia might adopt Skobeleff 's idea of a fomented mu- 
tiny, and advance with merely sufficient troops to cleave 
a passage through the Afghan barrier, or she might ig- 
nore for the moment the people of India, and push on 
with some such army of mammoth proportions as she 
employed in the last Russo-Turkish war. 

Let me deal with the former first. 

At the outset I must point out that a wide difference of 
opinion exists between English politicians and Russians 
as to the possibility of a mutiny in India, and that this 
deserves more attention than light-hearted publicists in 
this country are disposed to give it. English politicians 
generally assume that India is safe, or sufficiently safe, 
from the danger of another mutiny. Disturbances, it is 
admitted, might arise on the Russian approach, but the 
country generally would stand by us. I do not say that 
all politicians share this optimist view, but the majority 
do — or at any rate, they conceal their uneasiness and 
keep it from the public. 

Now Russian Generals, and the entire Russian Press, 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 37 

incline to a totally different opinion. General Skobeleff, 
General Soboleff, General Tchernayeff, General Kauf- 
mann, General Grodekoff, General Annenkoff, General 
Petrusevitch, and others less known, may be cited as 
eminent representative Russian military men who never 
entertained a doubt on the subject. I have discussed 
the Anglo-Russian conflict with many Russian officers — 
some of them personal friends of mine — but have never 
met one who differed from them in this matter. Yet 
some have made a special study of India. Skobeleff was 
always purchasing English books on the country, and I 
question whether there are half-a-dozen Members of 
Parliament who have such a good collection of English 
and foreign books on India as I have pulled about in 
the library of General Annenkoff. 

If we examine more closely the plans of Skobeleff 
and others, we shall see how important this factor of a 
general rising really is. Soboleff put the wants of Rus- 
sia in a neat, compact form the other day when he de- 
clared that " Russia does not want India : she wants the 
Bosphorus." The Russian invasion of India is commonly 
ridiculed by certain Radicals on the ground of the 
hugeness of the enterprise. They assert that the peo- 
ple would never exchange English for Russian masters, 
and that it would require a larger army than ever Rus- 
sia could spare to occupy and hold the country. But 
such assertions are based not upon facts, but illusions. 
Russia does not propose to occupy and hold India. I 
have never met a Russian who proposed — at any rate, 
for the present — such a difficult enterprise as that. 
Russia does not aim at replacing our administration 
by her own. None of the Russian generals ever sug- 
gested saddling their country with such a burden. What 



138 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Skobeleff really planned and advocated was, that the 
250,000,000 people should be encouraged and helped to 
throw the 100,000 English off their backs, and that dur- 
ing the universal collapse of our supremacy throughout 
the world that would ensue (in his opinion), Russia 
should occupy Constantinople. 

Such an enterprise is quite a small affair, compared 
with the undertaking imagined by those Radicals I have 
referred to. To secure its success, supposing India to 
be ready to rise and throw us off, all that is needed is 
to march to Candahar a force sufficiently strong to over- 
come the English force holding the frontier ; after 
which the Princes and the mutinous Sepoys themselves 
could be left to deal with the small garrisons located on 
the plains and plateaux of India, aided, perhaps, by a 
few Russian officers. When Skobeleff proposed his 
plan in 1876, the Russian outposts were too far from the 
Indian frontier, and the communications connecting 
them with Russia proper too extended and ill-developed 
to allow of more than a small force being sent to attack 
India. He, therefore, had to rely upon Afghan help on 
the one hand, and an Indian mutiny on the other. 

It is well to notice that he provided for two kinds of 
assistance in his plan.* If the Afghan co-operation had 
been slight, he would have stimulated a general rising 
in India. If, on the other hand, he had considered him- 
self sufficiently strong with Afghan help, to break 
through the frontier, he would only have " manipulated 
the disaffected Clements in India to Russia's advantage." 
The possibility of a general rising in India may be ques- 
tioned by English politicians ; but there is not one who 

* I may state that his plans are given in full in "The Region of 
the Eternal Fire." London : W. H. Allen &Co., 1884. 



SKOBELEFFS PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 39 

can deny that " disaffected elements " do exist in the 
country. 

The genuine belief of Russia in the probability of a 
mutiny in India on the approach of a small force against 
us, is too serious a factor in politics to be brusquely 
treated as an illusion. The more feasible a Russian 
attack upon our rule in India appears to the Russian 
Government, the less disposed will it be to treat us with 
diplomatic deference in Europe, and refrain from ag- 
gressive acts in Asia. Further, the greater the chances 
seem to it of a successful campaign on the Indian fron- 
tier than in Europe, the stronger the impulse to break 
through the Afghan frontier at any cost and secure 
Herat. What would Russia care for the Ameer's ill will 
at seizing Herat if she were sure of an Indian mutiny ? 
The more, therefore, she relies on an Indian revolt the 
less she may be expected to care for Afghan suscep- 
tibilities. 

Russia, in a word, has two cards to play — the Afghans 
and people of India. If she finds she cannot accom- 
plish her aims with the one, she will try to effect them 
with the other. 

" England lays a heavy hand on her dependent peo- 
ples," wrote General Soboleff in the Russ last January, 
when he was already aware that Russia had seized the 
approaches to Herat. " She reduces them to a state of 
slavery, only that English trade may profit and English- 
men grow rich. The deaths of millions in India from 
starvation have been caused indirectly by English des- 
potism. And then the press of England disseminates 
far and wide the idea of Russia being a country of bar- 
barians. Thousands of natives in India only await 
Russia's crusade of deliverance ! 



140 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

" If Englishmen would only throw aside their mis- 
placed pride, and study a little deeper the foundation 
of Russia's rule in Central Asia, comparing it with their 
own, they would soon see plainly why the name of Rus- 
sia has such prestige in Asia, and why the natives of In- 
dia hate the dominion of England, and set their hopes 
of freedom upon Russia. Russia gives full liberty to 
native manners, and not only does not overburden her 
subjects with fresh taxes, but even allows them exemp- 
tions and privileges of a most extensive character. 
England, on the contrary, is a vampire, sucking the last 
drop of blood out of India. 

" As to our course of antagonism in Asia, England 
herself threw down the glove at Sebastopol, and if the 
Russian flag now floats over Merv, the English have 
themselves to blame. We accepted their challenge ; it 
now rests with them whether there is to be a Russian 
invasion of India or not. But we hope the time has 
come when English strategists will take into considera- 
tion the 200,000 troops of the Caucasus, and the 100,000 
in reserve of Turkestan and Western Siberia, besides 
another army of half a million behind in European Rus- 
sia, and will look on the map and see what must happen 
if a Russian corps of 200,000 men, accompanied by an- 
other of 100,000 of splendid irregular cavalry, pass 
through Herat and Balah into India, and proclaim the 
independence of the native population. Let England 
think well of the consequence of Russia deciding to 
take up arms against her." 

By ignorant or interested writers these threats were 
represented as merely the casual frantic outpourings of 
a headstrong and harmless general. But it is well there 
should be no misconception on this score. Soboleff is 



SKOBELEFFS PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. I41 

an officer of very considerable weight and standing in 
Russia, and what he said represents fairly the feeling of 
the whole army and the greater part of the press at the 
present moment 

All the more reason, therefore, why we should cling 
to our hold upon Herat, and insist on a settlement of 
the frontier dispute before Russia masses a force at its 
gates capable of crushing Lumsden and his Afghan 
allies. 

Let us now consider the second form an attack upon 
India might take — i. e., a blow delivered by a large army 
instead of by a relatively small force, and operating 
without reliance upon a simultaneous rising on the part 
of the Indian people. 

It is no secret that the Government are perfectly 
aware that Russia could dispatch a very strong expedi- 
tion to the gates of Herat, and that the calculations as 
to what she could really do have been scientifically 
worked out by the ablest English military authorities, 
in a manner very alarming to those who hold the reins 
of power in this country. Soboleff's sneering sugges- 
tion that English strategists should take into considera- 
tion what Russia could accomplish from her Caspian 
base, in the event of war, has already been anticipated 
by our generals. They demonstrated, before even Merv 
was annexed and the gates of Herat were won, that Rus- 
sia could in 77 days mass 23,000 troops at Herat, and in 
six weeks afterward at least as many more, while in 
from 70 to ioo days she could put 13,000 men into 
Cabul, and in 90 days push 11,000 more into the northern 
passes of India. Without counting the latter, we may 
therefore say that before even the last two advances 
took place in Central Asia, from Askabad to Merv and 



142 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

from Merv to the Paropamisus approaches, our military 
authorities knew that in less than four months Russia 
could mass nearly 50,000 men — all Russian troops — on 
the camping-ground of the Key of India. 

A year ago, before these calculations became bruited 
abroad, I drew attention, in a pamphlet,* to the facility 
with which Russia, via the Volga and the Caspian base, 
could thrust a large army along the Askabad-Herat 
route to confront us at Candahar, in the event of Euro- 
pean complications. Fresh evidence has accumulated 
since of the aggressive strength of this line of operations, 
and it may be that events will practically test it before 
long. 

The Russian army, on a peace footing, numbers be- 
tween 800,000 and 900,000 men. In time of war two 
or three millions may be summoned under the flag. 
Every year nearly 300,000 recruits are drafted into the 
army. 

Moscow and the contiguous provinces are generally 
regarded as constituting the heart of Russia. If one 
will take a map, he will see that the distance is no further 
from this centre of strength to Krasnovodsk, on the 
Caspian, than to Constantinople. In 1877-8 Russia 
despatched nearly half a million men, with an enormous 
quantity of stores, in the direction of the latter place. 
To-day it would be as easy, or rather, easier, to deflect 
that number upon the Caspian. 

Most of the troops sent to the Balkan peninsula, in 
1877, proceeded by rail, and it is well known that half of 
Russia's difficulties arose from the restricted character 
of this means of communication. But the Volga and its 

* "Russia's power of seizing Herat and concentrating a force to 
threaten India." London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1884. 




General Sir F. S. Eoberts, VC, K.C.B. 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. I43 

tributaries drain the heart of Russia I have referred to, 
and constitute a magnificent waterway to the Caspian 
Sea. 

Although frequently described by travellers, the gran- 
deur of this Volga waterway has never been properly 
appreciated by English politicians. Within a few short 
hours' railway ride from St. Petersburg, the Volga can 
be touched at a navigable point, and from there troops 
can go in steamers or barges down the Caspian Sea. 
From the Caspian Sea runs the easy level road from 
Michaelovsk (near Krasnovodsk) via Askabad and 
Sarakhs, to the gates of Herat and to India. 

The resources of the Volga may be gathered from the 
fact that the traffic on the river amounts to over ten mill- 
ion tons annually, conducted by 650 cargo steamers and 
3,000 barges, having the united capacity of nearly 3,000- 
000 tons. The value of these steamers and barges is 
estimated at ^8,000,000 sterling. In excess of the 
3,000 permanent barges of 1,000 tons capacity each, there 
are hundreds of temporary ones constructed to convey 
cargoes to Nijni Novgorod, or other destinations, and 
then broken up. On the Volga and Kama 100 such barges 
are yearly constructed, with a cargo capacity each of from 
300 to 500 tons, and 2co with a capacity of from 5,000 
to 8,000 tons. These huge vessels, the size of ocean- 
going steamers, and the 300-foot permanent barges, are 
too large to pass through the canal system to the River 
Neva, the locks of which do not admit the passage of 
craft exceeding in length 147 feet ; hence 1,000 smaller 
barges, 100 feet long, and having a capacity of 200 or 300 
tons apiece, are yearly constructed simply for the trans- 
port of goods from the Volga to the Neva. Besides the 
extensive shipbuilding above referred to, 4,000 barges, 



144 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

wherries, and fishing boats are annually built on the 
Volga for the lower course of the river and the Caspian. 
The central point of the traffic on the Volga is Nijni 
Novgorod, where there is an annual turn-over at the 
Great Fair of from twenty to twenty-five millions ster- 
ling. Astrakhan, at the mouth, does a trade of ^"5,000- 
000 a year. The traffic passing through the mouth of 
the Volga amounted to a million tons in 18S2. 

These are some of the transport resources of the 
river Volga, down which Russia is despatching troops 
to reinforce Komaroff's army at the gates of Herat. 
Besides the navigable waterway from Tver, the railway 
system touches the river at four great points — Nijni Nov- 
gorod, Samara, Saratoff, and Tsaritzin. To each of 
these, troops could be despatched from Middle and 
Western Russia, and, on their arrival at the river, find 
plenty of transport to carry them down to the sea. 

That sea — the Caspian — associated in most English- 
men's minds with sands and scorpions, is now a great 
basin of busy commerce. Over 200,000,000 herrings are 
caught in it every year. The petroleum trade of Baku, 
opposite Michaelovsk, employs fifty large steamers and 
hundreds of sailing vessels. Seven thousand vessels 
enter and leave the port every year. The port of Baku 
contains pier accommodation for 100 steamers at one 
and the same time, while the petroleum refineries give 
the means of drawing largely upon engineering re- 
sources. Without experiencing anything like the diffi- 
culty she encountered in 1877, Russia could assemble 
in the magnificent harbor of Baku an army quite as 
large as she invaded Turkey with then. It would have 
better transport, the troops would arrive at the base in 
better trim, and they would have the enormous food 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 45 

supply of the Volga to sustain them in their cam- 
paign. 

The army of the Caucasus, 100,000 strong on a peace 
footing, is for the most part concentrated in Transcau- 
casia. Through Transcaucasia runs a railway from Ba- 
toum, on the Black Sea, to this same Baku on the Cas- 
pian. Baku, therefore, would serve as the concentrating 
point of the forces of the Caucasus as well as those 
from Russia proper. 

Baku, which in 1879 only contained 15,000 people, 
now has a population of 50,000, and is becoming a 
great city. There are 5,000 houses in the place, and 
1,500 shops, and 200 oil refineries turning out a quar- 
ter of a million tons of burning oil every year. 

Across the water to Michaelovsk is a day's journey; 
then comes the railway trip to Kizil Arvat terminus, 
144 miles inland, where the Transcaspian desert ends, 
and the fertile country commences, running all the way 
to Herat. As I have said, the transport power of the 
Caspian is now such that Russia could rapidly move, 
not simply thousands of troops, but tens of thousands ; 
for t'he fifty steamers are new and large, and the hun- 
dreds of sailing vessels ships of great capacity. 

We may therefore say that, so far as the collection of 
troops and stores in the Caspian is concerned, Russia 
could surpass any efforts we could make on the Quetta 
side of India. But there is another great fact. This 
assembly could go on secretly, and almost without our 
knowledge — at least, definite information could be sup- 
pressed—while we could not move a soldier from Eng- 
land without the circumstance being known to Russia. 
Further, while not a soldier could get to India without 
the liability of being attacked on the way, for Prussia 



146 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

might be able to secure allies in Europe, she herself 
could assemble a vast army in the Caspian, behind the 
screen of the Caucasus, without having to detach a sin- 
gle man to protect it. 

In 1877 Kishineff was the concentrating point from 
which Russia invaded Turkey. For her troops to pro- 
ceed to that point, the difficulties of transport and food 
supply were infinitely greater than they would be from 
the present terminal point of the Transcaspian railway 
system at Kizil Arvat. I say present terminal point, 
because although her engineers have been engaged 
extending the line since last autumn, nothing is known 
as to the amount of new railway now open for traffic. 
Now, from Kishineff to Constantinople, the troops of 
the Shipka column had to march 750 miles, and of the 
Sophia column, 970 miles. If we treat Kizil Arvat as a 
Kishineff, the distance thence to Herat is only 523 miles, 
as compared with the distances traversed by the Rus- 
sians in 1877, given above. But perhaps an objection 
may be raised to treating Kizil Arvat as a Kishineff — 
then start from the decks of the transports in the Cas- 
pian. The distance even then is only 667 miles, as 
compared with the 1,000 miles many Russians trudged 
on foot before they got to Constantinople. 

And mark this difference. Russia, in invading Turkey, 
had 'Austria to threaten her flank. There would be no 
such enemy in the Caspian. Russia, further, had to 
cross the Danube — one of the largest rivers in Europe — 
in face of the Turks. She had to encounter large armies 
at Plevna, and traverse the almost impregnable Balkan 
range, meeting, on the other side, armies again before 
she got to Constantinople. In the case of Herat, 
nothing of the kind exists. There is not a single river 



SKOBELEFF'S PLAN FOR INVADING INDIA. 1 47 

of any magnitude the whole distance from the Caspian 
to Herat. There is no mountain range — only the Paro- 
pamisus Downs, containing, according to Gospodin Les- 
sar, at least twenty good crossings. And instead of 
great armies, the Russians would find no enemy at all 
the whole way to their present outposts, and could now 
utilize the 50,000 Turcoman irregular horse to assist 
them in their undertaking. 

Thus the defence of Herat, in the face of such odds, 
is a very serious matter. It is no permanent advantage 
to us that the forces at present in the Transcaspian 
region should be relatively small, compared with the 
larger invading army I have referred to. Said a Russian 
general to me, during a conversation at Moscow during 
the Coronation festivities, " We have now such a good 
road to the heart of Afghanistan, and the communica- 
tions with the Caspian base, and from the Caspian base 
to Askabad, are so perfect, and admit of such a ready 
movement of troops, that we need only a handful of men 
to garrison the Turcoman region. It is cheaper to main- 
tain 50,000 men in the Tin" is district than at Geok 
Tepe and Askabad ; and we can throw them from the 
one point to the^ other at a moment's notice." 

Had Skobeleff been alive to-day, his plan for the inva- 
sion of India would have undoubtedly been the massing, 
on a large scale, of troops in the Caspian basin, and 
their dispatch to Herat via the Askabad- Sarakhs road 
and the parallel one from Astrabad via Meshed. The 
second is the old highway of invasion, and runs through 
the richest districts of Khorassan. On reaching the 
Hari Rud at Kusan, the Astrabad column would march 
to the south of Herat, leaving on its left flank the Paro- 
pamisus hills, and sever the Afghan fortress from India. 



148 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

It must not be forgotten that the Russians at Pul-i- 
Khatun and Zulfikar have only to make three marches 
to the west, and the occupation of Meshed would pro- 
vide them at a stroke with resources in transport, food, 
and supplies generally, equal to those at Herat. Such 
an occupation might be made by arrangement with the 
Shah, who is notoriously anti-English, or without it ; for 
if war arose, Russia would not hesitate a moment to cut 
off Khorassan from Persia at Shahrood, and use the 
Golden province as a line of advance and base of opera- 
tions. 

Hence the invasion of India, or the smaller operation 
of an attack on Herat, is an enterprise which seems per- 
fectly feasible to Russian military men, and it is the con- 
viction that the conflict would end in their favor that 
renders the Russian seizure of the gates of Herat so 
ominous. If Russia had not felt that she could safely 
affront this country, she would have never moved a 
Cossack across the Sarakhs-Khoja-Saleh boundary to 
the northern pasture lands of the Key of India. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT AND INDIA. 

The advance of the Russian locomotive — Immense changes it will 
occasion in Central Asia — Inevitable junction of the Indian and 
European railway systems via Candahar and Herat — Only 
£4,000,000 needed to complete the link — Charing Cross to India 
in nine days — Statistics of the line. 

A very great factor in the Russo-Indian question is 
the Transcaspian railway, which is sanctioned for con- 
struction as far as Askabad, and, according to Russian 
reports, is to be afterward continued to Sarakhs. If 
we allow the Russians to maintain their hold on the 
gates of Herat, and ourselves subsequently retire from 
safeguarding the fortress with English officers and 
troops, it will be always possible, after the place has 
been carried by a coup de main, for Russia to connect it 
with her railway system in a few months. The menace 
to India would then be perfect. 

To a correspondent of the Cologne Gazette Lessar is 
reported to have said as follows, the second week in 
March : " People attribute to us the idea of continuing 
the Transcaspian railway from Askabad to Sarakhs and 
Herat — a two-fold absurdity. I have studied those re- 
gions in all directions and am convinced that a line to 
Herat by Merv must follow the course of the Murghab, 
for a desert railway must, if possible, keep close to 
water. From a technical standpoint the railway from 



150 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Merv to Herat would be easy, for there is a gentle rise, 
and the chain of mountains, or rather hills, called the 
Paropamisus, has at least 20 good passes, and its loftiest 
peak is not 1,000 metres high. During the Russo-Turk- 
ish war I took part in laying down the much more difficult 
line from Bender to Galatz, and I believe the line from 
Merv to Herat would scarcely take more than three weeks. 
I should, however, be the last to recommend such a line. 
What we require in Central Asia is a line going from 
Askabad to Merv, and thence north-eastward to Bok- 
hara, so as to connect the markets together, facilitate 
the exchange of products, and open up new outlets for 
our Russian industry. When once we were at Herat 
with our line, the connection with the Indian lines at 
Quetta would only be a question of time, and then fare- 
well to our dreams of our Central Asian culture and in- 
dustry, Manchester and Birmingham would soon find 
their way by Quetta and Herat to Merv, glutting the 
Bokharan markets with their cheap goods, and we 
should see that we had merely labored for the English. 
The line to Herat held up as a bugbear in the English 
newspapers, is only an imaginary evil for the English, 
but a real one for us Russians, for so far from implying 
the entrance of the Russians into India, it would rather 
imply the entrance of English goods into the Central 
Asian markets, and no military advantages could guard 
us against this economic danger." 

In interviewing, unless the interviewer knows a little 
of the subject he is discussing, he is always sure to in- 
volve his "subject" in mistakes. Hence it would be 
unfair, in the present instance, to charge some of the 
above absurdities to Lessar himself. The interviewer 
implies that Lessar said that Russia had no idea of run- 



THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT, ETC. 151 

ning the line to Sarakhs (as well as to Herat), and also 
puts the matter as though Lessar stated that the railway- 
ought to run from Merv to Herat, not via Sarakhs. 
This, of course, is nonsense. What Lessar meant was 
that Russia, in pushing the line to Sarakhs and Merv, 
had no idea of extending it to Herat and India ; and 
he was only saying what was commonplace when he 
told the interviewer that from Merv to Herat a line 
must follow the Murghab. Of course he would object 
to such a line, because it is not on the route to India : 
the railway ought to turn off at Sarakhs to do that. As 
for its being possible to make a railway from Merv to 
Herat in three weeks, that was a statement Lessar could 
obviously never have made, for the construction of 240 
miles of railway is not to be done by any human power 
at present existing at the rate of eleven or twelve miles 
a day. 

I take notice of this interview at all, simply to point 
out one or two important facts which are not yet prop- 
erly appreciated by the British public. In the first place, 
it is an established fact that cannot be in any way con- 
tested, that it is possible to construct a railway from As- 
kabad to Herat, and thence to India. Secondly, it is 
equally beyond dispute that the two railway systems of 
Russia and India are pushing toward each other in such 
a manner, that unless one of them suspends the advance, 
they will be infallibly within a few short hundred miles 
of each other in a year or two's time. Further, that when 
this comes about, all that will be needed will be the con- 
struction of this short section to unite India with Europe 
by railway, and provide the world with a rival route to 
that via the Suez Canal. Finally, that as this new route 
will give Europe the means of getting to India in nine 



152 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

days or so, and India the means of returning the com- 
pliment, the traffic passing along the line through Af- 
ghanistan to India and back again will set up an amount 
of local progress and movement, altogether changing 
the conditions on the Afghan frontier. 

Russia, who is the creator of this new route, and who 
is doing her best to enforce its opening up, is now posing 
as its opponent, so as to lull England until she seizes He- 
rat. And she selects as the mouthpiece of this opposi- 
tion the very man who has done more than any one liv- 
ing to bring about the inevitable junction of the Indian 
and Russian railways ! 

Before describing the line, let me define what she is 
doing and what she is going to do. She is going to build 
the railway as far as Sarakhs, for that is an admitted fact 
in Russia, and Lessar himself told me as much a few days 
after his arrival in London. From Sarakhs, however, she 
does not mean to push on to Herat or its gates, not because 
it is impossible or difficult, but because England would 
regard it as a menace. To allay our uneasiness on this 
score, she says that she is going to turn off from Sarakhs 
to Merv, and afterward extend the line to Turkestan. 
Therefore, she asks that we shall not be disturbed by 
any bugbear of a railway to Herat, but allow her to re- 
tain the gates of that place without fear" of the locomo- 
tive pushing up thither. 

It is well we should clearly appreciate the reasons of 
this attitude. She does not want us rendered more de- 
termined to dispossess her of the gates of Herat by the 
fears excited by the advance of her locomotive, and she 
does not desire that we ourselves should rush on our 
Quetta line to Candahar and the Key of India. In her 
view that would be a calamity. It would strengthen our 



THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT, ETC. 1 53 

defence of Herat too much. But it would not do for her 
to say this ; therefore a commercial objection is trotted 
out, and she expresses a fear that if the two railway sys- 
tems were joined, England would deluge the markets of 
Central Asia with her cheap produce. 

To my view there is something delightfully audacious 
in this last contention. It is a well-known fact that every 
Russian advance means the exclusion of English goods 
from more markets in Central Asia, and that this is ac- 
complished, not by the establishment of superior trans- 
port, but by the short and summary method of ordering 
our manufactures out of the country altogether. At 
present, no English manufactured goods whatever are 
allowed to cross the Russian frontier in Central Asia 
from India ; and the produce of India, such as tea, in- 
digo, etc., is subjected to the heaviest duties. The fear 
expressed by Lessar, therefore, is grotesquely absurd. 
All that Russia would require to do, on the junction of 
the Russo-Indian lines, would be to frame an edict and 
place a custom-house officer at the connecting point, and 
English commerce with the markets of Turkestan and 
Turkmenia would be effectually gripped and held in 
tether. Nobody knows this better than Russia herself. 

On this account, we must not be lured into surrender- 
ing the gates of Herat, because Russia is only going to 
extend the Transcaspian railway to Sarakhs and Merv 
for the moment. As those two points form the bases of 
her present position, that simple extension alone would 
be a most serious matter ; because Russia would have 
her railway system running to within 202 and 240 miles 
of Herat, while ours at Pishin would be 469 miles dis- 
tant. It does not need much knowledge of military 
affairs to appreciate how great an advantage the Rus- 



154 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

sian generals would possess over our own, if no corre- 
sponding movement were made by this country. 

In this manner, the Russian railway advance provokes 
and compels the advance of the English locomotive into 
Afghanistan. This is a serious annoyance to Russia, 
for she wants to get as close to India as she can, and 
secure as much of the future highway as possible. She 
would like the junction to take place not further from 
India than, say, Candahar. She does not want England 
to push on the line to Herat, and thereby prevent her 
securing the Key of India. Hence the utmost efforts 
are being made to allay our fears, and prevent us, when 
the railway is finished to Pishin, from advancing for the 
moment any further. 

" Don't talk about the Transcaspian railway," said 
SkobelerT to me in 1882. " That's a fad of Annenkoff's. 
Nothing will ever come of it." 

Yet it has been since revealed in Grodekoff's history 
of the Turcoman war, that SkobelerT did attach an 
enormous value to the line, and took the deepest in- 
terest in its construction. He realized at the very out- 
set how vastly it would improve the Russian position at 
the gates of the Key of India. 

The notion of a Transcaspian railway did not crop up 
until after Lomakin's defeat at Geok Tepe in 1879. 
But for that defeat, it is a question whether it would 
have been constructed at all. The disaster at Geok 
Tepe shook the power of Russia in Central Asia, and 
rendered a campaign of revenge unavoidable. The 
principal difficulty in the second expedition consisted in 
the scarcity east of the Caspian of transport animals, to 
convey the stores of the army across the narrow band 
of desert lying between the Caspian and Kizil Arvat. 



THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT, ETC. 1 55 

To overcome this, a service of traction engines and 
fourgons was projected by General Petrusevitch, and 
later on, the construction of a tramway. Ultimately, at 
the suggestion of General Annenkoff, the Controller of 
Russian military transport, Skobeleff decided on a regu- 
lar railway, and induced the Government to send him 
the 100 miles of railway lying idle in store at Ben- 
der. 

At first the railway works were meant to be only 
temporary, but Annenkoff conceiving the idea of some 
day earning for himself the reputation of a second 
Lesseps, by pushing on the line to India and giving the 
world a new route to the East, made the line so strong, 
that, when at last it was finished to Kizil Arvat, 144 
miles from the Caspian, the five-foot metal way was as 
good as any in Russia. 

On Annenkoffs return from the seat of war, he issued 
a pamphlet in support of his idea. This was exposed to 
a deal of ridicule in Russia, as well as in England ; and 
not only did the Marquis of Hartington pooh-pooh the 
idea in the House of Commons, but even Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, Sir Richard Temple, and other so-called 
" alarmists " put it aside with disdain, as not entering 
the sphere of practical politics. 

On myself, however, the pamphlet made a very dif- 
ferent impression. So subversive of the condition of 
things in Central Asia did it promise to be, in my estima- 
tion, that I published a pamphlet on the subject, with a 
fac simile of Annenkoffs map, and issued 1,000 copies 
to Parliament and the press. In this pamphlet I demon- 
strated, by calculations based on Lessar's discoveries, 
that the extension of the line from Kizil Arvat to Herat 
would only cost Russia ^2,192,000, while the complete 



156 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

junction of the Russian and Indian railway systems 
could be effected for a little over ^£6,000,000 sterling.* 

Even this failed to move the lethargy of the Govern- 
ment, beyond causing the improvement of the Bolan 
route to be taken in hand, which, I have been informed, 
was due to this pamphlet ; but in Russia it had the fact 
of dissipating much of the ridicule to which Annenkoff 
had been exposed by the press, with which he was not 
popular, and when in 1883 the Transcaucasian railway 
was finished from Batoum on the Black Sea to Baku on 
the Caspian, it was at once seen how natural a continua- 
tion of this trade route Annenkoff' s line was across the 
Caspian. 

Still, nothing was done by England as a counterpoise 
until Merv was annexed. Then the Government, which 
had stopped the Candahar railway, and literally pitched 
a part of the line all over the country, gave orders for 
the same railway to be rushed on with all possible 
speed, and to be carried to the Pishin plateau beyond 
Quetta. 

As soon as this order was given, Russia retorted by 
sanctioning the extension of her own line from Itizil 
Arvat to Askabad. 

In this manner, even if the advance had not subse- 
quently taken place to the gates of Herat, two further 
sections of the Russo-Indian railway would have been 
constructed all the same. Whether England will retort 
on the extension to Askabad by a fresh advance on 
Candahar remains to be seen. The generality of Eng- 
lish politicians assert that it will be absolutely essential 
if the Russian line be carried on to Sarakhs. 

* " The Russian Railway to Herat and India." London, W. H. 
Allen and Co., 1882. 



THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT, ETC. 1 57 

At the outset, let us see how the Russo-Indian line 
will stand if no further advances be made beyond those 
actually sanctioned — that is to say, as far as Askabad 
on the Russian side, and Pishin on the English. 

Miles. Cost per mile. Total. 

Askabad to Sarakhs 185* £4,000 £742,000 

Sarakhs to Herat ■■■■ [^ WY. & ••■ - 9I °' 00 ° 

Askabad to Herat 388 miles .... £1,652,000 



The cost of the line is based upon the calculations of 
Annenkoff and Lessar. Between Askabad and Sarakhs, 
according to Lessar, the country is quite flat, and 
without a single obstacle to a railway. As regards the 
country from Sarakhs to Herat, Lessar, after his survey 
in 1882, divided it into two sections. A half, he said, 
would be as level as the Askabad-Sarakhs district, and 
the remaining half identical with the country commonly 
met with in Russia — that is to say, easy to traverse, 
but less easy than the rest, because of some hills and 
undulations. I have increased the cost of this by 
;£i,ooo a mile. I should say that no one has more 
insisted upon the feasibility of the line to Herat than 
Lessar himself, and it is he himself who has selected 
the Askabad-Sarakhs route as the best from the Cas- 
pian. 

Thus, for less than the price of a couple of ironclads 
Russia could carry her railway system right into the 
very Key of India. Considering that she has just 
spent ;£q, 000,000 in completing her railway communica- 
tion between the Caspian and the Black Sea, this is a 
very insignificant outlay. 

On the Indian side, when the Candahar railway was 



158 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

recommenced the terminal point was £ibi, 599 miles 
from Herat. The sanctioned extension to Pishin will 
carry the line to within 100 miles of Candahar, or 469 
miles of the Key of India. Thus, if we go no further, 
Russia will be 81 miles nearer Herat with her locomo- 
tive than ourselves. 

At ,£5,000 a mile, the estimated cost of the Candahar 
railway,. the outlay on our section to Herat, 469 miles, 
would be £"2,345,000, the country being more difficult 
between Candahar and Herat than between Askabad 
and Sarakhs. In this manner, when the sanctioned ex- 
tensions are finished, all the expenditure that will be 
needed to establish through communication between 
Europe and India by railway will be less than £4,000,- 
000 sterling. 

Miles. Cost of Section. 

Askabad to Herat 388 ,£1,652,000 

Pishin to Herat .... .... 469 .... 2,345,000 

Total length and cost .... 857 .... £3,997,000 



Considering the revolution that would be accom- 
plished by the possibility of proceeding from Charing 
Cross to India in nine days, this outlay is, relatively, an 
absurd trifle. If no political considerations hindered its 
accomplishment, a company might be formed and the 
money raised in London for the railway in a few 
hours. 

At the present moment Russia is going to spend, in 
extending the Vladikavkaz railway to the Caspian and 
Black Sea, a sum of money nearly equal to that which I 
have given above as all that is needed to render it pos- 
sible for English people to proceed to India in nine 
days. When this Vladikavkaz line is finished, it will 



THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT, ETC. 1 59 

still further improve the proposed line of communica- 
tions. At present the route would be Calais, Berlin, 
Odessa, Batoum, Baku, Michaelovsk, Askabad, Herat, 
Candahar, and Pishin ; the water breaks being — 
from Dover to Calais, Odessa to Batoum, and Baku 
to Michaelovsk. When, however, the Vladikavkaz line 
is completed, the water breaks will be only two. The 
traveller will proceed direct from Calais to Petrovsk, 
on the Caspian, and cross over thence to Michael- 
ovsk, thus saving the journey across the Black Sea. This 
Vladikavkaz-Petrovsk link will be completed next year, 
so that by the time the Afghan railway is open, the line 
of steam communication from London to Calcutta, via 
Herat, will be perfect throughout. 

I have said that in Russia it is stated on the best au- 
thority that a decision has already been arrived at to 
push on the Transcaspian Railway, when finished to As- 
kabad, still further, to Sarakhs. This has been practi- 
cally confirmed by Lessar. Whether it will turn off then 
to Me-rv or not, we need not discuss. I do not believe 
it will. I am persuaded Russia will make a dash then 
for Herat. But let us simply accept Russia's admission 
that the line will cease advancing toward India when it 
attains Sarakhs. Even if she goes no further, one thing 
is already certain — England will inevitably push on her 
Pishin line to Candahar. ' 

You may possibly think that events are not likely to 
be ripe for some time to come for a return to Canda- 
har ; but every hour they are tending to an English oc- 
cupation of Herat, and, whether the communications be 
maintained through Candahar or not, the connection 
between Herat and Pishin will inevitably take the form 
of a railway. If Russia pushes on her locomotive to 



160 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Sarakhs, to within 202 miles of Herat, it will not do for 
our locomotive to be 469 miles short of it. Public 
opinion will compel the Government to push on the 
Indian railway system to Candahar. 

In that case, the position will be this : — 





Miles. 


Total cost. 


Sarakhs to Herat 

Candahar to Herat 


202£ 

.... 309 


,£910,000 
1,845,000 



Total length and cost .... 571* •••• £ 2 >755, 000 

Thus, whether Russia turns off afterwards to Merv 
or not, the extension of her railway system to Sarakhs 
will have the effect of reducing the gap between the 
railways of Europe and India to less than 600 miles. 
But I do not believe that the public would be satisfied 
with this state of affairs. Relatively the Russian loco- 
motive would be far too close to Herat, and conse- 
quently our Candahar line would be pushed on abso- 
lutely to Herat. This done, the gap would be reduced 
to a paltry 200 miles, and there can be hardly a doubt 
that the moment a period of peace ensued the press- 
ure of commerce would quickly bring about a junc- 
tion. 

Hence, I hold that in a very few years' time India and 
Europe will be joined together by a quick route of rail- 
way running through Herat, and the traffic speeding 
along it, even if it be only passenger, will revolutionize 
the Russo-Indian region, and efface the southern portion 
of the Afghan barrier. 

If it be urged that I am too sanguine, I reply that 
the changes I prognosticate are nothing compared with 
what has been accomplished since 1880. Take Merv. 
It was then as mysterious as Timbuctoo, and common 



THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT, ETC. l6l 

report affirmed that it was instant death for any Eurc 
pean to penetrate to the haunt of the man-stealing 
Turcomans. To-day, the postman goes his rounds in 
the oasis, the policeman guards the shops in the bazaar, 
and a site is already staked off for a permanent tele- 
graph office. Take Herat. Less than eighteen months 
ago no Englishman thought of the Sepoy and Cossack 
confronting each other on the Paropamisus slopes. 
Herat was as much out of the world, so far as Euro- 
pean intercourse was concerned, as the Arctic region. 
To-day some of its gates are in the Postal Union, 
and a post-card can be sent by Lessar from London to 
Alikhanorf at Pul-i-khisti for a penny. 

Strange as it may seem, the opening up of this short 
cut to India, on the importance of which I have been 
insisting for years, without having produced much effect 
on the British public, is nothing more than a revival of 
a scheme that excited a mania in England 150 years 
ago. The Russians are only trying to do to-day what 
the English sought to accomplish in the reign of 
George II. 

One hundred and fifty years ago the merchants of 
England were bitten with the idea of establishing trade 
relations with India via Russia and the Caspian Sea. 
The goods were to be conveyed to St. Petersburg or 
some other Baltic port ; they were then to be sent by 
canal or road to the upper course of the Volga, and 
they were afterwards to float down the river 2,000 miles 
in barges to its mouth. Here they were to be placed on 
ships and taken to Astrabad Bay, and from this point 
dispatched by caravan through Persia and Afghanistan 
to India. 

If the conditions of trade and travel in Russia at the 



1 62 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

time could be adequately realized, people would be 
amazed at the wonderful enterprise of these merchants. 
In the Baltic there was constant war, the Volga swarmed 
with pirates, the Caspian was a Persian lake with rapine 
and disorder seething round its shores, and the whole 
of the country thence to India was as turbulent and 
untamed as the worst parts of Afghanistan to-day. 
Finally, in India itself, France was still the stronger 
power, and Clive had not commenced the career of con- 
quest destined to convert the country into the magnifi- 
cent dependency Of the Empire we find it to-day. . Such 
were a few of the conditions at the time the Russia 
Company sought to open up the Transcaspian route 
to India. In the interval that has elapsed the English, 
who only held a few points on the east coast of India 
(excluding the then insignificant port, without territory, 
of Bombay), have moved towards Europe from Calcutta 
to Quetta 2,000 miles. The whole of this country they 
have conquered and organized, and railway communi- 
cation runs right through it, or will do so when the 
Pishin railway is finished. The Russians, on their part, 
whose final stronghold was Astrakhan, have advanced 
towards India as far as Ak Robat and other gates of 
Herat, or 1,200 miles, the entire length of which is open 
to trade, and the greater portion traversed by steam 
communication. 

In this manner, instead of the Russians at Astrakhan 
and the English at Calcutta being over 3,700 miles 
apart from one another, and exercising no control over 
the intervening country, as was the case when Jonas 
Han way tried to push English goods to India 150 years 
ago, they are now, measuring from the Russian position 
at Ak Robat to the English at Pishin, only a little over 



THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY TO HERAT, ETC. 1 63 

500 miles apart, while some of their soldiers face each 
other. Yet, forgetful of the past, and blind to the 
forces at work at the present, English statesmen for 
years have been acting as though the trumpery Afghan 
barrier were destined to last for centuries. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE' FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 

Impossibility of maintaining the Afghan barrier as it is — The Sepoy 
must confront the Cossack — The expansion of Russia — Will 
Russia let us garrison Herat ? — Skobeleff's Afghan programme 
— England must herself organize the Afghan frontier, and man 
it with troops. 

The Tsar rules ioo million subjects ; the Queen con- 
trols in India 250 millions. Between the two empires 
lies the Afghan barrier. 

What is the Afghan barrier? To the majority of 
Englishmen it is a vast mountainous region, extremely 
inaccessible, and peopled throughout with fierce tribes 
averse to any intercourse with the Feringhi. To con- 
quer it would be a task equal to the Russian conquest 
of the Caucasus. To attempt commercial intercourse 
would be to expose England to the risk of having to 
perpetually avenge brutal murders. For Russia to try 
to march an army into any part of the Ameer's domin- 
ions would be to involve her in those disasters and 
losses which marked our last Afghan War. If given to 
strife among themselves, the people are welded together 
by a common feeling of patriotism against the attacks 
of outsiders. Irreclaimably cruel, they are best left 
alone ; and even if Russia tore her way through the 
tribesmen, and broke the Ameer's levies, England could 
confront the wearied and mauled invaders in the Khybef 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 65 

and Bolan Passes, and effectually check an inrush into 
India. 

Thus, to the view of most Englishmen, Afghanistan 
is a material as well as a moral barrier. To my view it 
is neither. 

There is only one possible solution of the Central 
Asian Question. If the Russian advance is to be per- 
manently arrested, we must confront the Cossack with 
the Sikh. Unless we move up to Russia, Russia will 
move down upon India. There can be no permanent 
zone maintained between the two empires. 

We shall see what a breakable barrier this Afghanistan 
is, if we look at a few plain facts plainly. All I ask, at 
the outset, is that you look at them with your own eyes, 
and not through the spectacles of 1842 or 1878 ; nor 
yet, again, through the lenses of political old fogies, or, 
worse still, of mere party hacks, who, because they or 
their leaders expressed such and such opinions — five, 
ten, or twenty years ago — would rather see the empire 
perish than change them. 

The Russians are posted at the gates of Herat ; the 
English are posted on the hills dominating the avenues 
to Candahar. Between them lies the Afghan barrier. 

That barrier, physically, is of such a character, that 
the Russians could drive a four-in-hand from their own 
Cossack outposts to ours, and, during the 549 miles' 
ride, they would pass only two towns on the road — 
Herat with 50,000, and Candahar with 60,000 people. 
There are bad roads in Afghanistan, but they do not 
lie between the Russians and the English. There are 
fierce tribes, but they lie the thinnest between the Tsar's 
soldiers and the Queen's. There are patriotic Afghans, 
but the least sentimental and the most amenable to 



1 66 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

European influence, lie between the Cossack and the 
Sikh. There are fearful mountains, but they do not 
lie along the road I mention. Horrible deserts exist, 
but in this case the most fertile parts of Afghanistan 
mark the route. In one word, there is no barrier at all 
between the Russians and the English, except such as 
we ourselves may try and create, and interpose to check 
the advance of the Cossack. 

Let me put the matter more plainly in the shape of a 
parable. 

A certain man stood at the junction of two roads : 
one, a level railway, along which, in the distance, could 
be seen a locomotive advancing, and the other a wind- 
ing post road which disappeared over a lofty hill. See- 
ing him standing on the metals, people shouted to the 
man to beware of the advancing train. But the man 
refused to look along the line ; he kept his gaze fixed 
on the old post road, and replied, " I can see no stage- 
coach coming over the mountain ; I don't believe in 
your warnings." And so he stood obstinately on the 
metals, refusing to move, until the train come up and 
cut him to pieces. 

Such has been the attitude of England and her states- 
men in regard to the Russian advance upon India. 
That advance was formerly through Orenburg and the 
deserts of Central Asia. When English statesmen 
looked in those days towards the advancing Cossack, 
they gazed at Cabul and the lofty Hindoo Koosh in its 
rear. There was a barrier then. But since 1869 the 
Russians have been advancing in another direction. 
They have been rattling along the almost level road 
from the Caspian to Candahar. Still, with woeful per- 
versity, English statesmen have refused to divert their 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 67 

gaze from the old mountain road, and have kept look- 
ing at Cabul, when they ought to have been watching 
Herat. To-day, they are beginning to glance in the 
right direction, but unless they rid themselves of all the 
old-fashioned notions about the Afghans and the Afghan 
barrier, the Russians will smash their way into India. 

In discussing the Russo-Indian question, politicians 
frequently quote the opinions expressed by Wellington 
in 1842, and by Lawrence and others in 1860-70, when 
Russia was conquering the deserts of Turkestan. They 
might just as well quote the Talmud. All the condi- 
tions have changed since those opinions were expressed ; 
everything has been turned topsy-turvy in Afghanistan 
and Central Asia, and the authorities cited for passing 
party purposes by shallow politicians would be the first 
to disown the erroneous application of those opinions if 
they were alive to-day. 

To the Russian official or officer who has made the 
journey of 3,000 miles to get from St. Petersburgh to 
the gates of Herat, what is the trumpery 549 miles of 
easy road intervening between him and the Pishin out- 
posts ? The Herat-Candahar region may be a barrier to 
politicians who have passed their lives in babble and 
barlycorn measurements, but to Russians, accustomed to 
think no more of a thousand miles' journey than the Lon- 
doner does of a 'bus ride to the Bank, the distance separa- 
ting the Cossack from India is grotesquely insignificant. 

The defect of the Afghan barrier is this — that it is 
weakest where it ought to be most strong ; and we can 
only remedy that defect by taking the organization of 
the defence into our own hands. In plainer words, we 
ourselves must hold the gates of Herat. 

All discussions about the return to Candahar are 



1 68 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

beside the mark. We can occupy Candahar whenever 
we like, and we need not concern ourselves about its 
security. The whole of our efforts must be concen- 
trated upon the safeguarding of Herat. 

We must make sure of the bulwarks of Afghanistan. 
The question of the inner defences can be settled at our 
leisure afterwards. 

To hear some people talk, the installation of an In- 
dian garrison at Herat would appear to be the most 
difficult task that has ever tested the resources of our 
empire. As a matter of fact, the army concentrated at 
Pishin would simply have to march 400 odd miles to get 
to Herat, and that by a broad wagon road. To a na- 
tion that has just sent, in face of fearful obstacles, a 
force from Cairo to Khartoum (1,500 miles), such an ex- 
pedition should be relatively a commonplace enterprise. 
Ten thousand Indian troops, aided by tribal levies, 
would be all that would be needed for the moment to 
safeguard the Key of India. The real difficulty con- 
sists, not in getting those troops there, but in making 
sure that Russia will not issue an ultimatum forbidding 
their advance. 

It may be opportune to repeat what transpired dur- 
ing a discussion I had with Professor Martens on the 
subject in 1882. The connection of Professor Martens 
with the Russian Foreign Office is well known, and some 
of his utterances appeared to me, at the time, so fraught 
with warning that I printed then in italics. I give the 
conversation and my comment just as I published it in 
1882,* and I think it will be found to possess signifi- 

* " The Russian Advance towards India; Conversations with 
Russian Statesmen and Generals on the Central Asian Question." 
London ; Sampson Low and Co., 1882, page 207. 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 69 

cance of an undoubted character at the present mo- 
ment. 

The conversation was upon the features of Afghanis- 
tan. I mentioned that General Annenkoff had said, 
" Take Afghanistan, for sake of peace." 

" But Professor Martens declared that England would 
not be able to annex Afghanistan without Russia? s per- 
mission, or as he more delicately put it, ' without inform- 
ing her first of her intentions ;' while as to Herat, he 
said that Russia would view an English occupation of the 
place with displeasure. 

" He would not allow that we enjoyed supremacy in 
Afghanistan ; nor yet that we could regard it as a second 
Bokhara. He said Afghanistan was an independent 
State, and a neutral one ; and, with reference to Lord 
Hartington's declaration last year, ' that England would 
not allow any power to interfere with the internal and 
external affairs of Afghanistan,' which I quoted, to show 
what our Government thought of Russian pretensions, 
he said that the declaration was contrary to the views 
which Russia and England diplomatically expressed upon 
the matter, previous to the Marquis's speech. He would 
not agree that the Afghan war had cancelled those 
views. ' Herat,' he said, 'is quite as important to Rus- 
sia as to England. If it is the Key of India it is also 
the Key of Central Asia. If we were there we could 
threaten you in India ; if you were there you could 
threaten us in Central Asia.' 

" This opinion was expressed also by Baron Jomini, 
one of the Under-Secretaries of State at the Russian 
Foreign Office, to Lord Dufferin in 1879. Writing on 
July 1 6th in that year, he states that Baron Jomini said 
to him : ' Although we don't intend to go to Merv, or to 



170 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

do anything which may be interpreted as a menace to 
England, you must not deceive yourself, for the result 
of our present proceedings ' {i.e., the operations of Gen- 
eral Lazareff for conquering and annexing Akhal) ' will 
be to furnish us with a base of operations against England 
hereafter •, should the British Government, by the occupation 
of Herat, threaten ' our present position in Central Asia' 

" Professor Martens would not admit that Herat was_ 
as much a part of Afghanistan as Cabul or Candahar, 
and thought that Persia ought to have it. On my point- 
ing out what a rotten State Persia was, and how com- 
pletely it was under Russian control, he said that if Russia 
occupied Herat she would make Persia her enemy. My 
strong dissent from this led him to propose that Herat 
should be made into a sort of Switzerland, on the buf- 
fer State system, although he had previously expressed 
his disbelief in the possibility of keeping up Afghan- 
istan as a buffer between the two empires. I held 
that such a project was impossible with Asiatics, but he 
continued to maintain that England should keep her 
hands off the place under any contingencies. 

" As I gathered from him, he maintains Russia's 
right to annex all the territory up to the Afghan fron- 
tier, if the nomads provoke her to advance ; he holds 
that Russia should also have Afghan Turkestan — i.e., the 
country between the Oxus and the Hindoo Koosh. He 
considers that Herat ought not to be treated as an Afghan 
possession, and, finally, he insists that the rest of Af- 
ghanistan should be looked upon as a neutral inde- 
pendent State, in the existence of which Russia has as 
much interest as England. It is needless to point out 
that these opinions cannot but be so many red rags to 
English Russophobists, and that, much as the Profes- 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 171 

sor desires a reconciliation between England and Rus- 
sia, a cessation of the Central Asian agitation is impos- 
sible while they are maintained. . I myself would al- 
low Russia to annex up to Afghanistan; but I would 
give her to understand that that country is English ter- 
ritory, and must not be looked upon as less our prop- 
erty than Mysore or Baroda. 

" I used to think that the claims put forward by the 
Golos and Novoe Vremya, asserting Russia's right to 
treat Afghanistan as a neutral State, and Herat as apart 
from Afghanistan, were merely expressions of Anglo- 
phobe feeling. It has surprised me to find them seri- 
ously maintained by a person of such weight as Profes- 
sor Martens." 

Since Russia seized the gates of Herat, the St. Peters- 
burg press has repeatedly intimated that she would 
not allow us to occupy and garrison the Key of India. 
These opinions have been treated somewhat heedlessly 
by the English press. They have regarded them 
simply as ravings of irresponsible journalists. But 
knowing what I do of the aims of Russian statesmen, 
and with the warnings of Professor Martens ringing in 
my ears, I cannot but think that the threats of the Rus- 
sian press possess a very serious significance. In my 
mind I am persuaded, that if we allow this frontier com- 
plication to simmer until Russia masses at Sarakhs and 
Merv and the gates of Herat a more powerful army 
than Lumsden and the Afghans control for the de- 
fence of the Key of India, she will suddenly throw 
off the mask and deny our right to send a force thither. 
Hence, if there is to be any advance for the defence 
of Herat, it must be done without delay. 

The present complications are something more than 



172 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

an obstinate controversy about a few miles of frontier. 
The conviction has been deepening in Russia for years 
that the economical depression to which it is a prey can 
only be dissipated by a solution of the Eastern Question, 
and that that solution is only attainable by taking up 
such a position on the Indian confines as shall compel 
England to acquiesce in the Russian occupation of Ar- 
menia and Constantinople. 

Apparently, Russia has now accepted in full the policy 
of General Skobeleff, which, published piecemeal since 
his death, has permeated the army and exercised an ex- 
traordinary effect in preparing Russia for fresh sacrifices. 
Let me quote what Skobeleff wrote to a Russian diplo- 
matist after his return from Geok Tepe, during a rest he 
was taking on his estate a Spasskoe Selo : 

"The expedition of 1880-81, entrusted tome, gave 
birth to the indispensability of creating new relations 
with Merv, Afghanistan, and Persia. It rests beyond 
doubt that the late Emperor would not allow any other in- 
fluence on the Persian frontier but that of Persia. Let us 
hope that those high ideals which lay at the foundation 
of the late Sovereign's programme will remain the lead- 
ing ones of the present policy. Up to now, our national 
misfortunes, according to our view, have mainly arisen, not 
from the breadth of our ideas, but from the irresolution 
and changeableness of our political and ideal aim of 
operations. This want of determination, hand in hand 
with financial unscrupulousness, has lain a heavy burden 
on the whole structure of the State. Personally, for me 
the whole Central Asian question is fully palpable and 
clear. If by the aid of it we do not decide in a com- 
paratively short time to take in hand seriously the East- 
ern Question — that is, to dominate the Bosphorus — the 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 73 

fleece is not worth the tanning. Sooner or later, Russian 
statesmen will have to acknowledge that Russia must 
rule the Bosphorus. That on this depends not only her 
greatness as a power of the first magnitude, but also her 
security in a defensive sense, and the corresponding de- 
velopment of her manufacturing centres and trade. 
Without a serious demonstration in the direction of In- 
dia, in all probability on the side of Candahar, a war for 
the Balkan peninsula is not to be thought of. It is in- 
dispensable to maintain in Central Asia, at the gates of 
the corresponding theatre of war, a powerful body of 
troops, fully equipped and seriously mobilized. We might 
give up the whole of Central Asia in return for a serious 
and profitable alliance with England, until we had 
secured those results on the Bosphorus above mentioned, 
since the whole of Central Asia possesses for Russia only 
a temporary political significance. As a vestibule to the 
theatre of war in the event of sharp complications, simi- 
lar to those of 1878, the conquered Akhal country would 
serve in conjunction with the exclusive preponderating influ- 
ence we enjoy in Persia With the pacifica- 
tion of the Akhal Tekke oasis, the widest field of action 
has opened before Russian influence in Afghanistan, 
whenever circumstances require it. Examining the 
strategical roads for the manifestation of this influence, 
in dependence on the results accruing to England from 
the Afghan war, we are bound to come to the conclusion 
that the principal line of operations will rest upon the 
newly-conquered oasis. The late Emperor, in appoint- 
ing me commander against the Turcomans, was pleased 
to declare, in expressing an opinion as to what would be 
the results of a successful termination of the expedition, 
that he would not allow on the Persian confines any 



174 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

other preponderating influence except that of Russia. 
Remembering the sacred words of the Emperor, I 
hastened forward to Askabad and proposed that the 
Atak should be vassal to us, and Residents appointed at 
Meshed, Herat, and Merv ; and finally, in drawing the 
frontier, I considered as a minimum of our demands that 

we should control the mountain passes 

What has been said above by me does not constitute a 
new question, but luckily the success of the Akhal Tekke 
expedition practically opens to us the possibility of ex- 
ercising an influence on the pliancy of Great Britain in 
the event of fresh complications arising from the East- 
ern Question. This affair, more than any other under- 
taking, demands knowledge and prolonged systematic 
preparations. In support of what I have stated, I am 
happy that I can quote an extract from the reports of 
Ellis, the English Ambassador at Teheran (the contem- 
porary of Simonitch), to Lord Palmerston in 1835, now 
just published. ' I have arrived at the deep conviction 
that the British Government cannot in any case allow 
the extension of the dominion of Persia in the direction 
of Afghanistan without absolutely infringing the security 
of our Indian possessions. Persia either does not wish, 
or cannot enter into a lasting alliance with Great Britain. 
Our policy for the future ought consequently to be to 
regard Persia not as a rampart protecting India, but as 
a first parallel, from which at a given moment an invasion 
of India might proceed. Every step of Persia towards 
the East brings Russia closer to the gates of India.' 
Here is a revelation to us of political ideas, which ought 
to lie in the future at the fundament, and with which I 
was guided in all my operations, both military as well as 
those concerning the political frontier line of the newly 
subjugated country." 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 75 

This was published in the Novoe Vremya last year, on 
the second anniversary of Skobeleff's death. The gaps 
in the letter represent portions prudently suppressed by 
that paper. If it be carefully read, it will be found . to 
possess fuller significance, and contain a more direct 
bearing on the present Russian advance and the present 
claims, than anything ever published in the Russian lan- 
guage, including the stale but often quoted will of Peter 
the Great. 

" Russia does not want India ; she wants the Bos- 
phorus." Such was the declaration of General Soboleff 
in the Russ a few months ago, and it will be seen that 
his words represent very neatly the views of Skobeleff. 
The terms of peace seem simple, and there are certain 
simple-minded sentimentalists who are carried away by 
the plausibility of O. K. and urge that the British lion 
should lie down with the Russian bear and surrender 
Constantinople. But I think I shall be able to show that 
the offer is totally hollow, and one which cannot be ac- 
cepted, even by the most willing Russophile. 

In the first place, not a single Russian writer has yet 
denned what the acquisition of " Constantinople " really 
means. Only one thing is certain— Russia does not 
mean Constantinople itself and nothing more. On the 
contrary, she wants the whole of the Bosphorus and Dar- 
danelles to give her a free and uncontrolled passage to 
the Mediterranean, and the amount of territory she 
would require with the channels she leaves open. Now, 
on the north side of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles is 
European Turkey, nearly as large as Great Britain, with 
5,275,000 souls (we exclude East Roumelia and simply 
reckon the territory under the direct sway of the Porte) ; 
and on the south side is Turkey in Asia, larger than Ger- 



176 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

many, France and Austria combined, with a population 
of 17,000,000. How much of this would Russia want ? 
Because, having secured the Bosphorus, we know that 
she would require plenty of territory on both sides to 
to protect it from attack. 

As regards territory in Europe, Russia has expressed 
pretty plainly her desire to take over all that is left of 
the Porte's dominions, while, in respect to Asia, it is con- 
sidered essential that she should have Armenia, so as to 
connect Kars with the Bosphorus. Thus, although the 
8,000,000 people in the immediate vicinity of the Bos- 
phorus, and the 14,000,000 other subjects of the Sultan 
located further off, do not ask for Russian rule, England 
is requested to surrender the larger proportion of them, 
because Russia wants an outlet to the Mediterranean. On 
the same grounds Denmark ought to be also surrendered, 
because the Danes control the exit from the Baltic. Nay, 
there is greater reason for this, because, while the annex- 
ation of Denmark would affect the interests of only 
2,000,000 people, the annexation of Constantinople would 
interfere directly with the destinies of at least 8,000,000 
people, and indirectly with 14,000,000 more. In a word, 
there can be no Russian acquisition of Constantinople 
that does not carry with it the annexation of a large pro- 
portion of the Sultan's territory, and it is well, therefore, 
that this should be clearly borne in mind by those who 
advocate a bargain between Russia and England. 

But, supposing England did surrender Constantinople, 
would India be ever free from attack, as Soboleff im- 
plies? Could we safely leave the gates of Herat in 
Russia's hands ? These are questions to which it is im- 
possible to return an affirmative reply. 

In the first place, Russia's guarantee, verbal or in 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 77 

writing, would be no guarantee whatever. To rely upon 
any diplomatic compact would be to put ourselves in a 
position as bad as that of the suburban policeman, who 
should hand over in a dark lane his truncheon and re- 
volver to the captured burglar, in return for the scoun- 
drel's assurance to go quietly to the station. It is not 
England's fault, but Russia's, that there is no guarantee 
Russia can give us which we can possibly respect. But 
even if we could place more reliance on Russian treaties, 
the expansion of Russia is a factor that would infallibly 
render them in time waste paper. Russia has a frontier 
line across Asia 5,000 miles in length, no single spot of 
which can be regarded as permanent. Starting from 
the Pacific we find that she hankers for the northern 
part of Corea, regards as undetermined by boundary 
with Manchuria and Mongolia, regrets that she gave 
back Kuldja, hopes that she will some day have Kashgar, 
questions the Ameer's right to rule Afghan Turkestan, 
demands the gates of Herat, keeps open a great and 
growing complication with Persia about the Khorassan 
frontier, treats more and more every year the Shah as a 
as a dependent sovereign, discusses having some day a 
port in the Persian Gulf, and believes she will be the 
future mistress of the whole of Asia Minor. It may not 
be Russia's fault that her frontier is nowhere in a con- 
dition of rest. I will not discuss that point, but I do 
insist that the frontier is one which must expand in the 
future, and in so doing, frequently press on our interests. 
Consequently, the surrender of Constantinople would 
be of no avail in bringing about a permanent peace be- 
tween the two countries, because there exist a score of 
other loopholes for quarrelling between them. 

It is the recognition, the sorrowful recognition of this, 



178 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

that renders me such a resolute opponent of the Russian 
advance into Afghanistan. Were I convinced that the 
surrender of Constantinople would put an end to the 
conflict between the two empires, I should be the strong- 
est advocate of such a concession, for I like Russia. I 
have many sincere friends in the country. I take the 
deepest interest in its progress and expansion, and I 
should be the last to advocate war. But I recognize 
that permanent peace cannot be purchased by any sur- 
render, and it is the consciousness that the concessions 
will only beget fresh demands that causes me to insist 
on the necessity for resisting to the utmost Russia's 
claim to the gates of Herat. 

However disagreeable the task may be, England has 
but one course open to her. She must insist on the 
surrender of the Afghan points seized, and she must 
apply herself resolutely to the organization of the new 
frontier. Fortunately, if the Afghan barrier lies open 
to Russia, it lies open equally to ourselves. The condi- 
tions at Herat are totally different from those at Cabul. 
The people are almost devoid of fanaticism, they have 
a traditional feeling in our favor, and have already de- 
veloped a fraternal sentiment since the presence of the 
Lumsden mission in their midst. Thus, if by friendly 
arrangement with the Ameer we could maintain a force 
in or near Herat, the measure would be very popular in 
the locality. 

As regards the actual frontier the matter is still easier. 
Along the whole valley of Herat to Kusan, the people 
dwelling in the villages are quiet and well-disposed ; 
north of them, to the Russian outposts, there are scarce- 
ly any inhabitants at all. Thus our outposts would be 
safe on the Hari Rud side of Herat. With regard to 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 79 

the Murghab, immediately north of Herat, are the Jem- 
shidis. These I have already described as peaceful 
and friendly ; so again are the Sarik Turcomans. 

Now for Afghan Turkestan. From Bala Murghab to 
the Oxus the Uzbegs are described by Grodekoff as 
particularly peaceful — too much so, he thinks, as they 
thereby expose themselves to Afghan tyranny. The few 
Turcomans also found are likewise free from turbulence. 
In this manner a very slight Anglo-Afghan cordon would 
suffice to guard the frontier from Persia to the Oxus, 
and it would effectually check Russian designs on Balkh 
and other foreposts of the Hindoo Koosh, as well as 
screen Herat. 

To the east of Herat are the Hazaras, and south-east 
the Amaks. These are supposed to number collectively 
650,000 souls, and could supply 20,000 or 30,000 horse 
equal to the Turcomans. They are Mongols by stock, 
and so independent that the Afghans have never been 
able to bring the former totally under subjection. 
With both, good relations have been established by Sir 
Peter Lumsden, and it is not anticipated by our Indian 
military experts that they would occasion any trouble, 
while, being a non-Afghan people, they would be a 
-valuable support to our cordon, in the event of any 
tumult among the Afghans themselves. The Firuzkuhis, 
30,000 in number, are another tribe that might render 
excellent assistance. 

Thus, a cordon established along the new frontier 
would have powerful support in its rear, and from 
Herat to the Oxus would be safe from tribal attack and 
separated by the Hindoo Koosh from the tumults and 
fanaticism of Cabul. The sole difficulty is the linking 
of this cordon with our position at Quetta. 



180 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

The first thing to be remembered is, that we are the 
practical proprietors of the whole of Beluchistan, the 
present Government having established a protectorate 
over it. It is very important to bear this in mind, be- 
cause it gives us the means of establishing communi- 
cation with Herat, without touching Candahar. As a 
matter of fact, the cordon I have referred to could be 
extended along the Perso-Afghan frontier to East 
Beluchistan, and there join hands with our own military- 
forces. It has been pointed out by the highest au- 
thority that a railway to Herat is feasible from the 
port of Gwadur, on the coast of Beluchistan, and this 
could be carried up to the Key of India without med- 
dling with Candahar, or traversing any country held in 
force by hostile tribes. 

Before Sir Peter Lumsden left England I discussed 
with him this plan, which I had been maturing some 
time, and had only refrained from making public to 
prevent Russia taking timely steps to frustrate it. I 
based its success upon the tranquil character of the 
North-west and West Afghan frontiers, and my views 
on this point have since been confirmed by the corre- 
spondence despatched from that region to the English 
and Indian press. Such a cordon would effectually 
check any further Russian advance, and it would leave 
untouched Cabul and Candahar, and the districts gener- 
ally of Afghanistan where fanaticism abounds, and the 
ill-feeling engendered by the last war has not yet 
passed away. 

Of late it has become known that some such plan had 
been drawn up by the ablest military authorities in India 
during the viceroyalty of the Marquis of Ripon. I can- 
not help thinking that England's power in India would 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. l8l 

have been stronger to-day, had he attended to this more, 
and left alone such fire-brand questions as the Ilbert 
Bill. 

Still, it is not too late for its adoption, if it be taken 
in hand before Russia consolidates her position at the 
gates of Herat. If it be left untouched till then, Russia, 
I am persuaded, will never allow the English to gar- 
rison the Northwest Afghan frontier without making 
a determined effort to prevent it. On this account, it 
is essential that public opinion in this country should 
be perfectly ripe for the permanent manning of the 
Afghan frontier with Indian troops, and that Russia 
should feel that Earl Dufferin is backed up, if he adopts 
such a policy, by the patriotic feeling of the entire Eng- 
lish empire. 

I may add that our military resources in India are 
quite equal to the task, if increased by a few reinforce- 
ments from home, and that the sole obstacle is, whether 
the Government may not hold back, fearing that public 
opinion in England is not sufficiently advanced for such 
a forward movement. To go into full details of the 
policy would be to lengthen out a book already suffi- 
ciently long, and, what is worse, perhaps lead to Rus- 
sian intrigue, in London and on the spot, to prevent its 
realization. But I have said enough in this volume, in 
describing the new frontier, to indicate its feasibility ; 
and India being ready to take the task in hand, in con- 
junction with the Ameer, I venture to express a hope 
that every reader will do his utmost to support the 
authorities at home and in India in accomplishing it. 

With regard to Earl Dufferin, little fear need be en- 
tertained that he will prove unequal to the situation. 
The case, however, is different with the Government 



1 82 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

at home. Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet is notoriously given 
to making concessions, and Russia, well aware of this, 
is resorting to every artifice to squeeze it. Against this 
evil tendency must be maintained a determined struggle. 
" No surrender ! " must be the motto of every English- 
man as regards Penjdeh, and " Hands off ! " in respect 
to Ak Robat, Pul-i-Khisti, and other gates of the Key 
of India. Whether Russia shall win the great camping- 
ground of Herat or be permanently excluded from it, 
depends largely upon you. If you, as one of the public, 
do not manifest a fixed determination to keep Russia 
out of Herat and its gates, the Government will catch 
the spirit of your indifference, and Russia will succeed 
in realizing her demands. 

Let me make the appeal, therefore, that if you thor- 
oughly appreciate the importance of preserving Herat, 
you will not simply content yourself with silent acquies- 
cence. The press and the platform are open to you to 
give publicity to your support, and if you have means 
you can help in the dissemination of pamphlets to keep 
alive public feeling to the danger of the Russian ad- 
vance. I have never rejected any one's co-operation in 
the sacred task of safeguarding India from the menace 
from the North, and gratefully place on record the en- 
couragement which has been given to my efforts by the 
sympathy conveyed to me by my readers. With your 
help I may be able to do more than I am doing ; with- 
out it I remain just as determined as ever not to allow 
Russia to have Herat while my tongue and my pen can 
prevent it. 

England has no aggressive aims in Central Asia ; she 
has no desire to meddle with anybody beyond the 
Afghan border. Afghanistan itself she strongly wishes 




Lord Dufeerin. 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 83 

should remain independent, and to render it so she has 
been paying the Ameer a subsidy of ;£i 20,000 a year to 
consolidate his authority. With that independence I 
am as little disposed to meddle as any member of the 
Manchester school can be, but I hold that it can never 
be preserved by the simple process of tossing ^"10,000 
a month across our Indian frontier, and exercising no 
control over its expenditure. The Ameer, * r a clever 
man in some respects, is not everywhere in his domin- 
ions a popular sovereign, and only Englishmen who 
are ignorant of Afghan affairs, or refuse to watch them, 
can deny that there is only one step between his rule and 
anarchy. If he were to die to-morrow we have no guar- 
antee that a period of turbulence would not prevail at 
Cabul, and Russia has pretty plainly informed us that if 
we do not maintain order throughout Afghanistan, she 
will not bind herself not to advance across the border to 
restore it. In other words, an outbreak at Herat would 
be a sufficient excuse for the occupation of the Key of 
India. 

Again, if Englishmen are blind to the fact, Russia is 
not, that the tribal differences existing in Afghanistan 
render the country peculiarly well adapted for gradual 
disintegration. The notion of a united Afghanistan is 
fit only for the nursery. The Afghans are conquerors 
and foreigners in the whole of the country north of the 
Hindoo Koosh, from Balkh to Herat. Their control of 
Herat, as Russia is constantly reminding us, is quite of 
recent origin, and even yet they have not succeeded in 
imposing their rule over all the clans dwelling between 
Herat and Cabul. If Russia retains her present posi- 
tion, she will be admirably placed for intriguing with 
the non-Afghan peoples, and detaching them one by 



1 84 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

one from the Ameer's rule. The Jemshidis would be 
operated upon first, then the Uzbegs, afterward the 
Hazaraks and Aimaks, and so on, with very little 
trouble. Unless we screen these tribes by an Indian 
cordon, Russia will be able to eat her way into the 
heart of Afghanistan. 

The rampart of the Sulieman range is as much a 
delusion as the Paropamisus hills. It used to be thought 
that a great mountain barrier ran parallel with the Indus, 
and that it was only pierced by three or four cracks — 
the Khyber, Bolan, and Gomul passes. That myth was 
exploded during the last war, a regular survey having 
disclosed the existence of 289 passes, every one capable 
of being traversed by camels. In the Dera Ismail Khan 
district alone there are 92 passes ; and in excess of the 
289 already mapped on the Indo- Afghan frontier, there 
are 75 more, leading from Beluchistan into India. To 
control all these passes in time of war, against an army 
located at Candahar, would be impossible. Among 
military men to-day there is no difference of opinion 
that we must go forward and take up a strong position 
to control the few roads debouching in the direction of 
this range. In other words, we must assume charge of 
the Key of India. 

England has to face this fact, and it is no use shirk- 
ing it. If she does not pervade Afghanistan, Russia 
will, and the weakest part of the barrier being precisely 
that which is closest to Komaroff and Alikhanoff, there 
is obviously every facility for the slow sapping intrigue, 
at which Russia is such an adept. We have already 
ourselves broken the isolation of Afghanistan by de- 
spatching officers and troops to Herat. Let us develop 
that intercourse, and upon it base the erection of such 



THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIER. 1 85 

a barrier along the Russo-Afghan frontier as will effect- 
ually secure Afghanistan from the corroding influence 
of Russia, and afford a means of consolidating our own. 
There need be no serious annexations, no meddling 
with the susceptibilities or power of Ameer or Afghan. 
Once such a defence is organized, in the Ameer's name, 
for the Key of India, we can rapidly put in order India 
itself. But, it must be clearly understood, this can be 
done only by ousting Russia from the gates of Herat 
she has seized, and by peremptorily rejecting her de- 
mands for the remainder. Otherwise a wedge will 
have been successfully driven in from Merv and Sarakhs 
to the great camping-ground of Herat, and it will 
require an enormous expenditure to defend the broken 
frontier from such treacherous coups de main as the 
recent seizure of Merv and the dash to the bulwarks of 
the Key of India. 



THE END. 



Messrs. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

publish, under the general title of 

The CAMPAIGNS of the CIVIL WAR, 

A Series of volumes, contributed by a number of leading 
actors in and students of the great conflict of i86i-'6s, with 
a view to bringing together, for the first time, a full and 
authoritative military history of the suppression of the 
Rebellion. 

The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which every 
doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possibility 
only of the future. But it is a matter for surprise that twenty years 
after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when a whole generation 
has grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority which is 
at the same time of the highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and 
to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field. 

The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materi- 
als of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent reading, 
an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary reader 
does not possess. There have been no attempts at general histories 
which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public. 
Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially 
welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very 
great class of readers ; — and there has seemed to be great danger that 
the time would be allowed to pass when it would be possible to give 
to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal 
recollection. These facts led to the conception of the present work. 

From every department of the Government, from the officers of the 
army, and from a great number of custodians of records and special infor- 
mation everywhere, both authors and publishers have received every aid 
that could be asked in this undertaking ; and in announcing the issue of 
the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the thanks which 
the authors have had individual opportunities to express elsewhere. 



The volumes are duodecimos of about 250 pages each, 
illustrated by maps and plans prepared under the direction 
of the authors. 

The price of each volume is $1.00. 



The following volumes are now ready : 

J. — The Outbreak of Rebellion. By John G. Nicolay, 
Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late Consul- 
General to France, etc. 

A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and covering th» 
|>eriod from the election of Lincoln to "the end of the first battle of Bull Run. 



II,— From Fort Henry to Corinth, By the Hon. M. 
F. Force, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnatti; late 
Brigadier- General and Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding 
First Division, 17th Corps: in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the 
20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh ; Treasurer of 
the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. 

The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May, 1862; 
tovering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc. 

Ill,— The Peninsula. By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D., 
President of the College of the City of New York : Assistant 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, 1861-62 ; Inspector 
General Fifth Army Corps; General commanding 2d Div., 
2d Corps ; Major General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army 
of the Potomac. 

The history of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the 
ead of the Seven Days' Fight. 

IV,— The Army tinder Tope, By John C. Ropes, Esq., 
of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, the Massa- 
chusetts Historical Society, etc. 

From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of Virginia, to the appoint- 
ment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1862 

V, — The Antiefam and Fredericksburg . By Francis 
Winthrop Palfrey, Bvt. Brigadier Gen'l, U.S.V., and form- 
erly Colonel 20th Mass. Infantry ; Lieut. Col. of the 20th 
Massachusetts at the Battle of the Antietam; Member of 
the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of the Massa- 
chusetts Historical Society, etc. 

From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, September, 1862,'to 
the end of the battle of Fredericksburg. 

Vl.—Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, By Abner 
Doubleday, Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A., and Maj. Gen'l, 
U.S.V. ; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg, etc. 

From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of Chancellorsville and 
Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the latter battle. 

VII,— The Army of the Cumberland, By Henry M. 
Cist, Brevet Brig. Gen'l U.S.V. ; A.A.G. on the staff of 
Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterwards on that of Major Gen'l 
Thomas ; Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army 
of the Cumberland. 

From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the batdes at 
Chattanooga, November, 1863. 



VIII* — The Mississippi, By Francts Vinton Greene, 
Lieut, of Engineers, U. S. Army ; late Military Attache to the 
U. S. Legation in St. Petersburg ; Author of " The Russian 
Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78," and of 
"Army Life in Russia." 

An account of the operations — especially at Vicksburg and Port Hudson — by 
which the Mississippi River and its shores were restored to the control of the Union. 

IX. — Atlanta, By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox, Ex- Governor of 
Ohio; late Secretary of the Interior of the United States; 
Major General U. S.V., commanding Twenty-third Corps 
during the campaigns of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc. , etc. 

From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to the beginning of 
the March to the Sea. 

X,—The March to the Sea— Franklin and Nashville. 

By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox. 

From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the surrender of Johnston- • 
including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee. 

XI.— The Shenandoah Valley in 1S64, The Cam- 
paign of Sheridan, By George E. Pond, Esq., Asso- 
ciate Editor of the Army and Navy Journal. 

XII, — The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65, Tlie 
Army of the Potomac and the Army of the 
J antes. By Andrew A. Humphreys, Brigadier General 
and Bvt. Major General, U. S. A. ; late Chief of Engineers ; 
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, 1863-64; commanding 
Second Corps, 1864-65, etc., etc. 

Statistical Record of the Armies of the United 
States, By Frederick Phisterer, late Captain U. S. A. 

This Record includes the figures of the quotas and men actually furnished by 
all States; a list of all organizations mustered into the U. S. service; the strength 
of the army at various periods ; its organization in armies, corps, etc.; the divisions 
of the country into departments, etc.; chronological list of all engagements, with the 
losses in each ; tabulated statements of all losses in the war, with the causes of 
death, etc.; full lists of all general officers, and an immense amount of other valuable 
statistical matter relating to the War. 



The complete Set, thirteen volumes, in a box. Price, $12.50 
Single volumes, . . ... . .1.00 



*** The' above books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, j>ost-j>aid, 
u£on receipt of j>rice, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



NOW COMPLETE. 

In three volumes, 12mo 9 with Maps and Plans, 



THE 

avy in the Civil War 



*"pHE WORK OF THE NAVY in the suppression of the Rebellion was 
■*■ certainly not less remarkable than that of the Army. The same 
forces which developed from our volunteers some of the finest bodies of 
soldiers in military history, were shown quite as wonderfully in the creation 
of a Navy, which was to cope for the first time with the problems of modern 
warfare. 

The facts that the Civil War was the first great conflict in which steam 
was the motive power of ships ; that it was marked by the introduction of 
the ironclad ; and that it saw, for the first time, the attempt to blockade 
such a vast length of hostile coast — will make it an epoch for the techinal 
student everywhere. 

But while the Army has been fortunate in the number and character of 
those who have contributed to its written history, the Navy has been com- 
paratively without annalists. During a recent course of publications on 
the military operations of the war, the publishers were in constant receipt 
of letters pointing out this fact, and expressing the wish that a complete 
naval history of the four years might be written by competent hands. An 
effort made in this direction resulted in the cordial adoption and carrying 
out of plans by which Messrs. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS are 
enabled to announce the completion of a work of the highest authority and 
interest, giving the whole narrative of Naval Operations from 1861 to 1865. 

I. THE BLOCKADE AND THE CRUISERS.— By Pro- 

fessor J. Russell Soley, U. S. Navy. 

II. THE ATLANTIC COAST.— By Rear-Admiral Daniel 

Ammen, U. S. Navy. 

III. THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS.— By Commander 
A. T. Mahan, U. S. Navy. 
Uniform with " TJie Campaigns of the Civil War," with maps 
and diagrams prepared under the direction of the A.uthors. 

Price per Volume, Sl.OO. 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 & 745 Broadway, New York. 



THE 

Navy in the Civil War 

I.-THE BLOCKADE AND THE CRUISERS. 

By Professor J. Russell Soley, U. S. Navy. 

u The book is well arranged, written clearly, without technical terms, 
and shows great familiarity with the subject. It is marked by thoroughness 
of preparation, sound judgment, and admirable impartiality. It is a promis- 
ing beginning of the projected series ; and if the other volumes prove 
worthy of this, they will make a valuable addition to the Army series, 
which has proved so useful and popular." — Ths Nation. 

II.-THE ATLANTIC COAST. 

By Real-Admiral Daniel Ammen, U. S. Navy. 

Admiral Ammen's history of the naval operations on the Atlantic 
coast, from 1861 to the close of the war, describes the active work of the 
navy in attacking the defensive strongholds of the Confederacy from 
Hampton Roads to Florida Keys. It includes a full account of the long 
siege of Charleston, and the scarcely less arduous operations against 
Fort Fisher, the capture of Hatteras Inlet, Roanoke Island and Newbern, 
and other minor movements along the coast. 

Ill— THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS. 

By Commander A. T. Mahan, U. S. Navy. 

The achievements of the Naval force on the Mississippi and its tributaries, 
and on the Gulf and the Red River, either independently or in co-oper- 
ation with the Army, form one of the most thrilling chapters in the history 
of the Civil War. The exploits of Farragut, Foote and Porter, with their 
gallant crews and improvised vessels, teem with acts of daring, marvelous 
escapes, and terrific encounters. Commander Mahan has done full justice 
to this side of his narrative, but he has given at the same time a record of 
this part of the war that has greater claims to historic value than any which 
have preceded it. 

Each One Volume, 1 2mo, with Maps and Plans. 

Price per Volume, 6I.OO. 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

74:3 & 745 Broadway, New York. 



Stories by 
American Authors 



*#* Cloth, i6mo, Fifty Cents each. Complete sets, io vols, 
in a box, $5.00. 



In accordance with the announcement made at its beginning, 
this now completed series is a collection of the more noteworthy- 
short stories contributed by American authors in recent years 
to periodicals, or included in publications for some reason not 
easily accessible. 

The remarkable popularity and critical success which the 
series has been fortunate enough to gain has more than justified 
the publishers' belief that American short stories thus brought 
together would make an extraordinary showing of strong, va- 
ried and striking work, the collective interest of which would 
be for the first time recognized. Now that the collection is 
finished, it forms one of the most entertaining resources that a 
lover of good fiction can have at hand. Taken from a variety 
of sources, it has drawn from more than one critic the verdict 
that it is entitled to a more enduring popularity than even its 
well-known predecessor in the English field, the ' ' Tales from 
Blackwood ;" and the admission that it goes very far to establish 
the American short story as the most characteristic, original 
and well conceived of its class. 

If the popularity of the isolated volumes is good evidence, the 
now complete group will have a standard value for the library as 
the only attempt made adequately to represent this department 
of our fiction. 



Send for Circulars giving Full Lists of Stories and 
Names of Authors. 



Standard Works of Fiction, 

PUBLISHED BY 

Charles Scribner's Sons, 



Mrs. Frances Hodgson Burnetts Novels 



THAT LASS O' LOWRIE'S. One vol., wmo, cloth, $1.50} 
paper, 90 cents. 

" We know of no more powerful work from a woman's hand in 
the English language." — Boston Transcript. 

HAWORTH'S. One vol., i2mo, cloth, $1.50. 

" Haworth's is a product of genius of a very high order. — N. ¥. 

Evening Post. 

LOUISIANA. One vol., 1 2mo, $1.00. 

" We commend this book as the product of a skillful, talented* 
well-trained pen. Mrs. Burnett's admirers are already numbered by 
the thousand, and every new work like this one can only add to their 
number. ' ' — Chicago Tribune, 

BURLY TIM, and other Stories. One vol., i6mo, cloth, $1.25. 

"The stories collected in the present volume are uncommonly 
Vigorous and truthful stories of human nature." — Chicago 
Tribune. 

EARLIER STORIES. Each, one vol., i6mo, paper. 
Pretty Polly Pemberton. Kathleen. Each, 40 cents. 

Lindsay's Luck. Theo. Miss Crespigny. Each, 30 cents. 

" Each of these narratives has a distinct spirit, and can be profit- 
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art, but deep pathos." — Boston Post. 

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STANDARD WORKS OF FICTION. 



DR. J. G. HOLLAND'S POPULAR NOVELS. 



EacJi one volume, 16ino 9 cloth, $1,25, 



" To those who love a pure diction, a healthful tone, and thought that 
ieads zip to higher and better aims, that gives brighter color to some 
cf the hard, dull phases of life, that awakens the mind to renewed 
activity, and makes one mentally better, the prose and poetical works 
cf Dr. Holland will prove an ever new, ever welcome source from which 
to draw.'''' — New Haven Palladium. 



NICHOLAS MINTURN. A Study in a Story. 

" Nicholas Minturn is the most real novel, or rather life-story, 
yet produced by any American writer." — Philadelphia Press. 

SEVENOAKS. A Story of To-Day. 

"As a story, it is thoroughly readable; the action is rapid, but not 
hurried ; there is no flagging, and no dullness. " — : Christian Union, 

ARTHUR BONNICASTLE. A Story of American Life. 

" The narrative is pervaded by a fine poetical spirit that is alive to 
the subtle graces of character, as well as to the tender influences of 
natural scenes. ... Its chief merits must be placed in its graphic 
and expressive portraitures of character, its tenderness and delicacy 
of sentiment, its touches of heartfelt pathos, and the admirable wis- 
dom and soundness of its ethical suggestions." — N. Y. Tribune. 

THE BAY PATH. A Tale of New England Colonial Life. 

"A conscientious and careful historical picture of early New Eng- 
land days, and will well repay perusal." — Boston Sat. Eve. Gazette* 

MISS GILBERT'S CAREER. An American Story. 

The life and incidents are taken in about equal proportions from 
the city and country — the commercial metropolis and a New Hamp- 
shire village. It is said that the author has drawn upon his own 
early experiences and history for a large part of the narrative. 



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STANDARD WORKS OF FICTION. 



GEORGE W. CABLE'S NOVELS. 



"I have read all thy stories and like them very much. Thee has 
found an untrodden field of romance in New Orleans ; and I think 
thee the writer whom we have so long waited to see come up in 
the South."— The Poet Whittier to Mr. Cable. 

THE GRANDISSIMES. A Story of Creole Life. With a 
frontispiece, "The Cabildo of 1883." One vol., i2mo. 
Price reduced to % 1 „ 2 5 . 

OLD CREOLE DAYS. With a frontispiece, "The Cafe des 
Exiles." One vol., i2mo, uniform with The Grandissimes, 

$1.25. 

Popular Edition of Old Creole Days. Two Series, sold separately, 
30 cents each. The same in cloth, gilt top, with frontispieces, 
75 cents each. 

"Here is true art at work. Here is poetry, pathos, tragedy, 
humor. Here is an entrancing style. Here is a new field, one 
full of passion and beauty. Here is a local color, with strong draw- 
ing. Here, in this little volume, is life, breath, and blood. The 
author of this book is an artist, and over such a revelation one may 
be permitted strong words." — Cincinnati Times. 



EDWARD EGGLESTON'S NOVELS. 



ROXY. One vol., i2mo, cloth, with twelve full-page illustrations from 
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" One of the ablest of recent American novels, and indeed in all 
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THE CIRCUIT RIDER. A Tale of the Heroic Age. One 

vol., i2mo, extra cloth, illustrated with over thirty characteristic 
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H. H. BOYESEN'S NOVELS. 



FALCONBERG. A Novel. Illustrated. One vol., $1.50. 

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able. ' ' — Chicago Inter- Ocean. 

GUNNAR. A Tale of Norse Life. One vol., square i2mo, $1.25. 

" This little book is a perfect gem of poetic prose ; every page is 
full of expressive and vigorous pictures of Norwegian life and 
scenery. Gunnar is simply beautiful as a delicate, clear, and power- 
ful picture of peasant life in Norway." — Boston Post. 

ILKA ON THE HILL-TOP, and Other Stories. One vol., 
square i2ino, $1.00. 

"Mr. Boyesen's stories possess a sweetness, a tenderness, and a 
drollery that are fascinating, and yet they are no more attractiv 
than they are strong." — Home Journal. 

TALES FROM TWO HEMISPHERES. A New Editios 
One vol., square i2mo, $1.00. 

" The charm of Mr. Boyesen's stories lies in their strength and 
purity j they offer, too, a refreshing escape from the subtlety and in- 
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strong without caricature or sentimentality." — Chicago Interior \ 

QUEEN TITANIA. One vol., square i2mo, $1.00. 

" One of the most pure and lovable creations of modern fiction. "- 
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" The story is a thoroughly charming one, and there is much \w 
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THE ADVENTURES OF CAPTAIN MAGO; or, A Phoe- 
nician Expedition, B.C. iooo. By Leon Cahun. With 73 
illustrations by P. Philippoteaux. Translated from the French 
by Ellen E. Frewer. One vol., 8vo, $2.50. 

THEOPHILUS AND OTHERS. By Mary Mapes Dodge. A 
book for older readers. One vol., i2mo, $1.50. 

" The whole series is very clever, and makes a volume of most 
amusing reading." — British Quarterly Reviezu. 

SAXE HOLM'S STORIES. Two Series. Each one vol., i2mo, 
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thoroughly beautiful in their spirit and their lessons." — The Chris- 
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HANDICAPPED. By Marion Harland. One vol., i2mo, $1.50. 

DR. JOHNS. Being a Narrative of Certain Events in the Life of an 
Orthodox Minister in Connecticut. By Donald G. Mitchell. 
Two vols., i2mo, $3.50. 

THE COSSACKS. A Story of Russian Life. Translated by Eugene 
Schuyler, from the Russian of Count Leo Tolstoy. One vol., 
i2mo, $1.25. 

RUDDER GRANGE. By Frank R. Stockton. A New and En. 
larged Edition. One vol., i6mo, paper, 60 cents; cloth, $1.25. 

THE SCHOOLMASTER'S TRIAL ; or, Old School and New. 
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THE ERCKMA NN-CHAT RIAN NOVELS- 

New Edition in Handsome Hinding. Each one vol. 12mo f 
uniform. Extra Cloth, $1.25 per vol. 

" These delightful works well deserve their great success. . . . Not only ia 
the couleur locale admirably preserved, but the very spirit of those who took part in 
the events is preserved." — President Andrew D. White, LL.D. 

FRIEND FRITZ. A Tale of the Banks of the Lauter. In- 
cluding a Story of College Life. — "Maitre Nablot." 
" ' Friend Fritz ' is a charmingly sunny and refreshing story." — N. Y. Tribune. 

THE CONSCRIPT. A Tale of the French War of 1813. With 

four full-page illustrations. 

" It is hardly fiction — it is history in the guise of fiction, and that part of his- 
tory which historians hardly write, concerning the disaster, the ruin, the sickness, 
the poverty, and the utter misery and suffering which war brings upon the people."— 
Cincinnati Daily Commercial. 

WATERLOO. A Story of the Hundred Days. Being a Sequel 
to " The Conscript." With four full-page illustrations. 

" Written in that charming style of simplicity which has made the Erckmann- 
Chatrian works popular in every language in which they have been published, 1 '— 
New York Daily Herald. 

THE PLEBISCITE. The Miller's Story of the War. A vivid 

Narrative of Events in connection with the great Franco- Prussian 
War of 1871. 

THE BLOCKADE OF PHALSBURG. An Episode of the Fall 
of the First French Empire. With four full-page illustrations 
and a portrait of the authors. 

*' Not only are they interesting historically, but intrinsically a pleasant, well-con* 
structed plot, serving in each case to connect the great events which they so graph- 
ically treat, and the style being as vigorous and charming as it is pure and 
refreshing." — Philadelphia Daily l7iquirer. 

INVASION OF FRANCE IN 1814. With the Night March past 
Phalsburg. With a Memoir of the Authors. With four full- 
page illustrations. 

" All their novels are noted for the same admirable qualities — simple and effective 
realism of plot, incident and language, and a disclosure of the horrid individual 
aspects of war. They are absolutely perfect of their kind." — N. Y. Evening Mail. 

MADAME THERESE, or, the Volunteers of '92. With four 
full-page illustrations. 

" It is a boy's story — that is, supposed to be written by a boy — and has all the 
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"Two as interesting- and valuable books of travel as have 
been published in this country."— New Yobk Express. 

Dr. FIELD'S TRA VELS ROUN D THE WORLD. 

I.-FROM THE LAKES OF KILLARNEY TO THE 
GOLDEN HORN. 

II.— FROM EGYPT TO JAPAN. 

By HENRY M. FIELD, D.D. 
JEach 1 vol. 12 mo, Cloth, gilt top, uniform in style, $2. 

CRITICAL NOTICES. 

From the London Times {of the First Volui7ie). 

11 As we all know, it is not necessary for a man to discover a new country in order 
to write an interesting book of travel. He may traverse the most beaten track in 
Europe, and yet if he can describe what he has seen with freshness and originality, 
he will succeed in engaging our attention. We do not go far with Dr. Field before 
finding out that he is a traveller of this sort." And so on for a column and a half, 
criticising here and there, but praising warmly ; and ending " Thus we take leave of 
a writer who has produced so interesting and meritorious a book that we are sorry we 
cannot coincide with all his conclusions." 

From the New York Tribune. 

Few recent travellers combine so many qualities that are adapted to command the 
interest and sympathy of the public. While he indulges, to its fullest extent, the 
characteristic . American curiosity with regard to foreign lands, insisting on seeing 
every object of interest with his own eyes, shrinking from no peril or difficulty in pur- 
suit of information — climbing mountains, descending mines, exploring pyramids, with 
no sense of satiety or weariness, he has also made a faithful study of the highest 
authorities on the different subjects of his narrative, thus giving solidity and depth to 
his descriptions, without sacrificing their facility or grace. 

From the New York Herald {of the Second Volume). 

It would be impossible by extracts to convey an adequate idea of the variety, 
abundance, or picturesque freshness of these sketches of travel, without copying a 
great part of the book. 
___ From the New York Observer. 

The present volume comprises by far the most novel, romantic, and interesting 
part of the Journey [Round the World], and the story of it is told and the scenes are 
painted by the hand of a master of the pen. Dr. Field is a veteran traveller ; he 
knows well what to see, and (which is still more important to the reader) he knows 
well what to describe and how to do it. 

From Rev. Dr. R. S. Storrs. 

It is indeed a charming book — full of fresh information, picturesque description, 
and thoughtful studies of men, countries, and civilizations. 

From Rev. Dr. A. P. Peabody, late Editor of the Nortli American Review. 

" I have never, within anything like the same space, seen so much said of Egypt, 
or so wisely or so well. Much as I have read about Egypt — many volumes indeed — 
I have found some of these descriptions more graphic, more realistic, than I have ever 
met or expect to meet elsewhere." 

By Charles Dudley Warner, in the Hartford Courant. 

" It is thoroughly entertaining ; the reader's interest is never allowed to flag ; the 
author carries us forward from land to land with uncommon vivacity, enlivens the 
way with a good humor, a careful obeservation, and treats all peoples with a refresh- 
ing liberality." 

*#* For Sale by all booksellers, or sent, post-paid, tipon receipt of price, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



Now in process of publication, uniform with Epochs of Modern History, *t*ch 
volume in izmo size, and complete in itself. 

^prljs of "Mmm\ JlisfoFg. 

A series of Books narrating the HISTORY OF GREECE AND ROME, and of their 

relations to other Countries at Successive Epochs. Edited by the Rev. G. W. 

COX, M. A, Author of the " Aryan Mythology," " A History of 

Greece," etc., and jointly by CHARLES SANKEY, 

M. A., late Scholar of Queen's College, Oxford. 



Volumes already issued in the " Epochs of Ancient History." Each one volum* 
12mo, cloth, $1.00. 



The GREEKS and the PERSIANS. By the Rev. G. W. Cox, M. A., late Scholar of 
Trinity College, Oxford : Joint Editor of the Series. With four colored Maps. 

The EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE. From the Assassination of Julius Cajsar to the 
Assassination of Domitian. By the Rev. W. Wolfe Capes, M.A., Reader of An- 
cient History in the University of Oxford. With two colored maps. 

The ATHENIAN EMPIRE from the FLIGHT of XERXES to the FALL of 
ATHENS. By the Rev. G. W. Cox, M. A., late Scholar of Trinity College, Oxford : 
Joint Editor of the Series. With five Maps. 

The ROMAN TRIUMVIRATES. By the Very Rev. Charles Merivale, D. D., 
Dean of Ely. 

EARLY ROME, to its Capture by the Gauls. By Wilhelm Ihne, Author of " History 
of Rome." With Map. 

THE AGE OF THE ANTONINES. By the Rev. W. Wolfe Capes, M. A., Reader 
of Ancient History in the University at Oxford. 

The GRACCHI, MARIUS, and SULLA. By A. H. Beesly. With Maps. 

THE RISE OF THE MACEDONIAN EMPHtE. By A. M. Curteis, M. A. i 
vol., i6mo, with maps and plans. 

TROY — Its Legend, History, and Literature, with a sketch of the Topography of the 
Troad. By S. G. W. Benjamin, i vol. i6mo. With a map. 

ROME AND CARTHAGE. By R. Bosworth Smith, M.A. 

The above 10 volumes in Roxburg Style. Sold only in sets. Price, per set, $10.00. 



*** The above books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, post or express charge*, 
/aid, upon receipt of the price by the Publishers, 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York* 



"These volumes contain the ripe results of the studies of men wha 
are authorities in their respective fields."— The Nation. 



€fprl?s of JlBofrrit Jisforg. 

Each 1 vol. 16mo., with Outline Maps. Price per volume, in cloth, $1.00. 
Each Volume complete in itself and sold separately. 



Edited by EDWARD E. MORRIS, M.A. 



The ERA of the PROTESTANT REVOLUTION. By F. Seebohm, Author ol 
" The Oxford Reformers— Colet, Erasmus, More." 

The CRUSADES. By the Rev. G.W.Cox, M.A., Author of the " History of Greece." 

The THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618—1648. By Samuel Rawson Gardiner. 

The HOUSES of LANCASTER and YORK; with the CONQUEST and LOSS 
of FRANCE. By James Gairdner, of the Public Record Office. 

The FRENCH REVOLUTION and FIRST EMPIRE ; an Historical Sketch. 
By Wm. O'Connor Morris, with an Appendix by Hon. Andrew D. White. 

The AGE OF ELIZABETH. By the Rev. M. Creighton, M.A. 

The PURITAN REVOLUTION. By J. Langton Sanford. 

The FALL of the STUARTS; and WESTERN EUROPE from 1678 to 1697. 
By the Rev. Edward Hale, M.A., Assist. Master at Eton. 

The EARLY PLANTAGENETS and their relation to the HISTORY of EUROPE ; 
the foundatiou and growth of CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. By the Rev. 
Wm. Stubbs, M.A., etc., Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford. 

The BEGINNING of the MIDDLE AGES; CHARLES the GREAT and 
ALFRED; the HISTORY of ENGLAND in its connection with that of EUROPE 
in the NINTH CENTURY. By the. Very Rev. R. W. Church, M.A. 

The AGE of ANNE. By Edward E. Morris, M.A., Editor of the Series. 

The NORMANS IN EUROPE. By the Rev. A. H. Johnson, M.A. 

EDWARD III. By the Rev. W. Warburton, M.A. 

FREDERICK the GREAT and the SEVEN YEARS' WAR. By F. W. Longman, 
of Bailie College, Oxford. 

The EPOCH of REFORM, 1830 to 1850. By Justin McCarthy. 

The above 15 volumes in Roxburg Style, Leather Labels and Gilt Top. Put 
up in a handsome Box. Sold only in Sets. Price, per set, $15.00. 



*** The above books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, $ost or exprest 
rkarges J>aid, upon receipt of the price by the publishers, 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York, 



A New Editiofty Library Style. 



S|p Ifisforg of {Romp, 

FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PERIOD OF ITS DECLINE. 

By Dr. THEODOR MOMMSEtf. 

Translated, with the author's sanction and additions, by the Rev. W. P. Dickson, Regius 
Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Glasgow, late Classical Examiner oi 
the University of St. Andrews. With an introduction by Dr. Leonhard Schmitz, and 
a copious Index of the whole four volumes, prepared especially for this edition. 

REPRINTED FROM THE REVISED LONDON EDITION. 
Four Volumes, crown 8vo, gilt top. Price per Set, $8.00. 



Dr. Mommsen has long been known and appreciated through his re- 
searches into the languages, laws, and institutions of Ancient Rome and 
Italy, as the most thoroughly versed scholar now living in these depart- 
ments of historical investigation. To a wonderfully exact and exhaustive 
knowledge of these subjects, he unites great powers of generalization, a 
vigorous, spirited, and exceedingly graphic style and keen analytical pow- 
ers, which give this history a degree of interest and a permanent value 
possessed by no other record of the decline and fall of the Roman Com- 
monwealth. "Dr. Mommsen's work/' as Dr. Schmitz remarks in the 
introduction, " though the production of a man of most profound and ex- 
tensive learning and knowledge of the world, is not as much designed for 
the professional scholar as for intelligent readers of all classes who take 
an interest in the history of by-gone ages, and are inclined there to seek 
information that may guide them safely through the perplexing mazes of 
modern history." 

CRITICAL NOTICES. 

" A work of the very highest merit ; its learning is exact and profound ; its narrative full 
of genius and skill ; its descriptions of men are admirably vivid. We wish to place on 
record our opinion that Dr. Mommsen's is by far the best history of the Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Commonwealth." — London Times. 

" This is the best history of the Roman Republic, taking the work on the whole — the 
author's complete mastery of his subject, the variety of his gifts and acquirements, his 
graphic power in the delineation of national and individual character, and the vivid interest 
which he inspires in every portion of his book. He is without an equal in his own sphere." 
— Edinburgh Review. 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



A New Edition, Library Style, 



S|p Iftslforg of (Jpncp. 

By Prof. Dr. ERNST OUKTIUS. 

Translated by Adolphus William Ward, M. A., Fellow of St. Peter's College, Cam 
bridge, Prof, of History in Owen's College, Manchester. 

UNIFORM WITH MOMMSEN'S HISTORY OF ROME. 
Five volumes, crown 8vo, gilt top. Price per set, $10.00. 



r Curtius's History of Greece is similar in plan and purpose to Mommsen's 
History of Rome, with which it deserves to rank in every respect as one of 
the great masterpieces of historical literature. Avoiding the minute de- 
tails which overburden other similar works, it groups together in a very 
picturesque manner all the important events in the history of this king- 
dom, which has exercised such a wonderful influence upon the world's 
civilization. The narrative of Prof. Curtius's work is flowing and ani- 
mated, and the generalizations, although bold, are philosophical and 
sound. 

CRITICAL NOTICES. 

" Professor Curtius's eminent scholarship is a sufficient guarantee for the trustworthiness 
of his history, while the skill with which he groups his facts, and his effective mode of narrat- 
ing them, combine to render it no less readable than sound. Prof. Curtius everywhere 
maintains the true dignity and impartiality of history, and it is evident his sympathies are 
on the side of justice, humanity, and progress." — London Athenceum. 

" We cannot express our opinion of Dr. Curtius's book better than by saying that it may 
be fitly ranked with Theodor Mommsen's great work." — London Spectator. 

"As an introduction to the study of Grecian history, no previous work is comparable to 
the present for vivacity and picturesque beauty, while in sound learning and accuracy of 
statement it is not inferior to the elaborate productions which enrich the literature of the 
age." — N. Y. Daily Tribune. 

" The History of Greece is treated by Dr. Curtius so broadly and freely in the spirit of 
the nineteenth century, that it becomes in his hands one of the worthiest and most instruct- 
ive branches of study for all who desire something more than a knowledge of isolated facts 
for their education. This translation ought to become a regular part of the accepted course 
of reading for young men at college, and for all who are in training for the free political 
life of our country." — N. Y. Evening Post. 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



LIFE OF 

Lord Lawrence 

BY 

R. BOSWORTH SMITH, M.A., 

LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE ; ASSISTANT MASTER AT HARROW 

SCHOOL. 



With Maps and Portraits, 2 vols,, 8vo, $5,00, 



"As a biography, the work is an inthralling one, rich in 
anecdotes and incidents of Lord Lawrence's tempestuous nature 
and beneficent career that bring into bold relief his strongly- 
marked and almost colossal individuality, and rich also in in- 
stances of his courage, his fortitude, his perseverance, his self- 
control, his magnanimity, and in the details of the splendid 
results of his masterful and masterly policy. . . . We know 
of no work on India to which the reader can refer with so great 
certainty for full and dispassionate information relative to the 
government of the country, the characteristics of its people, and 
the fateful events of the forty eventful years of Lord Lawrence's 
Indian career." — Harper's Magazine. 

"John Lawrence, the name by which the late Viceroy of India 
will always be best known, has been fortunate in his biographer, 
Mr. Bosworth Smith, who is an accomplished writer and a faith- 
ful, unflinching admirer of his hero. He has produced an enter- 
taining as well as a valuable book ; the general reader will 
certainly find it attractive ; the student of recent history will 
discover in its pages matters of deep interest to him." — London 
Daily Telegraph. 

*#* For sale by all booksellers, or sent, post-paid, upon receipt of price, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



AUTHORIZED AMERICAN EDITIONS. 

£mW% Ijjiskriral fflwh* 

THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 

From the Pall of Woolsey to the Death of Elizabeth. 



THE COMPLETE WOKK JJV TWELVE VOLVMES. 



By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A. 



Mr. Froude is a pictorial historian, and his skill in description and full- 
ness of knowledge make his work abound in scenes and passages that are 
almost new to the general reader. We close his pages with unfeigned re- 
gret, and we bid him good speed on his noble mission of exploring the 
sources of English history in one of its most remarkable periods. — Brit- 
ish Quarterly Review. 

THE NEW LIBRARY EDITION-. 

Extra cloth, gilt top, and uniform in general style with the re-issue of 
Mommsen's Rome and Curtius's Greece. Complete in 12 vols. i2mo, 
in a box. Sold only in sets. Price per set, $ 18.00. 
Note. The old Library, Chelsea, and Popular Editions will be discontinued. A few 

sets and single volumes can still be supplied. 



SHORT STUDIES ON GREAT SUBJECTS. 

THE NEW LIBRARY EDITION. Three vols. i2mo. 
Uniform in General Style with the New Library Edi- 
tion of the History of England. Per vol $1.50 



THE ENGLISH IN IRELAND 

During the Eighteenth Century. 
Three vols. i2mo. New Library Edition. Per vol $1.50 



*a* The above books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, post or ex 
fress charges paid, upon receipt of the price by the Publishers, 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



TURKISH LIFE IN WAR TIME. 

By HENRY O. DWIGHT. 



One Volume, 12mo, $1.50. 

Mr. Dwight's familiarity with the languages and manners of the capital, 
and his numerous sources of information from almost all parts of Turkey, 
have enabled him to give a most faithful account of the transactions of the 
war as seen from a Turkish point of view, and also incidentally to put his 
reader in possession of much information respecting the motley races under 
Turkish rule. 

o 

" The work can be especially commended as a graphic, and clear, and never-wearying 
story." — N. Y. Commercial Advertiser. 

"The book fills a place in the literature relating to its subject which, so far as we can 
judge, would be empty without it." — Boston Congregationalist. 

" It is even more charming than a good book of travel ; for the author pictures scenes 
with which he is familiar, and knows the full value of every incident he records." — Cin- 
cinnati Christian Standard. 

"It abounds in stirring incident of most exciting times, graphic descriptions of 
thrilling scenes, and information of importance to statesmen and of great interest to the 
general reader." — N. Y. Observer. 

"A better idea of the Turkish character may be gained through the many anecdotes 
and descriptions of scenes given by the writer, than by the study of any previous history 
with which we are acquainted." — Baptist Weekly. 

" No book yet published covers precisely the same ground, or handles the subject in 
precisely the same way. We find ourselves, in its perusal, lending very much the sort 
of attention to it that we should to the narrative of a friend who had passed through the 
scenes which Mr. Dwight's letters portray." — Syracuse Herald. 

"This book is the most vivid and faithful sketch of Turkish character that we have 
ever seen. . . . It is mainly a series of interesting notes and sketches, giving those 
little details of life and thought from day to day, in a time of great excitement, which 
are so essential in order to gain an accurate knowledge of any people." — The Nation. 

" The book has more than a transient value. It is a contribution to history. The 
author has not only descriptive talent, but a gift for discerning the meaning of the political 
and military manoeuvres, which encompassed Constantinople. While sufficiently inter- 
esting to the general reader, the book is full of information for the student of manners 
and of political affairs." — N. Y. Christian Advocate. 

"It is to us admirable in every sense. It is judicious, discriminating, comprehen- 
sive, impartial, free from animosity in its thorough and candid criticisms; eminently 
clear, vigorous, and animated in expression; tells us just what we wish to know, and 
wastes no time in doing it The book is one to which the reader can sur- 
render himself and simply enjoy." — N. Y. Christian Intelligencer. 

"'Turkish Life in War Time,' does not pretend to be a history of the Russian was, 
but it is a more valuable work than any so-called history we have seen. It is a record* 
the almost daily record, of a very keen observer, who set down the events that he saw, 
and who, from acquaintance with the Orient, understood the bearing of those events. It 
has all the interest of a personal narrative, and all the weight that we accord to an honest 
and well-informed observer. It is to such records of eye-witnesses as these that future 
historians must resort." — Hartford Courant. 



*£* Far sale by all booksellers, or sent, post-paid, upon receipt of 
frice, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New Yorf 



•A twrU of strange power and poetry,"— -N. Y. Woruj 



THE COSSACKS. 



TRANSLATED BY 



EUGENE SCHUYLER, Ph.D., 

From the Russian of Count Tolstoy, 

I vol., small 12mo, cloth, ....... $1.21 



OE-ITICAL NOTICES. 

" The translation is excellent, although the Russian flavor still remains. 
Yet this rather heightens than mars the fascination of the book." 

— Baltimore Gazette. 

4t A story of high merit and well-sustained interest." — Phila. Bulletin. 

*'The Cossacks is a novel likely to please a much wider circle ol 
readers in this country than anything that the more famous novelist 
(Turguenief) has done, than any other Russian novel which has been 
translated, indeed, including even the stories of Pushkin." 

— N. y. Evening Post. 

" The characters are all sketched by a master hand, and the story, 
without being artistically woven, is full of living interest and warmth, and 
we thank Mr. Schuyler for breaking up this new ground, and hope he will 
follow up the lead, for he has whet our appetites for more of this brilliant 
writer's work." — New York Herald. 

"Its interest, besides the interest of the qualities we have mentiened, 
resides in its broad and firm, yet delicate and subtle portraiture ; and apart 
from its novel characteristics, it should be welcome for the acquaintance ii 
enables one to make of the different personages it so admirably sketches." 

— New York World. 

" The story is one that American readers will enjoy, not only because 
it is in many respects a masterpiece of literary work, but also because it 
takes them into scenes entirely new to them, and among characters ai 
strange as the scenes in which they are placed." — New Haven Palladium, 



•** The above book for sale by all booksellers^ or 7vill be sent, post or exf-rsti 
ikorgtt $aia\ upon receipt of the price by the publishers % 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New Yore. 



•A GRilAT SUCCESS." -Pall Mall Gazette 



A. HEW AKD CHEAPEB KDITXOW. 

MR. EUGENE SCHUYLER'S 

TURKISTAN- 

Notes of a Journey in 1873, in the Russian Province of 

Turkistan, the Khanate.* of Khokan and Bukhara, 

and Provinces of Kuldja. 

By EUGENE SCHUYLER, Ph.D., 

formerly Secretary of the American Legation at St. Petersburg, now Consul-Genera 
at Constantinople. 

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. 

From the London, Times. 

" Mr. Schuyler will be ranked among the most accomplished of living traveler*. 
Many parts of his book will be found of interest, even by the most exacting of genera] 
readers ; and, as a whole, it is incomparably the most valuable record of Central Asia 
which has been published in this country." 

From the N. Y. Evening Post. 

"The author's chief aim appears to have been to do all that he says he tried to do, 
and to do greatly more beside — namely, to study everything there was to study in tho 
countries which he visited, and to tell the world all about it in a most interesting way. 
He is, indeed, a model traveler, and he has written a model book of travels, in which 
every line is interesting, and from which nothing that any reader can want to hear about 
has been excluded." 

Mr. Gladstone in the "Contemporary Review." 

"One of the most solid and painstaking works which have been published among us 
in recent years." 

From the New York Times. 

" Its description's of tha country and of the people living in it are always interesting 
and frequently amusing ; but it is easy to see that they have been written by one who is 
not only so thoroughly cosmopolitan as to know intuitively what is worth telling and whai 
had better be omitted, but who is, also, so practiced a writer as to understand precise!) 
l ,ow to set forth what he has to say in the most effective manner." 

From the Atlantic Monthly. 
"Undoubtedly the most thoroughly brilliant and entertaining work 3n Iurkittar 
which has yet been given to the English-speaking world." 

From the Independent. 
"It is fortunate that a record of the sort appears at this time, and doubly fortunate 
that it comes from the hand of so wise, well-informed, and industrious a traveler and 
diplomat" 

From the New York World. 
" Its author has the eye and pen of a journalist, and sees at once what is worr\ 
teeing, and recites his impressions m the most graphic manner." 

Two vols. 8vo. "With three Maps, and numerous Illustrations, 
attractively bound in cloth, price reduced from $7.50 to $5. 

*»* The above book for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, post or expresi 
charges paid, upon receipt of the price by the publishers, 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

743 AND 745 Broadway, New York. 



Army Life in Russia. 

By F. V. GREENE, 

Lieutenant of Engineers, United States Army, 

Late Military Attache to the U. S. Legation in St. Petersburg^ and author oj 
'•''The Russian Army and its Campaigns i?i Turkey i)i 1877-78." 



One Volume, 12mo, .... $1.50. 

Lieutenant Greene's opportunities for general as well as technical 
observation while with the Russian army in Turkey were such as have 
perhaps never fallen to any other student of the war. The story of this 
personal experience is embodied in this volume, which contains most 
vigorous and vivid descriptions of battle scenes, in the chapters on the 
Shipka Pass, Plevna, and in the very strong and excellent chapter on die 
winter campaign across the Balkans with Gourko. The chapters on the 
Tsar and the Russian generals, and the sections devoted to the Russian 
soldier, to St. Petersburg, and the army life of the Russian at home, are of 
absorbing interest. 



"His sketches are excellently well done, graphic, evidently not exaggerated, and 
very readable. It is a book that will be read with pleasure, and one that contains a 
great deal of information." — Hartford Courant. 

"This volume is in every way an admirable picture of army life in Russia. It is 
clear, concise, discriminating, and often very picturesque. The author, besides pos- 
sessing an excellent style, is extremely modest, and there are very few books of travel 
in which the first person is kept so absolutely in the background." — International 
Review. __ 

" Lieutenant Greene writes in a soldierly way, unaffected, straightforward, and 
graphic, and, though he has a keen eye for the picturesque, never sacrifices to rhetoric 
the absolute truthfulness so eminently to be desired in a narrative of this sort. — New 
York World. 

" He was with the Russian army throughout the campaign, enjoying perfect free- 
dom of movement, having every opportunity to visit the points of greatest activity, and 
to see the operations of greatest moment, in company with the officers who conducted 
them. His book is, therefore, for all the purposes of ordinary readers, a complete and 
satisfactory history of the war, founded upon intimate personal knowledge of its events, 
and of its spirit. It is a work of the rarest interest and of unusual merit." — New York 
Evening Post. 

" It is mos< fortunate for the reputation of our country and our army that we had 
such an officer to send to the far-away lnnd of Turkey in Europe, and most creditable to 
our 'War Department that it sent such a man. His book deseves to be universally read, 
and we are sure that no person whom these lines may lead to purchase it will fail to 
rejoice that they have been written. 1 ' — The Nation. 



*#* For sale by all booksellers, or sent, post-paid, upon receipt o) 
^rice, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 



An Inner History of Rtissian Nihilism. 



UNDERGROUND RUSSI 

Revolutionary Profiles and Sketches from Life. 

By Stepniak, formerly Editor of Zemlia i Voila 

(Land and Liberty). With a Preface by 

Peter Lavroff. 



1 Volume, 12mo, - - $1.25. 



The very great importance of this remarkable book has now come t 
be generally recognized. Throughout all Western Europe it has createt 
a most profound impression, and in Russia it marks an epoch in th 
history of Nihilism. How serious and significant is its influence, ma 
be gathered from an extract taken from a long letter devoted to a 
account of the book, written by the St. Petersburg correspondent of th 
New York Sun : 

"At this moment the Russian educated classes have forgotten all about their new! 
crowned autocrat and his manifesto. Their attention is so much concentrated o . 
underground Russia for the time being, it seems as though there were no ovei 
ground Russia. This has been brought about by a wonderful book, UNDER' 
GROUND RUSSIA, by a well-known Nihilist journalist, Stepniak (son of th 
Steppes). The book first appeared in Italian, and on that account the Czar 
ministers were greatly incensed against the Italian government. We hear tha> 
an English edition of the work has appeared in London and New York, and tha 
the book is about to be put into French and German. The number of Russian: 
who know Italian or English is limited, so the Italian book of the Russian authorj 
has been, translated into Russian. Thousands of manuscript copies of UNDER- 
GROUND RUSSIA are now circulated here from hand to hand, far and wideb- 
and by its attempts to seize the book the government has made the forbiddei 
fruit all the sweeter. In short, UNDERGROUND RUSSIA is the all-absorbing; 
topic of the day." 



For sale. by all book-sellers, or sent, post-paid, by the publishers, 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1 

74^ & j 45 Broadway, New-York. 



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